

JPRS-UPA-90-017  
2 APRIL 1990



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

***Political Affairs***

**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3**

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

**19980123 154**

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-017

### CONTENTS

2 April 1990

#### NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Tashkent Gorkom First Secretary Views February CPSU Plenum Results [A. Fazylbekov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 20 Feb 90]	1
Moscow Helsinki Group Urges Law on State of Emergency [XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 10, Oct 89]	2

#### REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Azerbaijan Considers Aid for Meskhetian Turks [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 14 Feb 90]	4
Azerbaijan to Step Up Development in Regions Bordering Armenia [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 16 Feb 90]	4
Azerbaijan Forms State Committee to Aid Refugees [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 22 Feb 90]	5
Kutaisi Gorkom Announces Personnel Changes [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 3 Mar 90]	6
Zugdidi City, Rayon Party Organs United [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 8 Mar 90]	7
65th Anniversary of Turkmen Communist Party Formation Commemorated [B. Chekushin; TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 14 Feb 90]	7
Turkmen Presidium Discusses Organizational Changes, Laws [TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 22 Feb 90]	9
Pulatov's Criticism of Uzbek Election Procedures Scored [L. Kabirow; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 27 Jan 90]	9
Official Faults Aspects of Uzbek Election Campaign [M. Teshabayev; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 28 Jan 90]	11
Uzbek Election Commission Details Voting Statistics [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 22 Feb 90]	13
Bureaucratic Impetus Behind Reinstitution of Uzbek SSR's Dzhizak Oblast [O. Nikolayev; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 6 Mar 90]	13
Uzbek Supreme Soviet 10 Feb Ukase on Penalties for Disturbing Public Order [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 11 Feb 90]	14
Uzbek Supreme Soviet 21 Feb Ukase on Temporary Prohibition of Demonstrations [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 22 Feb 90]	15

#### NATIONALITY ISSUES

Maj Gen Surkov Details Personal Role in Transcaucasus Crisis Chronology [M. Surkov; KOMSOMOLETS, 22 Feb 90]	16
Conference of Political Parties Held in Georgia [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 23 Jan 90]	20
CPSU Not Represented at Georgian Conference [I. Inoveli; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 23 Jan 90]	21
Georgian People's Front Member Evaluates Conference [M. Mamardashvili; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 28 Jan 90]	21
Dialogue on Georgian-Ossetian Situation [G. Tedeyev; KOMUNISTI, 10 Dec 89]	23
Spokesmen For Two Georgian Parties Interviewed [I. Melashvili et al; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 21 Dec 89]	24
Georgians Deputies Chided for 'Silence' at Second USSR Congress [I. Inashvili; KOMUNISTI, 22 Dec 89]	26
Georgian People's Front Chairman Interviewed [N. Natadze; KOMUNISTI, 22 Dec 89]	27
'Rumors' of Adjarian Separatism Criticized, Discounted [T. Putkaradze; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 26 Dec 89]	29
Abkhazian Group of Georgian People's Front Has Own Paper [K. Sadgobelashvili; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 4 Jan 90]	30
Georgian Refugees From Ossetia Recount Atrocities [A. Aslanishvili; KOMUNISTI, 5 Jan 90]	30
Tbilisi Demonstrations, Transport Strike Reported [G. Basharuli et al; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 11 Jan 90]	32
Society Formed To Promote Order in Georgian Ossetia [G. Sharadze; LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO No 2, 12 Jan 90]	32

Georgian National-Democratic Party Demonstrators Report Gains [G. Basharuli et al; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 13 Jan 90] .....	33
Investigation of Georgian Ethnic Clashes Continues [N. Shoshiashvili et al; KOMUNISTI, 16 Jan 90] .....	34
Georgians Urged To Vote Against Entrenched, Discredited Officials [AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 18 Jan 90] .....	35
Georgia's Armenians Urge Countrymen to Show Restraint [AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 20 Jan 90] .....	35
Tbilisi Demonstrations Ended, 'New Stage Begins' [G. Basharuli et al; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 23 Jan 90] .....	35
Georgian 'Political Club' States Demands Regarding Ossetia [AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 23 Jan 90] .....	36
Commission Member Details Uzbek Language Law Implementation Progress [N. Mirkurbanov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 13 Feb 90] .....	36

## MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Media Experts Discuss Draft Press Law [SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 17 Feb 90] .....	39
Chairman on State Press Committee Changes [N. Yefimov; PRAVITELSTVENNIY VESTNIK No 5, Jan 90] .....	44
Newsprint Deficit Causes Chronicled [P. Nikitin; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 18 Mar 90] .....	46

## HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Soviet Central Asian History Tied to State Federative Concepts [A. Agzamkhodzhaev; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 26 Jan 90] .....	49
1921 Treaty On Independent Nakhchivan Highlighted [S. Sadygov; AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI, 17 Nov 89] .....	50
Ossetian Separatism Linked to 1925 Plan [I. Putkaradze; KOMUNISTI, 13 Dec 89] .....	53
Roundtable on Preparation For New Edition of Kazakh Party History [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Jan 90] .....	57

## SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Special Treatment for Privileged Elite at 'Kremlin Hospital' [A. Nadzharov; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 11 Feb 90] .....	64
Failure of Anti-Alcohol Campaign Detailed [S. Shevchenko; SOYUZ No 6, 5-11 Feb 90] .....	67
Narcotics Center Head Interviewed [A. Zakhidoviy; KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA, 14 Feb 90] .....	69
Uzbek Health Facilities, Problems Examined [P. Menlikulov; SELSKAYA PRAVDA, 20 Feb 90] .....	70
High Infant Mortality in Tajikistan [Yu. Lapin; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 26 Jan 90] .....	72
Tajik People's Control Committee on Medicine Shortage [M. Rakhmat-Zade; KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 3 Jan 90] .....	73
Karakalpak ASSR Leper Hospital Conditions Described [I. Nigay; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 13 Feb 90] .....	76
Uzbekistan's Plan for Restoration of Navruz Holiday Outlined [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 26 Jan 90] .....	77
Study Provides Data on Armenian Komsomol Composition, Attitudes [G. Sayamov; KOMSOMOLETS, 6 Feb 89] .....	78
Project Underway to Translate Koran Into Modern Uzbek [I. Abdullayev; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 13 Feb 90] .....	81
Rostropovich, Wife Hold Press Conference [M. Rostropovich; ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 7, 17-23 Feb 90] .....	82
Zalygin on NOVY MIR Position in Current Literary Polemics [S. Zalygin; PRAVDA, 10 Feb 90] .....	83
USSR's 'Refugee' Problems Detailed [V. Buynovskiy; PRAVDA, 10 Feb 90] .....	87
Interethnic Marriages Compared by Republic [M. Tolts; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 3 Feb 90] .....	88
Georgian Census, Nationality Figures Reported [T. Ratiani; KOMUNISTI, 13 Jan 90] .....	89
Review of Collection of Articles, Book on Informal Youth Groups .....	91
Tendencies of the Development of Informal Youth Organizations	
[I. A. Vinokurova; OSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1—PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNIY ZHURNAL) No 6, Dec 89] .....	91
Youth Associations: Real and Imagined Problems	
[I. A. Vinokurova; OSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1—PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNIY ZHURNAL) No 6, Dec 89] .....	96

**Tashkent Gorkom First Secretary Views February CPSU Plenum Results**

90US0652A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
20 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with A. I. Fazylbekov by L. Levin and S. Fenyutin, under the rubric "The Participants of the CPSU Central Committee Speak": "While Engaging in Policy, Don't Forget the Work"]

[Text] The recent February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the published draft of the CPSU Central Committee's Platform to the 28th party congress are continuing to hold the close attention of millions of Soviet citizens. What is awaiting us tomorrow? What will our society be like? Unfortunately, these by no means simple, but vitally important, questions have failed to a large extent to receive their final resolution.

So, what is supposed to replace the present social pessimism and uncertainty? Are there any paths for the rapid and radical way out of the crisis? UzTAG correspondents L. Leven and S. Fenyutin discussed these matters with A. I. Fazylbekov, participant at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and first secretary of the party's Tashkent Gorkom.

[Interviewer] Atkhambek Ibragimovich, we are living in a very complicated time. There has been an aggravation of the interethnic conflicts, and in a number of regions of our country informal organizations and people's fronts and movements of various persuasions are gaining strength. There was a thorough discussion of this at the Central Committee Plenum. How do you evaluate this work? Because the very fact that the two days originally planned were obviously not long enough to work out decision...

[A. Fazylbekov] The recent Central Committee Plenum cannot be put into the category of traditional ones. And the interest that the Communists and the overwhelming majority of the Soviet nation have shown to it is justified. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the questions put on the agenda are disturbing everyone today. In principle, many of them have been resolved. The very situation of openness, the polarity of opinions, and the sharpness of the judgments completely correspond to the requirements of democracy. So the principles that were brought forth at the initial stage of perestroika completely found their reflection in the work of that forum.

The most important thing, in my opinion, that was confirmed by the Central Committee Plenum is the fact that the party sees its main goal in improving people's lives. The questions that became the paramount ones are the questions of the observance of social justice and of improving people's living and working conditions. This, in the final analysis, is what determines the progress of society.

There was serious and thorough discussion of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. The party does not need any privileges. It will compete for its leading role in society with various public organizations and, in the future, possibly, also with other parties.

Today it is necessary to evaluate the situation soberly, to take a realistic view of the essence of the problems. At the present-day stage, other than the CPSU, there is no other force that can bring society out of the crisis. Because no one has yet submitted a well-argued, viable strategic program for the country's socioeconomic recovery.

[Interviewer] At the Plenum, a number of statements included mentions of the low effectiveness of the work performed by the February forum, and about its boring pretentiousness. What can you see in this regard?

[A. Fazylbekov] I can understand the unease felt by that category of speakers. Our country's sociopolitical and economic recovery is encountering along its path a large number of complexities, and the anti-perestroika forces are making themselves known with increasing strength. But let us evaluate the situation soberly. Take, for example, the government's economic program. Everyone remembers the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies, at which that program was accepted. Yes, people have made many complaints about it. But nevertheless no one could submit a worthy alternative document. The times for petty carping have passed. People want to see graphically and to sense the changes. Therefore, the purposefulness of the union government's program, its aim of creating cost-accountable mechanisms, will yield the expected result. This is very important both for Uzbekistan and for its capital. People must be completely aware of what is awaiting them tomorrow, and what they will have.

[Interviewer] In what respects were your expectations not justified?

[A. Fazylbekov] I could not get rid of the feeling of a certain amount of hastiness in the preparation of the Plenum. The prospects for the development of the party were not defined with sufficient clarity. This, of course, reduced the effectiveness of the forum.

[Interviewer] What is your attitude toward the recommendation concerning the creation of a Russian Communist Party? What is your attitude toward the schism that has occurred in the Lithuanian Communist Party?

[A. Fazylbekov] The creation of the Russian Communist Party is a matter for the Communists of Russia. In March-April, at their party conference, they will make the final decision. But this is my personal point of view: there is no need to do this. Because that could lead to a schism in the CPSU, and it could aggravate the already tense situation in a number of regions in the country. Understandably, it was proceeding from this feeling that I voted for the Plenum decision that censured the schism



in the Lithuanian Communist Party. Essentially speaking, what has arisen there is two parties, standing on different platforms.

[Interviewer] You are the leader of the detachment of many thousands of Communists of different nationalities in the city of Tashkent. What do you consider to be the most important thing in your activities?

[A. Fazylbekov] It is hard to give a simple answer to that question. To a large extent, Tashkent is a unique city. For decades representatives of a hundred nationalities have lived and worked side by side here. Friendship, complete mutual understanding, and trust among them always distinguished our city. Therefore I consider the preservation of this unity to be one of our basic tasks.

The party has been repeatedly subjected to criticism for its excessive tendentiousness. At the present time the situation is changing fundamentally. Take, for example, Tashkent and the socioeconomic program for its long-term development. First of all, that program stipulates the elimination of that disproportion that formed in recent years in developing the country's major centers. Secondly, the rayons in the old part of the city that had formed historically will receive a second life. Thirdly, and this is very important, the program was worked out a year before the beginning of the next five-year plan. A definite reserve has been created, and that reserve must be used with the maximum effectiveness. This includes the concluding of contracts for materials and equipment; the organizing of new jobs; and the orientation on the sharp increase in production of mass-demand consumer goods. According to specialists, this program is capable of improving people's lives and of saturating the market with commodities. But with one important proviso. The political participation of the masses is a typical feature of democracy. However, one has observed those processes in which people, fascinated by it, have forgotten the basic thing—the work. It is possible to create and develop excellent drafts for the recovery of the economy, but they will remain only drafts unless people work strenuously.

[Interviewer] Important decisions have been made in the country to divide the functions of the party and the congresses. There have been elections of UzSSR people's deputies to the local soviets. The persons who have been chosen by the people will also include Communists. What would you want them to do?

[A. Fazylbekov] I shall discuss the city soviet. It will be necessary for the people's deputies to decide a large number of problems. The most important one is that they share the vital concerns of their constituents, they must work to improve their working and everyday living conditions, and to reinforce the friendship and mutual understanding among representatives of various nationalities. They must take needy families under their special supervision. I can assure you that the entire apparatus of the city's party committee will help the elected representatives of the people in all their good undertakings.

### Moscow Helsinki Group Urges Law on State of Emergency

18000112A Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE  
in English No 10, Oct 89 pp 18-21

[Article by members of the Moscow Helsinki Group: "Time to Get Ready for Democracy"]

[Text] The situation in the country today is causing anxiety among all who hope for democratic changes in our life.

General strikes by miners, bloody clashes in Georgia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, continuing confrontation in Nagorny Karabakh, strikes and the aggravation of contradictions in the Baltic Republics, widely expressed discontent in the Ukraine, Moldavia and in other regions of the country, all attest to the present threat to the stability of the Soviet state and society. Add to this the profound economic crisis, the shortage of some basic foodstuffs, the disastrous rate of inflation, and we see how explosive the public and political situation in the country is. It seems that everyone—from the head of state to participants in meetings and demonstrations—sees the danger of explosion. Deputies speak about this danger from the rostrum of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The mass media too have now begun introducing in their usual vocabulary such notions as "state of emergency" and even "civil war"...

The danger is real. And if, thank God, so far there are no direct reasons to talk about a civil war, state of emergency—without clear-cut regulation or accurately defined aims and limits—is the everyday reality in Nagorny Karabakh, Ferghana, a number of cities and populated areas of the country... It is clear that only immediate further development of the democratic social mechanism can lead the country out of its general crisis. But today nobody will give any guarantees that no aggravation of the crisis will occur before the democratic mechanism is set up and starts operating at full strength. Meanwhile, the aggravation of the crisis may entail a terrible threat of a public chaos, particularly dreadful in our nuclear age. Such a threat, in its turn, may give rise to a temptation to establish the power of a "strong hand," a military dictatorship.

The establishment of a military dictatorship would throw back for years, if not for decades, democratic reforms in our country.

However, even if the crisis is aggravated and even if it becomes necessary to declare a state of emergency in the country (such a need may arise objectively), it is not at all obligatory to stop the democratic process. It is necessary to prepare conscientiously for the danger of an aggravation of the crisis. In a state of emergency it is necessary for the government to prepare well in advance democratic legal rules which would make it possible, under any development of events in the country, to preserve the democratic trend of reforms and the determining

role of state and public democratic institutions already established and in the process of being set up.

The creation of a democratic legal basis for government actions in a state of emergency calls for a considered and detailed elaboration of corresponding legislation (including necessary changes of the USSR Constitution), and wide-scale and democratic discussion of the problem. This work must start immediately.

We suggest that the USSR Supreme Soviet urgently formulate and adopt a law "On the State of Emergency"—maybe in the form of the Fundamentals of Soviet legislation.

We believe that these principles must be based on international legal conventions and world practice, and must include the following:

1. A state of emergency on the whole or a part of the country's territory may be imposed only in a crisis situation affecting all the population of that territory and threatening the organized existence of community life which is the basis of the state.
2. A state of emergency may be justified only in order to bring the country back to a normal democratic development and, therefore, must be strictly and definitely limited in time.
3. The powers of imposing a state of emergency, the procedure of taking such a decision, as well as the permissible limits of the authority of the executive power must be strictly outlined by the law. Nothing in the legislation on a state of emergency can be allowed to undermine the legal system, domestic and international. There must be legislative measures directly banning changes in the Constitution in a state of emergency, and the unjustified and illegitimate prolongation of such a state.

Under all circumstances the national sovereignty of republics must be legally assured.

Urgent legislation must include at least the following principles recognized in the world community:

- a) the principle of declaring the state of emergency—in all places, following legal procedures by an authorized official body;
- b) the principle of notifying other states in a manner and in good time;
- c) the principle of exceptional threat originating from the inevitability of the crisis which endangers the existence of society, a crisis which cannot be prevented with peacetime measures;
- d) the principle of proportionality in applying measures or the suspension of rights and freedoms when the crisis situation becomes dangerous, so that the limitations do not exceed the strict bounds that the current situation calls for;
- e) the principle of nondiscrimination, which demands that the restriction of rights under a state of emergency must not entail discrimination on the basis of race, colour, nationality, sex, language, religion or social origin;
- f) the principle of inviolability of basic rights, such as the right to live, freedom from use of torture, slavery and the retroactive application of criminal proceedings, the right to protest subjectiveness of laws, the right to freedom of conscience and religion, family rights, the rights of children, the right to citizenship, and to participating in the life of the state.

The draft Fundamentals of the Legislation on the State of Emergency, prepared by a special commission of the Supreme Soviet, shall be subject to a nationwide discussion, and the Law on Fundamentals adopted by the Supreme Soviet—shall be approved at the Congress of People's Deputies.

Members of the Moscow Helsinki group:

Larisa Bogoraz, Yuri Orlov, Sergei Kovalev, Vyacheslav Bakhmin, Alexei Smirnov, Lev Timofeyev, Boris Zolotukhin

**Azerbaijan Considers Aid for Meskhetian Turks***90US0644A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
14 Feb 90 p 3*

[Azerinform report: "Showing Genuine Concern: Conference at the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Approximately a year has passed since, as a result of the well-known events, thousands of Meskhetian Turks, having left their homes in Uzbekistan, arrived in our republic. Today there are located in Azerbaijan approximately 30,000 resettled individuals—more than 5300 families—and this process is still continuing. The largest number of Meskhetian Turks are located in Saatlinskiy, Sabirabadskiy, Kazakhskiy, Kubinskiy, Khachmasskiy, She-makhinskiy, an Akhsuinskiy rayons. Living conditions have been found for more than 750 families, and 400 of them have had plots of land allocated to them. However, many refugee families are still living in tents, in old half-ruined homes, and administrative and other adapted buildings.

Does the republic have any opportunity to resettle the Meskhetians, to provide them with everything they require, to create new jobs for the adults, and to build new kindergartens and schools? It is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the republic-level and local agencies will have to resolve serious tasks to provide living conditions for the 165,000 refugees from Armenia, and the fact that a rather large number of acute social questions have accumulated in the republic itself... In the light of these problems there was a discussion at a conference at Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers with the participation of representatives of the Meskhetian Turks who had resettled from the cities and rayons where they had been located. The participants included administrators of republic ministries and departments, and chairmen of the ispolkoms of city and rayon soviets of people's deputies.

The conference was opened by G. A. Gasanov, chairman of Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers.

We are ready, he said, to render all kinds of moral and material support to all the Meskhetian Turks who want to remain forever in our republic, and we must do everything to assure that they become completely equal citizens and that the persons who are being resettled from Uzbekistan, like the refugees from Armenia, can live and work normally on Azerbaijan soil. This is an important task that is confronting all the party, soviet, and economic agencies, ministries and departments, and public organizations. Attaching exceptionally great importance to finding housing for the refugees and providing for their living conditions, the republic's government intends to keep this question under constant supervision. A special program is being worked out, to provide for the comprehensive resolution of all the problems linked with the creation of the necessary living, everyday, and working conditions for the refugees.

Taking into consideration the firm decision of the Meskhetian Turks to remain in Azerbaijan as permanent

residents, those who spoke at the conference emphasized, it will be necessary within the near future to resolve a number of first-priority questions. First of all, it is necessary to carry out a questionnaire among absolutely all the refugees, to ascertain the number of able-bodied individuals, and to determine the places where they have settled. It was noted that the rayons where the Meskhetian Turks have settled and where there are no conditions to enable them to establish a new life will require assistance from the republic agencies, including aid in allocating plots of land and bank credit for the purpose of carrying out individual housing construction, in creating new inhabited places and farms and additional jobs, and in finding jobs for the refugees.

The necessary assignments have been given in this regard to Gosplan, Gossnab, Ministry of Finance, Azerittifak, Gosagroprom, Ministry of Trade, Gosbank, State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, and other republic ministries and departments.

It was noted at the conference that, without the self-interested support provided by the central agencies, it will be very complicated to resolve the questions of creating new living conditions for the refugees in our republic. Therefore, Azerbaijan SSR Gosplan, Minfin [Ministry of Finance], and Gossnab have been instructed to consider and resolve these questions in union-level organizations.

The representatives of the Meskhetian Turks who spoke at the conference expressed their gratitude to the Azerbaijani nation and to the republic government for their hospitality and warm participation in the fate of the refugees, and they emphasized that the Meskhetian Turks who are located in the republic are ready to share the difficulties that have become the lot of the people of Azerbaijan and, together with them, they will participate in stabilizing the situation and will do everything to assure that every inhabitant of the republic can live and work in peace.

The participants in the work of the conference included M. I. Abdullayev, deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers, and chairman of Azerbaijan SSR Agroprom; and F. R. Mustafayev, deputy chairman of Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, and chairman of the State Committee for Work With Persons Who Were Forced to Leave the Places of Permanent Residence.

**Azerbaijan to Step Up Development in Regions Bordering Armenia***90US0644B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
16 Feb 90 p 1*

[Azerinform report: "Meetings at Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] What must be done to assure that, in the villages in the rayons adjacent to Armenian SSR, cultural services to the population are conducted on the proper level and the questions of instructing and educating the children are resolved successfully? How do we overcome the backwardness in these spheres? Those were the topics of

discussion in a thoroughgoing discussion in meetings at Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers with administrators of public education and culture from Dashkesanskiy, Zayagelanskiy, Kazakhskiy, Kedabekskiy, Kelbadzharskiy, Kubatliński, Lachinskiy, Tauzskiy, and Khanlarskiy rayons. Participants listened to an informational report given by Azerbaijan SSR Minister of Public Education R. B. Feyzullayev, and Azerbaijan SSR Minister of Culture P. Byul-Byul ogly.

Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers Chairman G. A. Gasanov spoke at the meetings.

In the concept of the republic's socioeconomic development that is being worked out by Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, it was noted at the meetings, an important place is given to the program of normalizing the situation in the rayons that border on Armenian SSR. The Council of Ministers owes a large debt to the inhabitants of those places. For a long time the questions of the socioeconomic development of the villages, primarily the mountain villages, have been resolved unsatisfactorily. The situation that has developed had a detrimental effect on the demographic situation: the people, and especially the young people, were forced to leave the places of their permanent residence. A population exodus was in progress.

An unfavorable situation developed in the area of public education, where there was an accumulation of many problems that were linked with the reinforcement of the material-technical base of the schools and the preschool institutions, and with the providing of them with pedagogical cadres. Many schools are housed in poorly adapted buildings. Frequently the shortage of pedagogical cadres occurs because the school instructors and the teachers at children's preschool institutions are not provided with housing and the normal everyday living conditions are not created for them.

The situation is no better in the area of providing cultural services to the rural population. Many villages lack club houses and libraries, and those that do exist are situated in old accommodations that have not been repaired for a long time. So it happens that the questions of people's cultured recreational activities and their education remain outside the field of vision of the local cultural agencies.

A number of questions linked with the reinforcement of the material-technical base of public education and culture were concretely resolved at the meetings. Azerbaijan SSR Gosplan and Gosagroprom, and Ministry of Finance were given instructions to develop those branches.

Ministry of Public Education was allocated motor transportation for the schools. Additional financing was planned for repairing the school accommodations. Prefabricated-slab buildings are being allocated, in order to house preschool institutions. At the same time, measures are planned to create kindergartens at home. Special attention will be devoted to questions pertaining to the pedagogical

cadres. On the basis of requests from the rayon agencies of public education, the republic's institutions of higher learning will begin training teachers in specific specialties. Simultaneously it is planned to improve the social and everyday living conditions for pedagogical cadres in rural areas. Minnarobraz [Ministry of Public Education], jointly with the rayon agencies, has been instructed to prepare a two-year program for developing public education in the villages in the border rayons.

In large-sized villages it is planned to be cultural-educational centers—club houses and libraries. They will be constructed by Gosagroprom, as well as the local soviets. A number of facilities will have to undergo major repair. The material-technical base of the cultural institutions will be reinforced: the rayons are being allocated motor-vehicle clubs and mobile motion-picture equipment, and video libraries are being opened up. The attention of the administrators of the cultural agencies was drawn to the experience of Kasum-Ismailovskiy Rayon. There, by way of an experiment, a rayon cultural association is functioning on principles of cost accountability. This has made it possible within a comparatively short period of time to build a number of rural club houses and libraries and to improve the workers' working and everyday living conditions and their material support.

Much will have to be done, the speakers at the meetings emphasized, by the local soviets in the area of developing public education and culture in the rural areas. The local soviets must keep these questions constantly in the center of their attention. Specific instructions were also given to a number of ministries and departments.

The example of Lachinskiy Rayon was mentioned at the meetings. Until recently it had a population of 49,000 persons, but currently the population has reached 53,000. Moreover, this did not occur by having an influx of refugees. Demonstrating a sense of patriotism, the persons who had left the rayon returned to their hometowns. The rayon agencies of authority are paying attention to the socioeconomic development of the villages and to the creation of the necessary conditions for their inhabitants. However, in the future this work must be conducted in an even more intensive manner, so that the people who have returned here can be firmly established on this land.

#### **Azerbaijan Forms State Committee to Aid Refugees**

90US0644C Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
22 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In the Azeri SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers has enacted a decree confirming the statute concerning the formation by the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee for Work With Persons Who Were Forced to Leave the Places of Their Permanent Residence.



The State Committee considers and resolves all the problems linked with the acceptance, housing, and providing of living conditions and jobs for persons who were forced to leave the places of their permanent residence, and with the construction of housing and social, cultural, and personal-services facilities for them, as well as other questions pertaining to this segment of the population, and coordinates the actions taken in this direction by soviet and economic agencies and byministries and departments.

The State Committee is headed by a chairman, who is simultaneously the deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers. The chairman has three deputies, one of whom is the first deputy.

The makeup of the State Committee includes a committee, as well as a seven-person board consisting of the State Committee chairman (chairman of the board; the State Committee deputy chairmen; and other managerial workers in the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee system.

There has been an increase in the number of workers at the ispolkom of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies in order to add to their tables of organization the duties of instructor for working with persons who were forced to leave the places of their permanent residence.

It has been recommended to the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Finance that it allocate, by drawing on the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers reserve fund, to the newly created State Committee the budgetary appropriations necessary to maintain its apparatus, and to the ispolkoms of the city and rayon soviets of people's deputies a corresponding wage fund with budgetary appropriations to maintain the additional billets.

The Azerbaijan SSR State Committee for Work With Persons Who Were Forced to Leave the Places of Their Permanent Residence is required, jointly with Azerbaijan SSR Gosagropom and Gosplan, to prepare and, within one month's time, to submit to the republic's Council of Ministers recommendations with regard to a list of contractual construction-and-installation organizations, enterprises in the building-materials industry and the construction industry, transportation, and mechanization which would be desirable to transfer from the Gosagroprom system and other organizations to be under the jurisdiction of the newly formed State Committee, with a definition of the volume and structure of the operations to be fulfilled by them. In the organizations of the State Committee there must be a concentration, as a rule, of the construction of production capacities and projects, apartment buildings, and projects in the social sphere, as well as other structures in places of dense population by persons who were forced to leave the places of their permanent residence.

Gosagroprom and the republic's construction organizations will be required, within the shortest periods of time, to complete the settlements for fulfilled operations with the organizations and enterprises to be transferred

to the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee for Work With Persons Who Were Forced to Leave the Places of Their Permanent Residence.

By decree of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, the republic's Gosplan and Ministry of Finance have been instructed to introduce the appropriate changes into the state plan for the economic and social development of the Azerbaijan SSR and the republic's budget for 1990; the Azerbaijan SSR State Committee For Work With Persons Who Were Forced to Leave the Places of Their Permanent Residence and the republic's Ministry of Justice, jointly with Gosplan, Ministry of Finance, and other interested Azerbaijan SSR ministries and departments, have been instructed to prepare and submit to the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers recommendations concerning the introduction of the necessary changes into the republic's legislation.

The Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers has enacted a decree entitled "The Creation of a Regional-History Museum in the City of Kazi-Magomed," in conformity with which the ispolkom of the Ali-Bayramly City soviet of people's deputies has been instructed to carry out the financing of the museum, and the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Culture, after coordination with the republic's Minfin [Ministry of Finance], has been instructed to consider and confirm its table of organization.

The museum has been provided with the appropriate facilities and necessary equipment. A large number of displays have been collected, including documents, photographs, books, certificates, decorations, and medals issued to famous people in the city, and samples of utensils that were found during archeological excavations. All this will promote the further education of the youth.

The Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers also enacted an order authorizing the republic's Ministry of Culture to create in Pushkinskiy Rayon the picture gallery that previously existed on public principles.

This picture gallery has been called upon to play an important role in the spiritual education of the workers of Pushkinskiy Rayon. It will make it possible to organize exhibitions of works created by folk artists, exhibitions of applied folk art, children's drawings, and works of amateur painters in the rayon and famous painters from the entire republic.

#### **Kutaisi Gorkom Announces Personnel Changes**

90US0724A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
3 Mar 90 p 1

[GRUZINFORM report: "The Plenum of the Kutaisi Party Gorkom"]

[Text] A plenum of the Kutaisi city committee of the Georgian Communist Party which considered an organizational issue took place on 1 March.

The plenum released from his duties as first secretary and buro member of the Kutaisi party gorkom G.S. Abzianidze, due to the state of his health.

On the eve of the plenum, 27-28 February, there took place in 76 primary and shop party organizations open party meetings, in whose work participated approximately 20,000 communists and non-party members. There also took place sessions of scientific councils of higher educational institutions, and meetings of representatives of the creative intelligentsia of Kutaisi, whodiscussed the likely candidacies for the post of first secretary of the Kutaisi city party committee. The majority of the meeting participants named as a candidate to the position of gorkom first secretary T.G. Shashiashvili, ispolkom chairman of the Kutaisi city soviet of people's deputies. In addition, 20 more candidacies were named in various collectives of the city.

The Kutaisi city party committee discussed the candidacies named by the labor collectives, and by secret ballot elected T.G. Shashiashvili first secretary of the Kutaisi gorkom of the Georgian Communist Party.

G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, addressed the plenum.

N.R. Sadzhaya, department head of the Georgian CP Central Committee department of party organization and cadre work, participated in the work of the plenum.

#### **Zugdidi City, Rayon Party Organs United**

90US0724C Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
8 Mar 90 p 3

[GRUZINFORM report: "The United Plenum of the Zugdidi Party Gorkom and Raykom"]

[Text] The Georgian CP Central Committee Buro adopted a decision on the unification of the Zugdidi city and rayon organizations of the Georgian Communist Party and the creation of the Zugdidi city party organization on their basis.

By the decision of this buro, it was determined that until a party conference of the united organization in conducted, the united plenum of the Zugdidi city and rayon committees is to be considered the leading party organization.

A united plenum of these organizations took place which considered organizational issues.

The plenum participants considered three candidacies for the position of Zugdidi party gorkom first secretary.

As a result of secret balloting, G.I. Gunava, who had worked as first secretary of the Abashskiy Rayon committee of the Georgian Communist Party, was elected first secretary and buro member of the Zugdidi party gorkom.

N.A. Chitanava, Georgian CP Central Committee Buro member and chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, addressed the plenum.

#### **65th Anniversary of Turkmen Communist Party Formation Commemorated**

90US0646A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 14 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by B. Chekushin, senior scientific associate, TF [Turkmen Branch] IML [Institute of Marxism-Leninism], under CPSU Central Committee, candidate of historical sciences, under rubric "65th Anniversary of the Formation of Turkmen CP": "The Workers' Combat Vanguard"]

[Text] For 65 years the Turkmen Communist Party has been part of the CPSU. The common goals also defined the common path of development. And this occurred soon after the national demarcation of the Central Asian republics and the creation of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.

The first step in the organizational formulation of the Turkmen Communist Party was the creation of a single governing party agency. First it was the Turkmen National Buro, which had party and state functions. Then, on 13 October 1924 the Orgburo of RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (bolshevik)] Central Committee approved the makeup of the Party Buro of the Turkmen Communist Party, which makeup was represented by the Turkmen National Buro. The persons confirmed as secretaries of the party buro were I. Mezhlauk and Kh. Sakhatmuradov; and as members, N. Aytakov, K. Atabayev, K. Kuliyeu, N. Paskutskiy, etc. That decision by the Orgburo of RKP(b) Central Committee laid the beginning for the existence of the Organizational Buro of the Turkmen Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [KP(b)T], which played an important role in the party-organizational construction of the Turkmen KP(b) during the period of its creation.

The first-priority task of the Turkmen KP(b) Orgburo in the area of party construction was the unification of the party organization of Turkmen (previously Trans-Caspian) Oblast of Turkmen ASSR and the Turkmen rayons of Bukhara and Khorezm SSR's within the confines of the single Turkmen Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and its ideological-organizational reinforcement. The carrying out of this task occurred in a difficult situation that was influenced by Turkmenistan's economic and cultural backwardness and by the overall weakness of the party organizations.

Early in 1925 the Turkmen KP(b) prepared the convening of the 1st Constituent Congress of the Turkmen KP(b). Conferences of local party organizations—rayon, city, and okrug—were conducted, where the participants discussed the immediate tasks of party work and questions of soviet-economic and cultural construction. The persons who were elected to make up the party committees were the best-trained and most active members of



the party organizations, such as T. M. Orazov, F. L. Fomkin, I. R. Mylnikov, M. P. Atashev, etc. The okrug party conferences held from 7 January through 2 February 1925 also elected delegates to the 1st Congress of the Turkmen Communist Party, which was held in Poltoratsk, the capital of Turkmen SSR from 14 through 19 February 1925 simultaneously with the All-Turkmen Congress of Soviets. By the time that the congress convened, the Turkmen party organization had in its ranks 5240 Communists, a large number of whom were party candidate members. They were all united into 194 party cells. The organization included five okrug party committees, 21 rayon party committees, and one city party committee. Two hundred forty-three delegates took part in the work of the congress. One-third of the delegates were Turkmens and representatives of other Eastern nationalities.

The congress delegates honored the memory of V. I. Lenin by rising.

The 1st TKP(b) Congress listened to and discussed a broad range of questions pertaining to party, soviet, economic, and cultural construction and passed extended decisions dealing with them. Those decisions defined the basic tasks of the Turkmen Communist Party in the area of party-organizational construction, the struggle to consolidate Soviet authority, the restoration and development of the national economy, and the building of socialism.

The congress elected the governing agencies of the Turkmen KP(b): the Turkmen KP(b) Central Committee, the Turkmen KP(b) TsKK [Central Control Commission], and the auditing commission. The first plenum of the Turkmen KP(b) occurred on 20 February 1925. It elected the following executive agencies: the Turkmen KP(b) Ispolburo and Central Committee Secretariat. I. Mezhlauk and Kh. Sakhatmuradov were approved as secretaries of Turkmen KP(b).

The 1st Turkmen KP(b) Congress completed the organizational formulation of the Turkmen KP(b) as an inseparable component of RKP(b). Its decisions were a combat program in the struggle waged by the republic's party organizations for the ideological-organizational reinforcement of its ranks, and for the socialist transformation of Turkmenistan.

Turkmenistan, like the other republics of the Soviet East, took the path of construction, bypassing capitalism. The Turkmen Communist Party creatively and flexibly applied the basic principles of Leninist strategy and tactics in the specific, at time unique, local conditions. It was constantly guided by V. I. Lenin's instruction to the effect that the Communists of the Soviet East "understood the uniqueness of their situation, the situation of their republics, unlike the situations and conditions of the RSFSR, and understood the necessity not to copy our tactics, but, in a well thought-out manner, to modify them as applicable to the difference in the specific conditions."

The fact that, simultaneously with the rest of the country, the previously backward nations made the changeover to socialism while bypassing the torturous stage of capitalist development was a tremendous achievement of the Leninist national policy. The giant leap forward by Turkmenistan and the other republics in the Soviet East from the Middle Ages to the heights of modern material and spiritual culture was completed thanks to the conscious, skillful use by the Communist Party of the laws governing social development and of the advantages of the new socialist way of life.

During the stern years of the Great Patriotic War, the party came forth as the inspirer of the nationwide struggle against the German fascist usurpers. During those years Turkmen SSR was one of the rear-area bases of the Soviet Army. Under the guidance of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the republic's Communist Party mobilized the masses for the defense of the socialist Motherland, and directed all efforts to assure that, under the difficult wartime conditions, the front and the rear would be provided with the maximum quantity of agricultural and manufactured products.

During the subsequent years there was a steady growth in the republic's economic potential and its contribution to the resolution of nationwide tasks. Lenin's idea concerning socialism as the creativity of the nation, an idea that was distorted during the years of the Stalin personality cult and the period of stagnation, is today filled with real content.

In our day the party organizations are considerably restructuring their work. They see their main task in mobilizing the workers to fulfill the tasks of perestroika. There has been a considerable increase in the number of CPSU members. Last year Turkmenia had 114,070 party members, of whom 74,900 were Turkmens.

In approaching the 28th CPSU Congress under the slogan "A Renewed Party For a Renewed Society," the CPSU supports everything that is truly valuable in the development of public thought, and decisively rejects what is unacceptable for us, what is linked with Stalinism and stagnation, with the arbitrariness of the system of administrative fiat, with the violations of socialist legality and the standards of public morality, with total centralization and political authoritarianism. In the struggle against these negative phenomena, against blind obedience, apathy, and indifference, the party makes broad fruitful contacts with everyone who is attempting by means of realistic, concrete deeds to promote the success of perestroika.

In all this one can see clearly the consolidating role of the CPSU, its ability to react flexibly and dialectically to the changes in the life of society, to master political methods, and to enrich its arsenal of ideological influence upon people's minds in the struggle against various kinds of extreme tendencies that are attempting to force the masses to take poorly thought-out, at times extremist, actions. Turning back today to the origins and principles

of revolution and to the Leninist ideas of building a new society, the party takes with itself from the past everything that is valuable in our revolutionary heritage, everything that is heroic, but primarily the ideals of the Great October, Marxism-Leninism that has been purified of the heritage of dogmatism, scholasticism, and situational interpretations.

The Soviet socialist state that was created by Lenin absorbed the revolutionary will and the strivings of the multinational family of completely equal nations. The commonality of their historical fate is the basis of the international socialist brotherhood. The unique union of republics became the result of the efforts of many generations of Soviet citizens. That union carries on its banner the international unity of the workers of all nations and nationalities of the USSR, and the right of nations to self-determination. At the same time the entire experience of socialist construction attests to the fact that in our countries, where representatives of more than a hundred nations and nationalities live, questions of international education and the reinforcement of the friendship of nations continue to be of vital importance today.

The party has recognized the necessity within the framework of the restructuring of the political system to carry out measures to assure the further development and reinforcement of the Soviet federation on the basis of democratic principles. The party organizations, the Communists of all nationalities, have been called upon to be the cementing force, the spirit of the socialist union of nations, the active bearers of internationalism.

Our present and our future lie in the consolidation and unity of all the Soviet nations. It is the patriotic and national duty of every citizen, every Communist, to take care of and to multiply everything that serves to consolidate Soviet society as the basis of the free development and flourishing of all the nations of the USSR, that services to reinforce the might of our common Homeland. V. I. Lenin called upon us to do this, and it is along this path that the Turkmen Communist Party is proceeding today.

#### **Turkmen Presidium Discusses Organizational Changes, Laws**

90US0646B *Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA*  
in Russian 22 Feb 90 p 1

[Turkmeninform report: "At the Presidium of Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] A regular session of the Presidium of Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet was held on 20 February, with Supreme Soviet Chairman S. A. Niyazov presiding.

The Presidium considered questions of preparing the drafts of laws entitled "Committees of Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet" and "Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in Turkmen SSR." The Supreme Soviet committees on questions of the operation of the soviets

of people's deputies and local self-government, on questions of legislation, legality, law and order, and citizens' rights and appeals were instructed to develop the indicated drafts of the laws and to submit them to the second session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

After the detailed discussion, the Presidium approved the table of organization of the Supreme Soviet, formed groups of specialists and the Management of Affairs of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet. The fundamentally innovational nature of these questions lies in the fact that the previous apparatus of the Presidium workers, including its departments, has been completely abolished. The work of each of the ten Supreme Soviet committees will be carried out by a definite number of people's deputies who have been released from their production and official duties, and who will be assisted by groups of specialists that were formed both from workers in the previous apparatus, and from newly involved highly skilled specialists.

The session also considered the question of the draft of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Decree entitled "Intensification of the Responsibility for Actions Directed Against the Public Order and Citizens' Security." The Supreme Soviet's Committee on Questions of Legislation, Legality, Law and Order, and Citizens' Rights and Appeals has been given the responsibility of modifying this draft and submitting it for the consideration of Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Presidium recommended to Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet that it prepare and enact the decree entitled "Limiting the Shipping of Manufactured and Food Products Outside the Confines of the Republic."

Then the session considered the question of the identification card and lapel pin of the deputy to the local soviet of the republic's people's deputies. The session approved the Statute Governing the Identification Card and Lapel Pin, as well as a new model of the lapel pin for the deputy to the local soviet.

The Presidium session considered certain other questions pertaining to the republic's state life. All the chairmen of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet committee took part in the discussion of the questions on the session agenda.

#### **Pulatov's Criticism of Uzbek Election Procedures Scored**

90US0628A *Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian  
27 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Lutfulla Kabirov, member of USSR Writers Union: "Who Is Playing the Apparatus Games?: Comments on T. Pulatov's Article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI"]

[Text] One must give full credit to the critical fervor that has recently seized the pen of writer Timur Pulatov. As one reads his articles, one sometimes even wants to bang

one's fist on the table, saying, "How much longer do we have to remain silent after hearing these facts!"

But let's refrain from pounding the table, inasmuch as Timur Iskhakovich might interpret this action as being the manifestation of power methods and games that are, in the writer's mind, typical of the apparatus. Because he does not like them and regularly fights against them in the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI newspaper. And he even cites facts which, as he emphasizes, are a stubborn thing.

For example, concerning the fact that, at the Uzbekistan Writers Union, the people are allegedly indignant about an "allocations-schedule" list of candidates for election as people's deputies, and have "demanded the convoking of a special plenum, so that each rayon can nominate its own candidates as alternates." It is unimportant that all this is not entirely true, and Timur Pulatov is well aware of that fact, inasmuch as he himself strolled around the half-empty auditorium among the rows, sowing philippics directed against the apparatus. But the attempt to hold a plenum actually was made. All the writers, however, did not support it, and fewer than half of them arrived at the auditorium and it was necessary to do without the plenum, since there had not been a quorum. The next day a repeated attempt was made. Once again there were only scattered individuals in the auditorium. So another way out was found: they added onto the number of persons who voted on the first day the number of those who come the day after...

Obviously, the election commission did not recognize that vote as being legal, and that, naturally, displeased Timur Iskhakovich, so he wrote angrily that "by means of the chicanery of the okrug commissions, the creative intelligentsia was actually eliminated from the struggle."

That same "chicanery-perpetrating" commission gave me the following information: at the last election (which, we might recall, did not have any alternates) to the Supreme Soviet, a total of 12 cultural figures were elected—these included painters, performing artists, and writers, taken together. This year the number of Writers Union members alone who have been nominated and registered is 16. Incidentally, that list also contains the name of Timur Pulatov. And, apart from the 156 journalists, scientists, physicians, and teachers, a total of 34 literary and artistic figures are participating in the pre-election struggle. The candidates include a rather large number of representatives of informal associations, for example, in such okrugs as the 35th Professorskiy Okrug, 291st Bulungurskiy, 313th Telmanovskiy, 418th Gatratskiy, etc.

Nevertheless the writer's realm is in words, not in figures. Figures can trip up a literary man. For example, he writes, "Two hundred ninety workers in the party apparatus lay claim to 500 places in the republic's Supreme Soviet." But here are the figures that were provided by the Central Election Commission: among the 1134 candidates, 105 party committee secretaries—

from the Central Committee to the partkom—have been registered, with practically all of them being alternate candidates. Including Central Committee secretary A. Yefimov, who was mentioned by the writer.

And now let us discuss someone who had his registration refused—I. Buriyev, deputy chief of Sredazneftegazstroy. In this regard Timur Pulatov is right: not everything has been said about this person, who "at one time began the struggle against I. Usmankhodzhayev, who was at that time the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee first secretary, concerning whose abuses he knew a lot."

The stenographic records of many plenums and aktiv meetings speak well about the nature of his struggle. Take, for example, the party conference at which, despite the opinion of many Communists in Navoi Oblast and the city of Zarafshan, I. Usmankhodzhayev stubbornly nominated I. Buriyev as chairman of the oblast ispolkom. Or the plenum at which the "warrior" and future candidate for election as deputy said (and I quote from the 4 April 1987 stenographic record), "But can one really compare the first secretary of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, a person whose name one does not even want to mention—Rashidov—with Inomzhon Buzrukovich Usmankhodzhayev? The difference is like the difference between heaven and earth. Inomzhon Buzrukovich is an accessible person, who resolves all questions. You can converse with him, you can talk on any subject. Including other secretaries. It is big difference, a very big difference, and definitely on the positive side. The secretaries who will win are the new ones, the accessible, populist ones. They resolve questions not for themselves, they work not for themselves, they work for the sake of the nation..."

Forgive us, but this is great and powerful language for such warriors against the apparatchiks' abuses!

Speaking in the name of the public and on instructions from it is something we have already done. And we also know the price of assertions of this kind. But, apparently, the bad examples at one time were so infectious that even the writer could not resist, could not betray himself, realizing that certain apparatus games with his participation had ended extremely successfully.

The champion of social justice should be reminded of one such example, which happened quite recently. At approximately the same time that I. Buriyev was "thundering" from his protector's rostrum, T. Pulatov, after the latest in a series of visits to former Central Committee second secretary V. Anishchev, who, as everyone knows, had extremely definite partialities and sympathies for individual literary figures and investigators, sent the Central Committee apparatus... an official application to have an apartment assigned to him.

At the former Central Committee Department of Culture, people were astonished at that request, inasmuch as, for many years, the Central Committee had not engaged in the distribution of housing. But inasmuch as

the author had mentioned his great merits in literature, his application was sent to the Tashkent City Ispolkom with a request that they consider it and send a reply. The people at the city ispolkom considered it and replied to the Central Committee that T. Pulatov already had an apartment and more than enough housing: while leasing a writer's dacha with an area of 100 square meters and a plot of land with an area of 1200 square meters, he was also No. 44 on the waiting list for improvement of housing conditions at the Writers Union.

But at that time, despite all the standards of morality and legality, with the aid of V. Anishchev, the apparatus game was played, and the bureaucrat-apparatchiks in the person of the Central Committee Departure of Culture and the city ispolkom lost. At someone else's expense, bypassing his associates in the creative shop, and jumping ahead of everyone else on the waiting list, T. Pulatov was given an apartment in the center of the city.

I wrote these lines and then I wondered whether these same bureaucrat-apparatchiks might try to discredit me, because others might try to follow the writer's footsteps and ask to have their applications for the improving of their housing considered not at the appropriate commission of the city ispolkom, but at sessions of the Central Committee secretariat. True, I am put at ease by the fact that the initiator of this practice is currently far away, and currently is himself monitoring the standards of social justice in RSFSR.

The apparatus games are curious. In their archives one can also find other stories with the names of the well-known author and the persecuted fighter for justice. And even if they are not just Central Committee secretaries, the others are far from that, but nevertheless they are still bureaucrats, so they put into the bound files every piece of paper, which is by no means of literary quality.

Obviously this is for future research and comments.

### Official Faults Aspects of Uzbek Election Campaign

90US0628B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
28 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Article by M. Teshabayev, member of Tsentrizbirkom [Central Election Committee], candidate of legal sciences: "Signs of the New and Backslidings of the Old"]

[Text] The election campaign in the republic provides the opportunity to conclude that the nation's very idea of what kind of person an Uzbek SSR people's deputy must be is changing. People have a fresh memory of how, quite recently, the person who was considered to be an ideal deputy was the one who had distinguished himself in production, who observed labor discipline, and who had been given various awards. Although even now a lazy loafer cannot count on people's sympathetic attitude. The voters' sympathies were primarily on the side of those who showed themselves to be creative, dynamic

warriors for perestroyka, and who showed in their programs an understanding not only of society's tasks, but also of the realistic opportunities and methods for resolving them.

In the process of nominating candidates for election as people's deputies, the active participation of the party and state agencies and the election commissions began for the first time to combine with the voters' self-organization. This is extremely important, because the higher the level of this self-organization, the more effective the electoral system is as a means of the people's administration of the affairs of state. Elections are becoming truly a form of direct democracy.

The citizens have begun uniting in initiative groups in order to guarantee their participation in various election procedures, particularly for the making of recommendations concerning the conducting of meetings to nominate candidates for election as people's deputies at people's place of residence and at meetings of labor collectives, and concerning the conducting of propaganda "pro and con" the candidates. We have seen the appearance of candidates who have carried out their right of self-nomination.

On the whole it can be said that the vast majority of the nominated candidates for election as deputies were determined specifically by the initiative of various voter groups, labor collectives, and public organizations, and the number of candidates who, in one form or another, were forced upon the voters has decreased sharply.

All these positive shifts cannot be evaluated apart from the new election legislation. It was precisely the Law Governing the Election of Uzbek SSR People's Deputies that provided the legal basis for the new practice, and without that law that practice could not have arisen. Therefore, there is absolutely no way that one can agree with the opinions of those who feel that the reform of the election legislation allegedly did not add anything to the democratic nature of the elections. Just as one cannot deny the fact that by no means all the opportunities provided by the new legislation have been implemented, and that the law as a whole did not overcome the stagnant practice in all instances.

The voters' active participation and their responsibility and their conscientious attitude toward the election did not manifest themselves to the identical degree everywhere. Whereas in Tashkent, Samarkand, Andizhan, and many rayons in the republic one can state boldly that there was a true explosion of voter participation, in other cities and rayons the atmosphere that prevailed was the previous atmosphere of stagnant peace and quiet. It was also not completely possible to overcome the inertness of the old apparatus-type mind set typical of the previous directive methodology for regulating the electoral process, which methodology had developed under the system of governing by administrative fiat. In the outlying areas, the initiative was frequently grabbed away from the election commissions by other organizations. In

other situations the commissions themselves were not models of democracy—many questions were decided by them not by means of joint discussion, but unilaterally by the commission chairman or secretary after coordination at the appropriate party or soviet administrative level.

One has also encountered signs of a low level of political culture among certain citizens, including managers of various ranks, which signs attest also to those persons' inability to wage an honest, well-principled struggle. There have been instances of a disrespectful attitude toward one's rivals and toward the opinion of the election commissions.

Much of this is explained by the insufficient legal knowledge, and by the conviction that one can achieve one's goal only by using all means, both the possible and the impossible. These consequences of the many years of dominance by the system of governing by administrative fiat can be eliminated only by time, only by the consistent and steady development of the citizens' political awareness and the introduction of universal legal training.

The new attitude toward the elections and the new demands on the deputy's personal attributes and his role in the administration of the state could not fail to have an effect on the makeup of the registered candidates. We are graphically convinced of this by Tsentribirkom's statistical data. That data provide rich and rather reliable material for analysis and conclusions.

First of all let us see how we have taken advantage of the chief democratic principle in the new law—the alternative nature of the election. Labor collectives, public organizations, and meetings at voters' place of residence nominated approximately 1500 candidates to accept 500 mandates—an average of three contenders for each mandate. This is a completely normal result, judging from all the international standards. But this is only "an average," and in 133 election okrugs, only one candidate was nominated.

In the course of discussing the draft of the Election Law, there was a rather broad discussion of the skeptical evaluations also of such a new institution as the conference of okrug representatives. People viewed in that institution an instrument for weeding out the candidates who are not wanted by various agencies, and as a method for nullifying competitiveness and reducing the number of candidates to just only per okrug.

In a number of instances, those fears were justified. However, excesses of this kind were not typical of most of the conferences. On the whole, they demonstrated their substantial merits, and provided the voters with a unique opportunity to see the candidates "in person," to discuss their qualities in a meaningful manner, to listen to and compare their programs, and to make statements about them.

The conferences proved to be beneficial when there was an excessive number of candidates. They limited that number to reasonable limits. The question of conducting a conference, in accordance with the Election Law, was resolved not by the okrug electoral commissions at their discretion, but on the recommendation of the labor collectives and public organizations nominating the candidates for election as deputies. The conferences were held in only 31 electoral okrugs.

The okrug electoral commissions registered 1134 candidates for election as Uzbek SSR people's deputies. However, certain pretenders even now, in the last stage of the election campaign, have begun withdrawing their candidacies. This is, of course, allowed by the law. But there is also a moral aspect of this. The labor collectives and public organizations that trusted those persons to represent their interests and that gave them their mandate must receive from those candidates open explanations about their reasons for rejecting it.

In 39 okrugs, more than five candidates were registered; in 11 okrugs, from three to five candidates; and in 175 okrugs, two candidates each. But in 175 okrugs—that is, in more than one-third of them—there will be no election struggle. Obviously, even the lack of rivals is not yet a guarantee that the candidate will definitely be elected.

For the sake of justice, it must be stated that the people who became the only candidates in their okrugs were definitely not just the first administrators of the oblast, rayon, and city agencies, or the large-scale farms. They also include 49 workers and kolkhoz members; 27 workers in the field of science, literature, culture, and public health; and others.

Among the total number of candidates who were registered in the electoral okrugs, 28.6 percent are workers and kolkhoz members (in the previous election, they constituted 51.2 percent); 14.6 percent are women (previously 35.9 percent); 7.6 percent are young men and women aged 30 years or less (previously 23.0 percent); and 88.2 percent are Communists (previously 67.8 percent).

The first conclusion is that, with the previous election system, when the "allocations list" that was passed down "from the top" planned literally all the candidate's parameters, all the segments of the population were definitely represented more harmoniously in the republic's highest agency of power. However, it would seem that the Supreme Soviet is by no means required to be an accurate structural model of the republic's population.

The figures that have been quoted express the voter's attempt to see in the makeup of the highest legislative agency those persons who are capable of fulfilling well their high state duties.

Representatives of 22 nations and nationalities populating our republic have been registered as candidates for election as Uzbek SSR people's deputies. They include 855 Uzbeks, 97 Russian, 19 Karakalpaks, 42 Tajiks, 17



Kazakhs, 12 Kirghiz, 5 Turkmen, 26 Tatars, 11 Armenians, 8 Koreans, and others.

Consequently, the republic's Supreme Soviet will be a multinational one, that takes into consideration the interests of all the nations and nationalities in the republic.

Perestroika—our basic task—has been well thought-out, presented, and begun by the party. The persons who must be the first to take part in it are the most politically active representatives of society, namely, those whom—irrespective of the social segment to which they belong—the CPSU has always united in its ranks. Therefore the increase in the number of party members among the candidates would seem to be completely natural.

The election campaign and the election itself, without a doubt, will become a tremendous event in perestroika. The authority of the republic's highest agency of power will depend on those who have been elected by the people.

#### **Uzbek Election Commission Details Voting Statistics**

90US0653B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
22 Feb 90 p 1

["Report by Central Election Commission on the Results of the Election of Uzbek SSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] After examining the minutes received from the okrug election commissions concerning the results of the election of Uzbek SSR people's deputies, the Central Election Commission reports that the voter lists for the election of Uzbek SSR people's deputies by electoral districts included 10,035,180 persons, and 9,385,740 persons, or 93.5 percent, took part in the voting.

In Karakalpak ASSR, 98.3 percent took part in the voting; in Andizhan Oblast, 96.1 percent; in Bukhara Oblast, 92.6 percent; Kashka-Darya Oblast, 96.0 percent; Namangan Oblast, 98.1 percent; Samarkand Oblast, 95.5 percent; Surkhan-Darya Oblast, 95.0 percent; Syr-Darya Oblast, 97.6 percent; Tashkent Oblast, 91.4 percent; Fergana Oblast, 95.3 percent; Khorezm Oblast, 97.3 percent; and in the city of Tashkent, 80.5 percent of the voters.

In order to conduct the election of Uzbek SSR people's deputies, 500 electoral okrugs were formed. A total of 1094 candidates ran for election as deputy. The ballots included one candidate each in 174 okrugs, two candidates each in 177 okrugs, and three or more candidates in 149 okrugs.

The election was held in 499 electoral okrugs. People's deputies were elected in 368 okrugs. In 95 okrugs in which there were more than two candidates running for election and none of them was elected, in accordance with Article 52 of the Law Governing the Election of Uzbek SSR People's Deputies a runoff election must be held.

In 36 electoral okrugs where one or two candidates ran for election as deputies, the candidates failed to receive the

necessary number of votes and were not elected as deputies. In all these okrugs, in conformity with Article 53 of the Law Governing the Election of Uzbek SSR People's Deputies a runoff election will be held. In one electoral okrug, as a result of the withdrawal of a candidate for election as deputy, no election was held. In conformity with the Election Law, a new election will be held.

The Central Election Commission, on the basis of Article 49 of the Election Law, has registered all the elected Uzbek SSR people's deputies. A total of 368 Uzbek SSR people's deputies were elected. The elected deputies include: women, 42 (11.4 percent); men, 326 (86.6 percent); workers, 50 (13.6 percent); and kolkhoz members, 25 (6.8 percent). The deputies include: CPSU members and candidate members, 348 (94.6 percent); non-party members, 20 (5.4 percent).

Citizens of 17 nationalities residing in our republic were elected to the highest agency of state power.

The election of Uzbek SSR people's deputies have become a major step in carrying out the political reform planned by the party, testimony to the further development of democracy, and an important landmark in the political and social life of our republic, that is proceeding along the path of perestroika.

#### **Central Election Commission for Election of Uzbek SSR People's Deputies.**

#### **Bureaucratic Impetus Behind Reinstitution of Uzbek SSR's Dzhizak Oblast**

90US0653A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 6 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by O. Nikolayev, Uzbek SSR: "Administrative Rapture, or the Great Resettlement of the Apparatchiks"]

[Text] The news that it is planned to divide Syr-Darya Oblast in two within the near future has caused, understandably, a commotion in the offices. In one of them I was told outright:

"Because of these shakeups, people just don't feel like working. Nowadays, wherever you call, no one picks up the telephone. Apparently everyone's hands are occupied—they hanging onto their chairs."

However, the most curious aspect of this situation is that the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet ukase concerning the unification of Dzhizak and Syr-Darya oblast was enacted only slightly more than a year ago. The city that became the center of the consolidated Syr-Darya Oblast was Dzhizak, the former capital of Dzhizak Oblast. At the same time, the rayon of the same name was eliminated and was made subordinate to the city.

Many people at that time failed to understand what had caused the unification, what lay behind "the improvement of the administrative-territorial division of the republic," and what advantages were promised by the



new general scheme for administering Uzbekistan's national economy. A few people seriously felt that the purpose was to wipe off the map an oblast and a rayon that for many years had been considered a "zone beyond criticism"—Rashidov's hometown. Currently there is no one to ask about this: I. Usmanhodzhayev, who was then the first secretary of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, during whose incumbency all this occurred, has now been sentenced, as everyone knows. The previous "first persons" no longer exist either in the Supreme Soviet Presidium, or in the republic's Council of Ministers.

Other administrators who set up the grandiose experiment in abolishing and then fusing together in the republic a number of oblasts and almost a score of rayons have also left their positions, and by no means always at their own volition. Essentially speaking, that had been an experiment involving hundreds of thousands of people.

No. The nation did not remain silent. Workers made requests and protests to the agencies of the highest power in Uzbekistan. But they encountered only evasive and mollifying speeches. Finally, after the publication of the ukases, what had invented deep down in the apparatus became a reality.

The unifying processes took a prolonged and difficult course. The oblasts and rayons were all choked up at plenums, conferences, and sessions—because it was necessary to determine who would remain and who would leave behind hundreds of offices. In former Dzhizak and Syr-Darya oblasts, more than 1500 persons were released. There is nothing that can be said about the cost of the merger—no one knows the exact figure. Not even the statisticians to whom I made inquiries. But, nevertheless, one can definitely say that the apparatus "perestroyka" took the form of tens of millions of rubles of wasted expenditures.

Was there any real benefit in consolidating the oblasts and rayons? Probably the only area that benefited at first was public health. With a large amount of pomp and rapturous paeans, a number of buildings that had been left by the apparatchiks were remade into medical institutions. True, soon those rapturous paeans abated somewhat: the administrative buildings were not too well adapted for therapeutic purposes, and so there was no rush to repair them.

Here is just one example. A children's infectious-diseases hospital was put into the building that previously housed the party's Dzhizakskiy Raykom and the Dzhizakskiy Rayon Ispolkom. In the course of a year it proved to be impossible to get the plumbing to work properly, to install a laundry, or to bring everything up to the appropriate sanitation standards. And now Dzhizakskiy Rayon has had all its rights completely restored, and the resuscitated rayon ispolkom is taking the building back. It is being planned to transfer the sick children quietly,

without informing Minzdrav [Ministry of Public Health]. That's just one little present from the apparatus...

Let us assume that the unification of oblasts and rayons was a mistake for which no one can be held responsible. Although it might be worth while to go looking for the culprits. But what are people supposed to do now, when much has been shaken up and then has settled down? Should they begin everything from the beginning?

A commission for the deconsolidation of oblasts, rayons, and other territorial formations has been formed in the republic. Its members meet with the inhabitants and listen to their opinions and complaints. Incidentally, frequently these are the complaints: it takes too long to make a trip to the oblast center. Well, then, maybe the oblast organizations should hold fewer meetings and conferences, and should resolve the questions that are of vital interest to people on the spot, rather than forcing them to seek justice in the large and small capitals.

And is Syr-Darya Oblast, with a territory of 25,600 square kilometers and a population of approximately 1.8 million persons, really too large and unmanageable? The country has a rather large number of oblasts that are even a big bigger. But that's no problem—they are coping with the situation.

Thus, for the time being, only one thing is clear: the stupendous experiment that was set up by the republic's previous administrators failed to yield any improvements. Properly speaking, no one had any idea of what would happen—there had been no serious scientific impact reports. As a result, the ties and traditions that had formed here were broken.

One can only hope that this time there will be no mistakes.

Nevertheless, one cannot fail to notice something that literally lies on the surface: the next in the series of shakeups and the possible deunification of the oblasts and rayons in the future means not only the three-years-long apparatus confusion and inaction, but also, in the event of a division, the doubling of all the administrative-bureaucratic structures.

#### **Uzbek Supreme Soviet 10 Feb Ukase on Penalties for Disturbing Public Order**

90US0653C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
11 Feb 90 p 1

["Ukase by Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Concerning the Intensification of Responsibility for Actions Directed Against the Public Order and Citizens' Security"]

[Text] For purposes of ensuring public security, reinforcing order and discipline, and stopping the provocative rumors that are causing panic among the population, in conformity with the 21 October 1989 decree of

Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, entitled "Measures to Stabilize the Public-Political Situation in the Republic," the Presidium of Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To establish that the manufacture or storage, with the purpose of disseminating, or the dissemination itself, in oral, written, printed, or video-tape forms, of materials that contain appeals for pogroms and the forcible deportation of citizens, or that constitute a threat to public order or people's security, or are aimed at creating panic among the population, is punishable by a fine in the amount of from 200 to 500 rubles, or corrective labor for a period of up to two months with the deduction of as much of 20 percent of the person's earnings for deposit to the state budget, or by administrative arrest of up to 10 days, with confiscation of the means for manufacturing and disseminating the materials.

2. The dissemination of rumors and fabrications for the same purposes is punishable by a fine in an amount up to 50 rubles, or corrective labor for a period of up to one month with the deduction of as much as 20 percent of the person's earnings for deposit to the state budget, or by administrative arrest of up to 10 days.

3. If the actions stipulated by Articles 1 and 2 of this Ukase have been committed repeatedly over a period of a year, or by a group of persons, or if a minor has been involved in such actions, these actions are punishable by a fine in the amount of from 500 to 1000 rubles, or corrective labor of up to two months with deduction of as much as 20 percent of the person's earnings for deposit to the state budget, or administrative arrest for up to 15 days, with confiscation of the means for manufacturing and disseminating the materials.

4. Persons who have committed actions indicated in Articles 1, 2, and 3 of this Ukase that result in serious consequences bear the criminal responsibility stipulated by the legislation that is in effect.

M. Ibragimov, chairman,  
Presidium of Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet;  
L. Bekkulbekova, secretary,  
Presidium of Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet  
Tashkent, 10 February 1990.

**Uzbek Supreme Soviet 21 Feb Ukase on  
Temporary Prohibition of Demonstrations**

90US0653D Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
22 Feb 90 p 1

["Ukase of the Presidium of UzSSR Supreme Soviet Concerning the Establishment of Order in Organizing and Conducting Meetings, Rallies, Marches, and Demonstrations in Uzbek SSR"]

[Text] In conformity with the 20 February 1990 statement of USSR Supreme Soviet, and also with the workers' demands for the establishment of firm public order and the reinforcement of discipline, and taking into consideration the fact that extremists and criminal elements can join in with the demonstrations and marches, and that, in its turn, can lead to antidemocratic actions, pogroms, arson, and instances of violence and crude pressure upon people and of intimidation of them, the Presidium of the UzSSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. Temporarily, until the stabilization of the social-political situation in the republic, to prohibit marches and demonstrations, and to conduct the sanctioned rallies and meetings in the established procedure and only in enclosed areas.

Violation of this ukase will incur the responsibility stipulated by the legislation that is in effect.

2. The executive committees of the oblast soviets of people's deputies and the Tashkent city soviet of people's deputies are to make the appropriate changes in the decisions regulating the procedure for conducting mass measures.

3. The executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies are to establish direct contacts with all the public organizations, including the informal ones, and, on a mutually acceptable basis, strive for a situation in which the meetings and rallies being conducted do not create any unnecessary social-political tension and any negative manifestations are prevented.

4. The ukase goes into effect on the day of its publication.

B. Bugrov, deputy chairman of the Presidium of UzSSR Supreme Soviet

L. Bekkulbekova, secretary of the Presidium of UzSSR Supreme Soviet

Tashkent, 21 February 1990.

### **Maj Gen Surkov Details Personal Role in Transcaucasus Crisis Chronology**

90US0694A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian  
22 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Major General M. Surkov, by Gagik Karapetyan: "Without Avoiding the Dialogue: A Heated Discussion and Three Typical Episodes With the Participation of USSR People's Deputy, Major General M. Surkov"]

[Text] Episode one—a very important one. May 1988. Yerevan. On Teatralnaya Ploshchad several people had announced a strike. The 10,000-15,000 citizens of Yerevan who had surrounded them suddenly began to move decisively toward the Armenian CP Central Committee building, demanding explanations about the location of their countrymen. The situation that had arisen was an explosive one, and no one knows to this day how everything would have ended if the people had not been stopped by a very high metal fence and... a young lieutenant colonel who went out to negotiate with the people. Despite the angry shouts, he led them all back to the square, easing the tension on the way by carrying out a discussion in a very reassuring manner. Then, having listened to his solicitous conversation with the hunger strikers, the people gradually calmed down, and then went back to their homes. At that time there were very few people who knew that the 42-year-old M. Surkov, who was a colonel at that time, had been appointed chief of the political department of the Yerevan Garrison only three months previously.

[G. Karapetyan] Mikhail Semenovich, almost two years later, once again it was precisely you—by this time a USSR people's deputy and a major general—who succeeded in stopping a confrontation by informal organizations in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the area bordering on Nikhechavan. Why is it that, even during the tragic days of January 1990, neither the party workers nor the soviet workers in the two neighboring republics had been totally unable to learn how to conduct a dialogue?

[M. Surkov] Probably a definite role was played by the fact that my general's uniform had become a familiar sight at the combat positions on both sides. Although, to tell you the truth, I was not the only person who had the idea of conducting the long-awaited negotiations. The first dialogues proved to be very difficult. At first the attempt was made to guarantee representation: whereas Ararktsyan, member of the Armenian National Movement [AOD], remained constantly the official representative of the AOD, Allahverdiyev, as he called himself, a member of the Azerbaijan People's Front [NFA] Majlis, and Ragimov, member of the Nakhichevan People's Front, later drove up to the representatives of the Ilichevskiy Rayon People's Front.

In the next round of negotiations, the persons who took active part also included officials, particularly Akopyan and Abbasov, the first secretaries of the neighboring Araratskiy and Ilichevskiy party raykoms; Serobyanyan, secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee;

Dayan, deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers; Dzhalilov, first secretary of the party's Nakhichevan Obkom; and Gadzhiyev, deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers.

As the roundtable expanded, the first knotty problems—which, essentially speaking, were "mini-problems"—became untied very rapidly: all the armed groups retreated from the borders of the two republics, and the situation between them is now monitored by troops. In a word, the army is, for the time being, the only guarantee that the bloodshed will stop, although one can still observe sporadic disturbances.

[G. Karapetyan] Nevertheless, many people have taken a skeptical attitude toward the contacts between the representatives of the AOD and the NFA and, I would say, are underestimating them. What is cited as argument number one is the fact of the abrogation of the minimal understandings that had been achieved at the February meeting in Riga with the Baltic Council acting as intermediary. People asked what the informal organizations would be able to do, if they have not yet succeeded in organizing the negotiations between the leaders of the neighboring republics.

[M. Surkov] That's a valid observation: the first persons, in one way or another, dictate the style and the temperature of the communication between the opposing sides at all levels. I know that telephone dialogues over the Yerevan-Baku "hot line" are being conducted intensively. Probably the time has already come to have discussions at a single table, with a subsequent report appearing in the press. I emphasize that one should not forget at such time the chief characters in the conflict—the representatives of Nagorny Karabakh. They must not remain off to one side of these future meetings. I am deeply convinced that there is a need for immediate, but well prepared, dialogues, up to and including mass television and radio dialogues in any combination (various segments of society, together or separately; republic administrators; members of informal organizations; USSR people's deputies; workers, peasants, and intellectuals of Armenia and Azerbaijan), with the intermediacy (during the initial stage), for example, of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Interethnic Relations. It seems to me that the forthcoming negotiations can be conducted in stages—from general discussions to the specific points and details. Each meeting that has even the slightest amount of success must definitely be broadly illuminated.

[G. Karapetyan] By expressing these valid recommendations for tomorrow, it turns out that we are thus admitting that none of the numerous previously enacted parliamentary decrees and recommendations for extinguishing the interethnic conflagration in the region have worked. What is your opinion, as a people's deputy? What are the causes of the appearance of what are, essentially, stillborn plans and schemes for normalizing the long-standing conflict, the echo of which is being felt by the inhabitants of many other regions in the country?

[M. Surkov] First, after the center has made various good decisions, no persistent, deeply thought-out organizational work has been conducted in the outlying areas. We may as well admit that the party and soviet administrators of both republics have not taken, and are not taking, any preemptive tactical steps.

Secondly, neither in Armenia nor in Azerbaijan has there been, so far, any consolidation of the healthy forces of society, of the proponents of perestroyka. If this has occurred anywhere, it is on an extremely modest and shy scale.

Thirdly, the center's decisions were doomed to failure from the start since they failed to take into consideration the opinions of absolutely all the participants in the conflict. Every time I notice their intensive search for what they consider to be the vulnerable places in a particular decree, the text of which they treat lightly, just so they do not have to fulfill it, giving as their reason some kind of "dirty trick, insult, or infringement of national dignity." Certainly my associates—the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies—must understand that any intelligent decision made by the center must first undergo a "test drive"—at various groups of the population in every republic, for example, the local deputies, war and labor veterans, and respected, authoritative persons with their own point of view.

The cornerstones on the path to a document that the parties can agree on is careful, precise argumentation, and in every word in any decision, document, or communicate one must hear the ring of truth, however bitter it may be. Believe me when, speaking from experience, I say that any half-tones, any half-truths, across-the-board generalizations, or search for an imaginary common denominator in treating the events in the region, and, as a consequence, any parity measures or schemes for illuminating them in the central agencies of the press, radio, or television have frequently led, and continue frequently to lead, to very unpleasant consequences. At such time one should ignore what is unfortunately the permanently heightened psychological mood of the population in both republics (its components are the destructive earthquake, the economic blockades, the conflicts with the troops, and the curfew on the scale of a state of emergency).

I cannot keep myself from recalling that God gave man two ears so that he could listen wisely to both sides. Frequently our second ear, which is intended specifically for listening to our conversational partner, goes deaf during the days of the "state of emergency."

[G. Karapetyan] In such an instance, would it be possible, using your nice image, to ask you about your "recipe"—your own version for the gradual stabilization of the interrepublic conflict that has reached the dangerous point of civil war?

[M. Surkov] Unfortunately, I would unambiguously cite the time that has been lost and the deeply exhausted interethnic ailment. Also, until lately, no consideration

was taken of the possibilities or the authority of the informal organizations: people should have sat down at the negotiations table long ago. Finally, it is definitely necessary to ask ordinary people for their advice. It is precisely for this reason, it seems to me, that the summaries and recommendations of numerous conferences, meetings, and visits by so-called "specialists" in interethnic relations have not been brought to their logical conclusion. Naturally, in attempting to ask honestly your difficult question, I would not want to offend anyone or to censure the positions taken by the sides as applicable to Nagornyy Karabakh. It seems to be personally that this "eternal" problem can be resolved by taking into consideration the ideas and recommendations expressed at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum. There probably is today a vital necessity, despite anything at all, to subordinate NKAO [Nagornyy Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] temporarily—and I emphasize temporarily—to the center.

First of all, I would not remove the autonomous oblast from the makeup of Azerbaijan and make it part of Russia—there is no need to violate the territorial integrity of one union republic at the expense of another. The center, obviously, can grant NKAO the status of an independent economic regions with an autonomous political structure. For example, the delegates to the forthcoming CPSU forum are elected by the NKAO Communists themselves, and all the socioeconomic problems that were neglected for many decades will be resolved also in a direct manner by way of the center.

I shall repeat myself for the third time: all the things everything that I have enumerated are temporary measures that, it seems to me personally, must be calmly tried out, "test-driven," and verified for their viability. And at such time it is also necessary, without losing a single day, to conduct to the utmost the numerous dialogues and roundtables with the participation of the official and the informal organizations. Their preliminary, gradual results must definitely be presented for universal discussion in both republics. It is very important here to demonstrate reciprocal wisdom and patience, and to listen to the point of view being expressed by the opponent, rather than by the enemy. And there is something else. Each participant in the negotiations must have in reserve his willingness and his own method to attempt to reach a reasonable compromise.

The shortage of specifically these components in the discussion or dialogue between nations that have been neighbors for many centuries is, in my opinion, the basic reason why, as a result of the still unresolved problem of NKAO, thousands and thousands of innocent people are suffering directly and indirectly. And not just in the Transcaucasus.

[G. Karapetyan] When talking about the role of the Armenians in this "hot" region, certain people have been

mentioning the appearance of a "domestic Afghanistan, with Lebanon added for good measure." What is your opinion about this?

[M. Surkov] The army is always forced to interfere when a real threat to the lives of Soviet citizens arises. Or in instances of catastrophes and other tragedies with human victims. At such times we military men are the last hope, the lifebelt.

However, our ideal role is noninterference in such conflicts. Although the leaders of certain aggressive groupings in the region attempt to present us as movie monsters who want to kill or shoot everyone. Because we have the most humanitarian task: we must attempt to prevent any further escalation of the conflict between neighboring nations, to prevent any bloodshed.

It is precisely for this region that our subdivisions currently are situated along the so-called artificial boundary between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Something else that causes serious alarm is the large amount of weapons that were seized in January in the outlying areas—every kind of weapon. Because, sooner or later, those weapons will have to be fired, but no one knows yet at whom.

The country's defense minister himself, his deputies, and a number of generals are engaging from day to day in what are by no means army functions: unblocking the railroad on the Baku-Yerevan stretch, and delivering food supplies, medicines, and newspapers to mountain villages in NKAO, where other deliveries have been temporarily stopped because of the exchanges of gunfire and the blockade. Day and night, officers risk their lives by remaining on duty at the "hot spots," providing for law and order for the local population and providing for its security.

When I received my appointment to this job, I never thought that I would have to participate in instituting a curfew or a state of emergency. Even before that, I never assumed that, together with my comrades, I would engage in eliminating the consequences of an earthquake. But today new tasks have arisen, tasks that are unusual for army men: the organization and conducting of negotiations between informal organizations and representatives of official organizations, stubborn attempts to stop the economic blockade...

**Episode two—a very personal one.** As of today, M. Surkov and his family have moved eleven—yes, eleven!—times. Elder daughter Olya has attended nine schools. Currently she is in the fourth year at Yerevan University. She began in Petrozavodsk, but now—if you want, you can believe this or, if you want, you can not believe—she can read... Armenian.

The general learned about this completely by accident a year ago. It seems that the entire YeGU [Yerevan State University], headed by its rector, USSR People's Deputy S. Ambartsumyan, planned to lay flowers on the memorial to the victims of the 1915 genocide, having honored the

memory of their innocent countrymen who had been victims of the Sumgait butchery. Together with his comrades, Mikhail Semenovich had provided a present to take care of any expenses on the road to the memorial. Now imagine the mute scene when he saw walking in the university column his own daughter, chatting with her classmates in Armenian.

Larisa, the younger daughter, is 13. She can already understand rather well her "teacher"—two-year-old neighbor Mikael. The general's wife, Leonarda Tikhonovna, is a teacher herself. She walked by his husband's side as he made his way from senior sergeant to major general. But now, for example, she goes to the stores alone, understanding the local salespersons without any interpreter. Because he is so busy and so tired, the head of the family has time only to do some reading before bedtime—the republic press and textbooks on the history of the Armenian nation and state. The Surkovs' rule—know the language in the place where you are serving—is observed strictly by them.

[G. Karapetyan] Whether you like it or not, certain people already consider you to be subjective with regard to the Armenians. Do you fight against this natural (I remind the reader that Surkov is a USSR people's deputy from Armenia) and admissible feeling?

[M. Surkov] In this regard I have two work methods: listen to everyone and only then express my own point of view; and take into consideration the competent opinions of my associates who are serving in other parts of the country. Of course, during the two years that I have lived here, I have gained a wide circle of friends from among the local inhabitants. Forgive me, but this is the kind of person I am.

[G. Karapetyan] I myself sensed your communicativeness and friendliness at our very first meeting. Nevertheless, I would like to know your attitude toward the creative works and personality of Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, after a verbal "duel" with whom at the 2nd Congress of USSR People's Deputies I saw on your desk a tremendous pile of letters from all parts of the country, all beginning with the salutation, "Our respected young general..."

[M. Surkov] Yes, that is how the poet "christened" me. Thanks for the compliment, but, as you can see, I'm not really that young. But just as I did when I was a child, right now, after our polemics, I love to read what Yevtushenko has written. If you recall, when I spoke for the second time at the 2nd Congress, I asked people, first of all, to be more respectful toward one another, and especially to their associates in the country's highest forum.

Who is right? Forty percent of the authors of letters addressed to me supported or censured Yevtushenko and me, and the others expressed their neutrality. I am ready to show all the letters to anyone who is interested, and I recommend to you and to Yevtushenko that we do not continue this topic as an argument for the purpose of



putting all the dots on the i's. Especially since the poet and deputy was expressing his views on completely different problems from the ones that I had been touching upon. And I had absolutely no intention, as the respected poet asserted, of driving a wedge between the country's leadership and the intelligentsia, among whom I have a rather large number of friends and acquaintances.

[G. Karapetyan] To prevent our readers from considering these words to be an unsubstantiated assertion, could you limit yourself to listing their names?

[M. Surkov] First of all, I would mention USSR People's Deputy and commentator Zoriy Balayan, with whom I regularly have dialogues on Armenian television. In places where I had served previously, I formed very good relations with RSFSR People's Performing Artists Nikolay Kunayev and Vyacheslav Gordeyev, the artistic directors of song and dance ensembles, respectively, of the Leningrad and Moscow military districts; with RSFSR Honored Performing Artist Aleksandr Pavlov, from the Theater imeni Vakhtangov...

As I work in Armenia, naturally, I am friendly with the flower of the local intelligentsia, and particularly with USSR People's Performing Artists Sos Sarkisyan and Frunze Dovlatyan, and writer Karen Simonyan, although we, even as USSR people's deputies, have different points of view concerning a number of problems affecting this long-suffering republic.

[G. Karapetyan] Certainly one of the most important problems must be the process of restoring the disaster zone where the Leninakan voters cast their votes for you, a representative of the army, thus evaluating your include in these matters to be entirely civilian. So far as I know, the meeting between the deputies from the earthquake area and N. I. Ryzhkov, which meeting was proposed by you from the rostrum of the 2nd Congress, has not yet occurred. If there are no military secrets, could you share with us what you are planning to tell the head of the Soviet government?

[M. Surkov] It has been 14 months since that terrible tragedy in Armenia, but it is no secret that the construction-and-restoration operations have been conducted atrociously. The CPSU Central Committee Politburo managed to do a lot. But it definitely could not do everything. There are a rather large number of reasons for the failure: they include the economic blockade, the disbalance among the production and construction plans, and the excessive autonomy of the construction workers in all senses of the word. What do I propose? Taking into consideration the fact that representatives of many of the union republics are working in the disaster zone, we should immediately create a permanently operating group of USSR people's deputies who would maintain contact with their countrymen, would know their opinions, and would exert an influence upon the state of affairs.

And there is something else. The disaster zone is called a rebirth zone. In my opinion, it could also become a test ground (forgive me for using a military term) for renewing the principles of the international education of youth, and, in general, the interrelationships among Soviet citizens. Unfortunately, in this area also there are a large number of unresolved problems.

[G. Karapetyan] Mikhail Semenovich, what real contribution has been made by military construction workers if, according to statistical data, there is not yet any way that the mass activation of housing, schools, kindergartens, clinics, and movie theaters will begin in the disaster zone, and the situation with regard to illumination is bad there?

[M. Surkov] Objectively, the work plan in the earthquake zone is being fulfilled to its maximum only by the military construction workers. Judge for yourself. Last year alone, they turned over more than a thousand apartments and the two very first schools, which the children are currently attending in overcrowded classrooms. In addition, all the badly damaged barracks were restored and settled long ago. Not many people realize that during the earthquake no one died in buildings that had been erected by the military. But many of them, unfortunately, proved to be under the ruins of the "murderer" buildings which continue to be on the conscience of the unpunished civilian construction workers.

**Episode three—a very risky one.** When I read essays devoted to the military, I stop believing the author who persistently assert that for these people with shoulder boards, like everyone else, the sense of fear is, nobody knows why, practically biological. As for General Surkov, it seemed to me that the real danger threatened him during the days and nights of repeated meetings with armed formations.

According to statements made by witnesses, Mikhail Semenovich began to feel strange quite recently in one of the Nakhichevan hospitals. The general was looking for (and finally found) a young person named Vagan, who had proven to be a hostage. Learning that the military had arrived immediately after the events in Baku, aggressively-minded—as you can imagine—women immediately filled the chief physician's small office. Surkov immediately realized that the slightest manifestation of fear would cause irreparable harm. An hour or two later, the medical personnel had calmed down. A discussion on a completely equal level ensued. The main thing was to withstand the psychological attack. In this episode the major general sensed not only, and not so much, a natural fear, but, it seems to me, the exceptional complexity of an ordinary visit to any "hot spot."

[G. Karapetyan] But at this time the word "general" and the adjective "general's"—as in "the generals' dachas, the generals' rations, the generals' salaries"—are mentioned everywhere, starting with the press and ending with our parliament, in the same disdainful, insulting tone that everyone associates today with members of



cooperatives. Don't you think that the question ought to be asked point-blank: "Exactly who are you, you Soviet generals?"

[M. Surkov] I am a peasant from Kaluga. My parents have lived for many years in Obninsk. I was a few months short of 15 years of age when I got behind a lathe at the Omsk Plant imeni Karbyshev. Then I moved to Leningrad, where I graduated from night school, and worked as a shroud and rigging worker. During my free time and on vacations I traveled all over the Urals and the Altay. I participated in seven kinds of sports, and even graduated from a trainer school, after becoming a candidate for master of sports in unarmed combat...

I was called into the army after I had been attending the Economic-Engineering Institute imeni Togliatti for a short time. I served in various places: the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and in Novgorod Oblast; the Taman Division and the coast of the Barents Sea... I might also add: the Guards Leningrad Motorized Regiment, where, since the day of its formation—18 February 1923—and on the recommendation of the first regimental commander, Yan Fabritsius, the civil war hero, the workers from the Kirov Plant have traditionally been assigned.

My basic salary after 20 years of service (650 rubles) is no higher than the earnings of a skill worker with the same labor longevity, but it is less than the weekly proceeds of almost any cooperative member. I shall not go against my conscience and complain, but when figuring out my family's budget, please take into consideration the expenses for three women in the home. Everything else—the apartment and the car—is official. That means, it's only temporary.

Yes, until recently the members of the Military Council in our military unit had dachas in the resort town of Tsakhkdadzor. Almost two years ago, when the first refugees appeared in Armenia, we transferred all of them except one official dacha to them on our own initiative.

[G. Karapetyan] One of the people's deputies has asserted that, despite the reductions, there are more generals in Moscow alone than in the entire American army. Is that a true statement?

[M. Surkov] If I knew the exact figure, rather than judging from rumors, I would definitely give it to you. However, I cannot fail to mention the level of competency. Because things are getting to the point of the ridiculous—while the first Congress was in session, a television journalist interviewed a little old lady in the street, and asked her, "Is 70 billion enough for our defense?" Naturally she answered, "It's enough, sonny!" Is this supposed to be a public-opinion survey?

Please understand me correctly: we military men are not interlopers in our society. Let's not set one person against another. We have our problems in the army too. We have our faults and our neglected diseases. But we have always stood up for the people. We have never had any other principle.

[G. Karapetyan] Thank you for your frank answers. So far as I know, you have never refused to give an interview to any journalist, either Soviet or foreign. What is this, a fear of quarreling with the press during the period of glasnost, or do you have other reasons for doing this?

[M. Surkov] Since I was a child, my parents taught me always to respect another person's work. But the most important thing is that in the current situation I hope that every objective article that is published will help Soviet citizens to understand and clarify the truth concerning the situation in the region first-hand. Therefore, when answering mean-spirited questions, I attempt to throw light on the interethnic problems in the most carefully weighed manner, from all sides, rather than in a one-sided manner.

I hope that our conversation also will help the readers to clarify the situation around the tragic events in the two neighboring republics. I would like to emphasize that both the Armenian nation and the Azerbaijani nation are worthy of respect and understanding. Excluding those aggressive forces who bear the responsibility for the bloody pogroms, instances of arson, the gunfire, blockades, the thefts of government-issue weapons... The statement is made correctly that the "black sheep," that is, dishonest people, can be found among any nation. Therefore, on the whole, every nation, every people, is worthy of having everyone else take it into consideration. In my opinion, this moral absolute is, as it were, a law for the preservation of the Soviet federation.

If the practice of giving a popularity rating existed in our republic, a person who could lay claim to one of the first ten places as best-known political and social figures would undoubtedly be General M. S. Surkov. After finding himself, by the will of the command element, in the thick of the trans-Caucasian events, he was able, as they say, to prove to be in the right place, to find what was probably the only possible line of behavior that brought him the population's genuine respect. Today he—and this will said not to offend the other military leaders and officers—personifies for many people the image of the Soviet Army ambassador, a person who is honest to the nation and to his own conscience, who applies all efforts to normalize the situation in the republic and the region. On the eve of 23 February we give our sincere holiday wishes, in the person of Mikhail Semenovich, to all the military personnel, enlisted men, officers, and generals of the Yerevan garrison.

**Conference of Political Parties Held in Georgia**  
90US0511A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
23 Jan 90 p 3

[GRUZINFORM report: "A Step Toward Accord"]

[Text] The first conference of political parties, public associations and organizations of Georgia opened at Tbilisi University imeni Ivane Dzhavakhsishvili. Its participants are discussing the current situation in the

republic, and exchanging opinions about achieving political and economic independence.

In addressing those in attendance, Tbilisi University Professor Solomon Khutsishvili noted the conference's enormous significance as an important stage in the consolidation of the republic society to resolve the most complicated tasks facing it. It is now more important than ever to strengthen national agreement, and to come to a single opinion of the paths for achieving progress in all areas of life in Georgia.

On the first day of the conference, dedicated to an analysis of the political situation in the republic, the following spoke on the platforms of their organizations: Zurab Zhvaniya (Greens movement), Nodar Natadze (People's Front), Georgiy Mardzhanishvili (National-Liberal league of the People's Front), Georgiy Nodiya (Tbilisi Political Club), Akakiy Bakradze (Rustaveli Society), Aleksandr Rusetskiy (National Accord), and others.

The conference will continue for 4 days.

#### **CPSU Not Represented at Georgian Conference**

90US0511B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
23 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by Irina Inoveli: "They Eliminated Themselves..."]

[Text] In Tbilisi yesterday, the first conference of political parties and public organizations of Georgia began its work, calculated to last for several days.

Members of the most disparate political parties and associations crossed swords in quite pointed discussion of the situation in the country and paths toward its further development, thus demonstrating that although not yet having been permitted "from above," a multi-party system has nevertheless already become one of the realities of our rapidly changing life today. And it seems that only one party, the CPSU, has for some reason not expressed a desire to take part in the work of the conference. And so, it turns out again, a confrontation? But what happened to the appeals for a dialogue? Yet perhaps the CPSU representatives wanted to participate in the conference, but they were not allowed?...

Wishing to get answers to these questions, I call the Ordzhonikidzevskiy party raykom, since the conference is taking place within the territory of this rayon, on the premises of Tbilisi State University imeni Ivane Dzhavakhsishvili. Raykom First Secretary Dalila Bodzhgva picks up the phone. Upon hearing the question, she replies:

"You know, just today, at about one, I found out that such a conference was taking place. I found out quite by accident from the party committee secretary at Teymuraz Khurudze University..."

"Yes, but after all, the entire republic press announced this in advance. For example, back on 10 January, ZARYA VOSTOKA published an interview with one of

the members of the conference organizing committee, who said that the organizing committee was inviting all political parties, public associations, and organizations to participate in the conference. This unusual event is already known for a month, and the raykom found out about it just today."

"But you know what the last 3 weeks have been like for us..."

"That doesn't say anything. Could it be that nobody—nobody!—from among the raykom staffers watches the press, or did someone simply decide not to pay any attention to the report of the upcoming conference? Could it be that the raykom is waiting for instructions from above, as it used to be?"

"There are no such orders anymore... We work independently."

"Dalila Davidovna, I understand that orders on any matter are not issued from above now. But after all, there exists such a thing as thought inertia. The habit of 'not sticking out.' Not trying to show oneself up as being better informed than the leadership. And if there had been no 'orders' from above regarding the conference, perhaps the raykom itself was not to raise the issue with the gorkom? But what would have been better yet was to determine independently, take it upon yourselves to be bold enough to participate in the conference's work."

"Yes, probably... But I repeat, I learned about this measure just today, in the middle of the day. Incidentally, it should be specified as to who is holding it, and just why it is being held at the university..."

Such was my conversation with the party raykom first secretary, leading to sad reflections. A conversation causing the question hanging in the air to be asked more and more insistently: Can the old party apparatus work under the new conditions?...

#### **Georgian People's Front Member Evaluates Conference**

90US0511C Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian  
28 Jan 90 p 3

[Interview with Merab Mamardashvili, professor of the Georgian Academy of Sciences Philosophy Institute, and board member of the republic's People's Front, by Eka Akhalkatsi: "It is Time to Stand on Our Feet"; date and place not given]

[Text] The first conference of political parties, public associations and organizations of Georgia took place over the course of 4 days at the Tbilisi University imeni I. Dzhavakhsishvili. Its distinguishing feature: There were no indifferent people in the auditorium. Incidentally, there could not be any; after all, the most pointed, important problems associated with Georgia, today's Georgia, and the future's Georgia, were being discussed. Moreover, the conference must become an important stage on the path

toward drawing the political formations existing in our republic closer, in unifying them.

One of those who during these days, in his own words, "listened carefully and respectfully to all the proposals and concepts presented" was Merab Mamardashvili, professor of the Georgian Academy of Sciences Philosophy Institute, and board member of the republic's People's Front.

[Correspondent] What do you think, Merab Konstantinovich; did the conference serve as a step toward accord?

[Mamardashvili] If we have in mind the mutual explication of the positions of various parties and formations, I think that this goal has been achieved, even surpassed. The members of the conference coordinating committee must be thanked for that; from the very beginning, they managed to set a tone conducive to talking, and maintained it to the end, which, you will agree, is not very simple, considering our burning Georgian temperament.

Moreover, the conference's goal has been met in that we managed, as so seldom happens, to accomplish what we had agreed upon, and not what came up during while the matter was under way—we managed not to be distracted by current events. After all, events always occur, and will occur, and the day will never come when there is not a need to react to something, but then there will never be time to think a bit about anything. But the conference was just such an attempt to create a place and a rhythm for reflection, deliberations, adjustment of thoughts and conceptions, programs, policies, and tactics. The conference also showed that in my view, in any case, the situation in the party is better than could have been supposed, that the party has well-thought-out conceptions. There are all guarantees that the political process in Georgia will not be in danger of anarchy and chaos.

Perhaps I am quite optimistic in this case, yet it seems to me that a great many healthy thoughts were expressed. Despite their radical nature, they are healthy in form, and form has decisive meaning in politics... If something does not bring down this tone that has been taken, I think that political life in Georgia will develop in a healthy, and not a morbid way. It is not necessary for everyone to adhere to a single program; it is important that everyone adhere to a single political morality, specifically, the morality that political tolerance and unforced mutual consent and mutual concordance of positions.

Another thing is the moral result of this conference, its spiritual result, and it is this, it seems to me, that already presents complex problems. It presents them to the Georgian people, and this became particularly clear after the conference. Has the people indeed awakened; have people come to the sleep of passivity, inertia, and conformity? It seems to me that it would simply be a shame for our youth, this "incendiary material" of the national liberation and republic movement, if the basic mass of the Georgian people does not rouse itself by

force of youth's example in the face of their direct political task, specifically, in the face of the upcoming elections.

The people must simply be ashamed to continue, in the face of such a movement, to elect deputy-servitors, "marionettes." If the current Supreme Soviet adopts any sort of radical decisions, it does so only under the fear and pressure of the liberation movement, and this makes the decisions unsecure and unreliable; they cannot be counted upon, for the mere personal convictions, inner freedom, and civil courage of the deputies themselves cannot be a solid political basis and force. Yet all the time, we ourselves have elected obedient "marionettes of power," meaning that they are a part of ourselves. They are Georgians too. It is a shame for them, and for ourselves, the electors. And, I repeat, it is particularly shameful in the face of youth, the future of Georgia. It is all the more shameful that there is an opportunity to shake it off and understand that the continuation of the political inertia and passivity continues and eternalizes the slavish spectacle of our official parliamentary life, especially if we consider that we have the opportunity to halt this spectacle. This depends entirely upon the activity, the arousal of the fundamental masses, simply masses of the Georgian people.

This particularly concerns our statehood, which cannot be received—we must create it ourselves. For this, we need to study the capacity and skills for living and resolving all our problems ourselves, having eradicated for this, of course, all the servile and self-seeking habits of clever bustling.

In the process of the parliamentary campaign, some sort of measures must be undertaken by the deputies themselves, and the Government, and above all by the president, since I distinguish the president from party power. He also so distinguished himself, having occupied this post unique in the USSR political structure. Since this is the case, I feel that in order for the election campaign to recover and give a precedent for our desired political future, and to fill the authority of representative power with content, he can (and must) take one decisive step—now, immediately—dismiss the parliament, which has compromised itself, and hold elections (perhaps about 2 weeks later than the designated deadline), going over the head of the "party aktiv," over the head of servile parliament directly to the masses, to the people, to independent amateur public organizations and forces. The political self-awareness, political arousal of the basic mass of the people now has the deciding word. It is time to get on our feet! This lesson stems from a mutual exchange of opinions among parties. This is especially important if we consider the current Caucasus situation, which puts us face to face with the historical predestination and calling of Georgia. Georgia's synthesizing and conciliating function in the Caucasus stems from its geopolitical situation and the historical genotype of Georgian politics and statehood, with its inherent traditional links between West and East, its intermediary role and tolerance with regard to various ethnic groups and

cultures. The principle of the ecumenism, which has always been inherent in Georgian Orthodoxy, has also been preserved. In a word, the presence of the Georgian element in the common Caucasian life is special. And we cannot countermand this historical calling—it has been assigned by both geopolitics and history, by the same extent to which we Georgians are situated on the horizon of this predestination. We can fulfill it only on the basis of a newly obtained, independent statehood. It is a condition of a certain anti-empire, all-Caucasus front, of which we cannot speak without independent Georgian statehood, one that would get back its historical and political functions, including the function of international policy.

These functions must be returned. But they must be returned to someone. Georgian statehood must be reborn. This task exists regardless of whether we understand it or not, whether we are now on the level of its historical problems or not.

The conference fortified the rhythm of political life, and political life is the sum of interrelations among political forces. The existing parties, which they call "informals," and I put that word in parentheses, they are the reality. There cannot be two opinions about whether they must be legal. Moreover, I feel that the problem of legalization is not indeed a matter of the "informals"—their source is the popular sovereignty movement, that is, the sovereign desire of a nation. The problem of legalization is a matter for the Georgian Communist Party—let it genuinely take part in real national life. Only in dependence upon this can it receive an actual role and place in the spectrum of our political life. The capacity for this, and, consequently, for change, must be proven.

The very phenomenon of politics disappears under a monopoly in politics. On the one hand, the party and state turned into apolitical formations; on the other, the people were depoliticized. The condition of the people is a shameful sight, and I repeat once again, that it is time for us Georgians to wake up. To be ashamed of our own political representatives and of the fact that the people has been passively and slavishly electing them for a decade now...

[Correspondent] There are already over 100 political formations in Georgia. What do you think, is their quantity of use to Georgia's national movement?

[Mamardashvili] It is difficult to answer that, because while we are not living a real, normal political life, and the phenomenon of a multiparty system is still not a real, substantive phenomenon. This is until now an external multiparty system, since a genuine multiparty system can be created only after the differentiation and structuralization of a free and independent society, after the differentiation of the social fabric of interests differentiating one population group from another. Parties must not be distinguished on the basis of their leaders and concepts—that is insufficient. They must be distinguished by their representation of various interests,

various strata and groups of the population—the peasantry, the entrepreneurs, and others who form their political interests and theses through some sort of party. So long as this does not exist, we may come to it only through the differentiation of society's social fabric.

How to come to this? Obviously, we have now an interval, a transitional stage, and for the time being, this phenomenon of a multiparty system must be taken for what it is. There may be only two parties, yet really strong ones, or there could be even more. I do not know. We must still conduct an experiment, which way will be characteristic for us. After all, we do not have our specifically Georgian experience that would distinguish our political life. We do not have our own position, and we do not know what that should be: The period between 1918 and 1921 was too short to be convince us as to specifically what form of political differentiation characterizes us Georgians. I repeat: There is only one reality—pluralism, a complex and free public, economic, and cultural life.

#### Dialogue on Georgian-Ossetian Situation

18130048A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian  
10 Dec 89 p 4

[Article under rubric "Events in Tskhinvali" by KOMUNISTI Correspondent Givi Tedeyev, with Gruzinform report and editorial comment: "The Dialogue Continues"]

[Text] A dialogue was held in Tskhinvali, designed to defuse the situation in the South Ossetian AO [autonomous oblast]. It was participated in by oblast party and soviet officials, representatives of science, culture, and the public, USSR People's Deputy Eldar Shengelaia, Tbilisi Ivane Dzhavakhishvili State University Vice Rector Levan Aleksidze, Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences Philosophy Institute Director and Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Niko Chavchavadze, Georgian SSR Theater Workers' Society Chairman and USSR People's Artist Giga Lortkipanidze, motion picture director Merab Kokochashvili, and Doctor of Philosophy Major-General Kim Tsagolov, the chairman of Moscow's Parna Ossetian Culture Society.

The dialogue concerned the negative phenomena that have created a tense situation in the region. It was stated that there is a force which benefits from the strife between the Georgians and the Ossetians, and that we all must thoroughly perceive and understand it.

Participants in the dialogue noted that during the first stage of its existence, Adamon Nikhas did play a certain role, but that now it needs to be "dismantled." They decided it would be advisable to create a new social organization—an Ossetian Social-Democratic organization which would carry out measures useful to both sides.

The participants' speeches reflected the idea that we need to curb our emotions, understand one another,

avoid conflict situations, and restore the historical brotherhood and good relations that Georgians and Ossetians have had through the ages, because enmity and a position of strength are dangerous to both sides.

It was stated that hundreds of women and children had fled from Tskhinvali to other regions of Georgia and to North Ossetia, even though there is no danger of retaliations. The situation is becoming somewhat better in Tskhinvali. Most plants and enterprises are operating, and schools are open. Transportation is operating between Tskhinvali, Tbilisi, and other areas of the autonomous oblast; the railroad is again in operation.

Participants in the dialogue agreed that the most urgent task now is to stabilize the situation and to draw up a document designed to improve relations between the Georgians and the Ossetians.

Participants in the dialogue visited the oblast hospital, where they talked to the wounded. They also visited the South Ossetian State Pedagogical Institute, and they talked with representatives of the city's intelligentsia.

[Gruzinform report] At a rally in Tbilisi's Communards Park, representatives of the city's and nearby districts' Ossetian community drafted an appeal to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers.

The appeal stated, in particular, that participants in the rally, on behalf of the majority of Georgia's Ossetian inhabitants, reject the demands presented (supposedly in the name of the entire Ossetian nation) in the Adamon Nikhas Society's appeal that was sent earlier to the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers. In their own appeal, participants in the rally demanded that the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies not discuss but rather totally reject the Adamon Nikhas Society's appeal as being false, groundless, and invalid.

One paragraph in the document that was adopted at the rally states that any appeals that might be sent by the Adamon Nikhas Society in the future ought not to be accepted for discussion, since this organization does not reflect the opinions and interests of all the Ossetians residing in the territory of Georgia.

The same rally drafted an open letter to all Ossetians living in Georgia and to Georgia's social organizations. The letter calls upon them to spare no effort to ensure normalization of the situation, the triumph of reason, and restoration of the Georgian and Ossetian peoples' age-old brotherhood.

As we can see, the Georgian and Ossetian communities are actively involved in stabilizing the situation in the South Ossetian AO. The effort has already borne fruit: the clouds of misunderstanding and mistrust are dispersing; we are becoming stronger in the faith and hope that the two fraternal peoples' age-old friendship and mutual respect will triumph again.

This encouraging prediction was shared with millions of viewers by All-Union Television day before yesterday, on 8 December, during its popular morning program "120 minutes," on the basis of the relevant materials.

How regrettable it is, therefore, that the program "Vremya" that same evening broadcast a report which reflected the complex situation in the oblast in a rather one-sided and inaccurate light.

Let us hope that in its future broadcasts, "Vremya" will provide Soviet viewers exclusively with objective and verified information concerning both the autonomous oblast and the republic as a whole.

### Spokesmen For Two Georgian Parties Interviewed

18130052A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 21 Dec 89 p 4

[Interview with National Justice Party member Irakli Melashvili and National-Democratic Party member Irakli Kadagishvili by Marine Latibashvili: "By Parliamentary Means"]

[Text] Young people today constitute the majority and basic nucleus of the members of our republic's formal and informal associations, parties, and societies. Young people are in constant quest of truth. It is this spirit which infuses our correspondent Marine Latibashvili's conversation with National Justice Party member Irakli Melashvili and National-Democratic Party member Irakli Kadagishvili.

[Correspondent] There are a number of informal political parties in Georgia today. Each one of them is striving for Georgian independence. Because they exist separately, however, it may be that they each perceive a different path toward accomplishing this goal. How do you both see this difference?

[Melashvili] The difference is that as of today we think it is impossible just for Georgia to quit the Empire, and we recognize the gradual process that is taking place within it. We think that some of the republics should leave the "Union," thus promoting its disintegration.

In this case I believe that transformation of the inner structure of the Empire is one of the main processes. By that I mean, disintegration of the one-party system of soviets, a process which will lead to a multi-party system and genuine democracy. Genuine democracy does not exist outside a multi-party system, and so our aim is to create just such a multi-party system.

[Kadagishvili] To some extent our own aim is also a multi-party system. Political democracy cannot exist without it. As for the specific differences between the parties, the National-Democratic Party believes it is worthwhile and acceptable also to fight for the establishment of a multi-party system along with the restoration of independence. Recognition of a multi-party system, moreover, must take place in a form which replaces the



existing political system with a new one and results in a genuinely national, multi-party parliament.

There are other platforms, however, by parties which believe that it is as yet impossible to fight for and demand a multi-party system, which must come about as a result of some kind of action such as, for example, the removal of occupation forces and so on.

This constitutes one of the most important differences among the parties' positions—namely, when one party, along with independence, does not rule out a democratic stage in which a second party carries out a very powerful and political act such as the idea of national insubordination. The idea of national insubordination itself is acceptable to all parties, but it seems to me that the implementation of national insubordination depends strongly on the nation's psychic state. Insubordination is the kind of act which requires a certain psychic charge and attitude among the people. It is essential, therefore, to ensure that there is a simultaneous effort to provide for some sharing of political power in Georgia, the exact reflection of which would be the establishment of a multi-party system.

[Correspondent] What importance do you attach to the creation of the Main Committee for National Salvation?

[Melashvili] That association is of great importance. The creation of the National Salvation Committee will guarantee that the national movement will get out of the situation that has developed today—namely, that in the situation since 9 April the national movement has in fact failed to completely grasp the situation that has developed today not only in Georgia but all over the Soviet Union.

[Kadagishvili] As you know, the National Salvation Committee was created after 9 April, when the leading representatives of the national movement were in jail. Then a split occurred. But time and the course of events have shown us that unity of our national forces constitutes the main guarantee of our victory. It seems to me, therefore, that the unity of our main political forces in the National Salvation Committee is a wise political decision which is designed to benefit the Georgian nation.

[Correspondent] What do we gain from the acknowledgment by European states that Georgia is a country that was invaded and annexed?

[Melashvili] Although we don't place much hope on the support of the Western states, that acknowledgment is nevertheless essential. Unless we become the subject [subyekt] of international law, unless we make everyone understand that Georgia is a separate entity and needs to clarify its relations with a second entity—that is, Russia—we will gain nothing. This is the purpose of the demand that international missions be sent to Georgia and that, through them, the Georgian question be discussed in the United Nations, the European Parliament, and the European Council. As is well known, according to the Vienna Treaty, Georgia is part of the European Zone. That is, it has entered the sphere of international politics as a country in the European Zone; this is

extremely important. In general, moreover, Georgia's recognition as a separate international subject of law will help us in our struggle for freedom.

[Kadagishvili] If the countries of Europe recognize Georgia as a conquered country, we will gain politically. Europe, America, and international organizations will consider Georgia not as a state that voluntarily joined the Soviet Union but as a conquered and occupied country which needs political and moral support. So it is not, of course, a panacea for gaining independence, but it is a factor which will play the lion's share in the struggle. At this point I should like to mention the people's great interest in the session of the Supreme Soviet. Here is my position:

The Supreme Soviet passed a law concerning the fact of annexation. Although it speaks of the fact of annexation, it does not focus attention on the fact that the political institutions and political system in place since February 1921 are illegal. If this had been noted there, it would constitute full acknowledgment of the annexation.

[Correspondent] The political situation in our country is a very complex one. Today Georgia is a "fortress broken into from within." How do you assess the present internal political situation?

[Melashvili] Georgia's internal political situation has almost always been difficult. Since 9 April, everything has changed radically in the republic. Previously there was little but the opposition between the authorities and the informal associations. The situation is different now. Today, the task of resolving national problems is a major concern of the authorities as well, who now serve as defenders of the Georgian nation's interests. They no longer interfere with demonstrations. In other words, the situation has changed, and our tactics must change also. We must show the people which path to take. When a national movement becomes strong, it is immediately faced with ethnic conflicts. It is a union-wide pattern. The ill-informed population living within the republic's territory is supposedly fighting for their own rights, and the Central authorities and the press have taken the position that the interests of the other peoples in the republics are being infringed upon. It is a familiar pattern, and others used it long before the bolsheviks. The ethnic conflicts are especially "well-reflected" in Georgia, the Baltic republics, and Moldavia, the five republics where the struggle for independence is strongest.

[Kadagishvili] Georgia today is having a tough time of it in terms of internal politics. Several factors can be discerned: first, the Georgian nation is psychologically ready to receive the idea of independence. The national movement has been consolidated and enjoys unlimited authority among the people. From this it follows that our political enemy is trying to aggravate the internal situation. This is clearly reflected in the whole chain of ethnic crises in Georgia. The Georgian people are well aware of who is the author of these conflicts, whence he comes and what aim he pursues. Briefly, it is the ancient



imperial formula of "divide and conquer!" We must explain to the peoples living in Georgia that Georgians are by nature extremely philanthropic and that their struggle is founded on principles of international justice.

A second danger that comes from our adversaries is the creation of the People's Front. I personally have great respect for representatives of the People's Front, but the idea behind the creation of the People's Front itself was for the authorities to undermine the national movement's consolidating power and to shift the entire emphasis of the political struggle to the People's Front, which has declared itself the child of perestroika and whose political credo fits within the framework of perestroika.

A third factor is that in Georgia, just as all over the Soviet Union, the idea of the rehabilitation and resuscitation of the soviets has surfaced again, as is reflected in the fact that in Georgia as well as in Russia itself the Soviets took power by means of illegal violence. Today every attempt is being made to assure that today's elections are popular and universal. Let's keep in mind that if a government is elected in that way, it is legal. So what they want is to be able to tell us later that, sure, in 1921 some mistakes were made, some kind of annexation took place, but today everything has been corrected, the people have elected the soviets and have endorsed the existing political system. The soviets will be clear testimony of that. Even the slightest examination of Soviet laws, moreover, will show us that the republic Constitution must be in absolute agreement with the All-Union Constitution and that no radical decision can be taken unless all-union consent has been obtained.

A fourth factor that stands out clearly today: the authorities have now turned away from outright opposition and toward dialogue. Previously, everything seemed to be quite clear: if you made a speech, the government would put you down. You never even got a chance to develop your idea. Today the authorities are ready to talk with you about any issue, which makes their position more flexible and acceptable to the people. For our part, however, this necessitates new forms of struggle.

Hence, what we have here is four factors: the ethnic crisis, the rehabilitation of the soviets, the attempt to combine the national movement under the People's Front, and the authorities' switch to dialogue.

Now concerning the Ossetian question. It seems to me that, based on the present Constitution, the Georgian Supreme Soviet cannot abolish the oblast. Incidentally, there are forces within Ossetia with which we can find a common language. There is the danger that ethnic conflicts will also occur in Dzhavakhetia. We have been told this by our Armenian friends. We were visited by representatives of the "Armenian Pre-Parliamentary Movement" (there is such a movement in Armenia), who supplied us with reliable information. It was supposed to start this winter, but it was postponed until spring. Here again we must do everything possible to block this ethnic

crisis. If an "ethnic crisis spectacle" is put on for us in Dzhavakhetia, we must endeavor to at least weaken if not totally block the situation.

[Correspondent] Where does the national movement stand today, and how do you envision its future?

[Melashvili] Georgia's national movement has completed one stage, namely the "awakening" of the people. Do you know—when you offer the people something new, you must first prove that what is already in place is no good. We have proved that the system as it exists in Georgia is unacceptable to the Georgian nation and we must fight to create a new system.

The second stage is now underway. We must show the people effective ways to achieve independence. We must achieve a genuine parliament. The Supreme Soviet is not a parliament; rather, it is more similar to some panacea of a parliament [as printed], because in a one-party system any talk of true democracy is a fairy tale. Hence, we are still aiming toward a multi-party system; this is the stage that must now be passed through. We must direct the power which the Georgian people have manifested along the correct paths. If we cannot do so, our national movement will collapse.

[Kadagishvili] It seems to me that the Georgian people now need effective measures. The mass demonstrations that have been taking place in Georgia need to be stepped up. At the same time, other forms of struggle need to be found. It also seems to me that along with the referendum which we must organize, the people will have to make a wise decision—whether to vote for this or that proposition. It will be a test of the political parties' and the people's level of organization. In my opinion, the question of a multi-party system must be placed on the agenda.

### Georgians Deputies Chided for 'Silence' at Second USSR Congress

18130053A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian  
22 Dec 89 p 1

[Article under the rubric "Report From the Congress" by special correspondent Irakli Inashvili: "Questions Are Many, Answers..."]

[Text] Let us admit something that has become obvious: the rivalry has become increasingly intense at our country's Second Congress of People's Deputies, and it requires not only human maturity but also civic courage and great competence on the part of the members of our radically new parliament. To say nothing of the fact that everyone has some drawback, that only now are the deputies learning the art of politics. And we certainly must acknowledge that not everyone has an equal start, so to speak. While some of them already have access to the higher mathematics of politology, others are barely versed in its rudiments. Probably this accounts for the fact that, as we have observed more than once from the press gallery, many deputies—including ours—do not

vote themselves but turn their card over to their neighbors, thereby entrusting them with their own responsibility.

Concerning what happened at the Congress on Wednesday, 20 December, it would be better to talk with a jurist knowledgeable about affairs of state. But there is no such specialist among the deputies elected from Georgia. I must make special mention of the fact that we don't even have a jurist of any profile, let alone a specialist on matters of state and law! Is this right? Does it in any way enhance the authority and competence of the republic's group of deputies? You may dispute me on grounds that in the course of nominating and then electing candidates for deputy, primary importance was not placed on professionalism. That's true, of course. It's true, but not totally. Let us not dissemble: let us recall that during the elections of USSR People's Deputies there were attempts at manipulation. Therefore, we must not blame blind chance alone for the fact that there are more than enough apparatus officials among the deputies from Georgia, although there are plenty of cultural figures as well. Anyway, for example, there are only a couple of economists, let alone jurists. And, strictly speaking, perhaps there are not even a couple. It is regrettable.

In the discussion concerning matters of the operational time frame of the Congress, the status of USSR People's Deputies, and the revision of the country's Constitution (which today is more "leftist" than the constitutions of certain union republics) on 20 December, no one from Georgia took part. I do not intend to discuss the reasons for this. I will say one thing: on that day, deputies from other regions submitted quite a few very important democratic proposals. Unfortunately, most of their proposals were defeated in the voting. The Congress repeatedly demonstrated that there is no mechanism for defending minority opinion in its work, just as there is no mechanism for defending the will of deputies from entire regions, including, especially, the union republics.

The Congress rejected one Baltic deputy's proposal that the voting be organized according to republics, also a proposal concerning the right of veto. The Congress rejected them despite the fact that representatives from Armenia and certain other republics also demanded that norm. As the Chairman stated, the "qualified" majority decreed otherwise. The Congress also rejected a Ukrainian deputy's proposal that representatives of the various peoples be allowed to speak in their native language on the speaker's stand. The excuse was made that the technical capabilities for this were not available. Well, sir, perhaps it really would be too difficult to translate the almost 140 languages of the Soviet Union's nations and nationalities, but what about translating the languages of the union republics? Well, that's technically impossible also, and at any rate these questions have come too late—the train, as the saying goes, has already departed. Nevertheless, we are rather disappointed. We do not, after all, know what position our deputies took on this and other issues. The vote was not by roll-call,

and as we have noted, none of our deputies went up on the speaker's stand or asked for the microphone. During recess, to be sure, one of our deputies, a scientist, told me of his astonishment at the fact that, as he put it, the consciousness of the deputies from some of the republics was rather low, which in fact decided the fate of the ballot, but.... I repeat, however, that this reaction was the exception and did not change the atmosphere. And anyway, what difference does a conversation in the corridors make?!

The same thing—that is, silence on the part of our deputies—characterized the extremely heated discussion of amendments to the USSR Constitution. There may be those who think this remark is unfair. Well, I won't argue about it; after all, it's not only the deputy who goes up on the speaker's stand who is working here but also the one who is in the audience, even if he doesn't take the microphone. But when I asked some of our deputies directly why they were keeping silent, why they did not defend their position in public, I often got this answer: I don't consider myself sufficiently confident in these matters. But people who were very well informed about such things also said the same.

I know I'm talking about a touchy subject which we used to avoid, but we will have to talk about it sometime.... Especially considering the fact that elections to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet are almost upon us. And the level of competence of its members, their overall general and political level, will largely determine the maturity, correctness, and democratic quality of the decisions taken by the highest organs of state authority.

### **Georgian People's Front Chairman Interviewed**

*18130054A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian  
22 Dec 89 p 3*

[Interview with People's Front Board Chairman Nodar Natadze by Vilen Mardaleishvili: "Tell the Truth!: 'Careful, Relaxation Is Fatal!'" ]

[Text] Our readers probably remember that just a month ago we launched our rubric "Tell the Truth!" with an interview with Georgian Rustaveli Society President Akaki Bakradze.

Now let's listen to Georgian People's Front head Nodar Natadze.

[Mardaleishvili] My dear Mr. Nodar! It's true the Georgian Supreme Soviet session ended some while ago, but its significance is so great to our nation's future that it will continue to be the subject of discussion by our society.

I would like to know how you view the results of the session.

[Natadze] I must say that the session completely fulfilled my expectations. It passed significant amendments to the Georgian Constitution. Consider this one: all-union

law is in effect in Georgia only if the republic Supreme Soviet recognizes that the law is not in conflict with Georgia's interests.

Or consider this: the Georgian Constitution has been amended so that Georgia's land, water, forests, and all her natural resources are Georgia's **property**. The all-union Constitution includes an article which could never have come from the hand of a jurist. It states that the land, water, forests, and so on constitute the joint **appurtenances** [prinadlezhnost] of the whole "Soviet people." Appurtenances is not a juridical term; legally the word obligates no one to anything. Hence, this change in the Georgian Constitution is not in conflict with the all-union Constitution. Appurtenances are one thing, property is another. Property is a juridical term; appurtenances is a purely poetic metaphor. That article was inserted stealthily—thievishly, in fact—into the all-union Constitution during the Brezhnev era; the union republics weren't even given the chance to say anything. It's true that Brezhnev didn't quite dare state directly that the land, water, forests, and so on are the property of the Soviet Union, but he "technically" insinuated that they are the appurtenances of the Soviet people. In this way he enabled the bureaucratic apparatus to exploit our natural resources with impunity and to put us down psychologically, oppress us, and tell us that our lands are not our own—and to protect itself against any criticism by professional jurists. If anyone should object that the article constituted an infringement of the republic's rights, he would be told that it was simply a metaphor and didn't hurt anything....

In short, the Georgian Constitution now clearly states that all natural resources are the property of Georgia.

And here's another very important paragraph—Article 69. As we know, this article states that "the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; this right shall be sacred and inviolate." This wording was added to at the session. Here, let's read it word for word: "Any act or other means by the highest organ of state authority of the USSR to abolish or restrict the Georgian SSR's right freely to secede from the USSR shall not be permitted.

"From the moment any decision is made to abolish the Georgian SSR's right freely to secede from the USSR, the Georgian SSR shall be considered to have seceded from the USSR.

"...The question as to whether the Georgian SSR's right freely to secede from the USSR is being restricted shall be determined by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet."

You must agree that this is an extremely important proposition.

As I have said, the session fulfilled my expectations in this regard, but of course there are plenty of other issues and problems! For this reason, the Georgian SSR

Supreme Soviet ought to convene its next session without delay; those other problems also need to be dealt with....

[Mardeleishvili] What do you have in mind specifically?

[Natadze] Well, consider the recent events in Tskhinvali.... As you know, the Supreme Soviet has created a commission to study the matter, and hopefully it will come to a conclusion that is meaningful, precise, and takes all arguments into consideration....

[Mardeleishvili] I am aware that you have been going to Tskhinvali every day, sometimes twice a day, during the events taking place there. What is the present situation in Inner Kartli?

[Natadze] It's bad.... Let's not fool ourselves—the situation there is tense. There are those who wish to portray things as if only a couple of illiterate extremists are committing crimes. The sad fact is that these extremists have attracted a mass of followers. It's sad: the process of schooling and education is such that it has made the people forget that they are living on Georgian soil. Well, let them do so, but they ought to be aware that it is Georgia's land and no one else's. I cannot recall any other time in Georgia when Georgians were insulted and beaten up just because they were Georgians. But this is what is now happening in many districts of Georgia.... Provocations are staged, obviously prepared in quite another quarter, by the so-called "Third Force," whose bait has been taken by populations of several categories....

[Mardeleishvili] Do you see any way out of the situation?

[Natadze] One solution is for every Georgian community to be prepared at any time to be able to repel any aggressive action on its own. And I would like to add one thing: it seems we have all thought that no Interfront could arise in Georgia. As you know, Interfront is a modern version of the Black Hundreds. The revolutionaries and progressive thinkers applied the term "Black Hundreds" to the organization which was officially named the "Russian People's Alliance" and which, with the support of the Cossacks, crushed and routed everything that was progressive, settled scores with everyone who attempted to fight tyranny. Its present-day version is the rise of the Interfronts which have been created in the Baltic republics. We believed that no Interfront would be created in Georgia because the non-Georgians living here have a stable life and should therefore have a sense of responsibility for the future fate of their own ethnic groups. But it turns out, unfortunately, that an Interfront circle is gradually being formed.... What are we to do, then? We must be careful, very careful, for relaxation is fatal!

[Mardeleishvili] Mr. Nodar, I believe that the People's Front is supposed to help deal with a variety of social and national problems that exist in Georgia now. Has it been able to do so yet?

[Natadze] Our activities are supposed to serve a lofty goal—Georgia's independence, the creation of a democratic, happy society. Our activities include tireless efforts to revive the Georgian countryside, settle land-use problems, and a great deal more, but ever since the People's Front was formed there has been no end of tension in Georgia, and we have shifted all our energies to dealing with that.... So far, in short, we are not in charge of events, they are in charge of us. We have to hope that this is only temporary.... And let me now take the opportunity to say something to KOMUNISTI's readers: a lot of people have jumped on the People's Front's bandwagon. They go around in our name and do things that are unbecoming to anyone. There have even been cases of extortion....

[Mardeleishvili] Mr. Nodar, the old year is soon coming to a close, a year that was sad and bitter for all of Georgia. Do you perhaps have some statement to encourage the Georgian people for the new year?

[Natadze] It is true that Georgia has not had such a difficult year for a long time. It has been a morally difficult year, but at the same time we could say that the year has been one of spiritual revival for the Georgian people. Let us hope that our spiritual revival will continue to grow. Let us hope that we will experience fewer misfortunes.

#### **'Rumors' of Adjarian Separatism Criticized, Discounted**

18130057A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 26 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by Taniel Putkaradze: "An Enemy Cannot Harm His Enemy as Much as a Man Can Harm Himself"]

[Text] It is common knowledge that imperialist powers, opponents of society's natural development, bend every effort to preserve their imperial integrity (for some of our countrymen, the Empire constitutes a guarantee of a soft job). Under conditions of semi-democracy, they find it most expedient to achieve their aims by setting in motion a whole array of institutions (establishments) fomenting provocations and rumors. Our enemies are well aware that they can put a stop to the struggle for Georgia's independence only by setting Georgians against one another. (There is another danger as well—Don Quixotism in politics—but this latter is characteristic of the beginning stages of the national movement....) Therefore, by utilizing all kinds of disinformation they not only get us to take up arms against others but also attempt to pit the Georgians of various districts against one another. So far, their activities have been most vigorous in areas of Western Georgia. In our opinion, television and the press have been helping them achieve their aims. In particular, any public discussion of some rumor or provocation, any public denial of some brainless politician's venomous opinion by persons in authority, frequently produces the opposite effect, often serving as **negative advertising** [antireklama]. In addition, public repetition of a falsehood (even in order to deny it) serves to spread the rumor....

At the present stage in Georgia's history, the henchmen of the aforementioned Empire are at work in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi, and just about everywhere else. Their every political sally is made to order for the Georgian people's psychological situation today. In particular, because our nation today lacks a perfected, unified political image (such as they have in the Baltics, for example), any tongue-wagging among the public at large spreads as fast as a plague in swampy land. At the same time, when searching for the sources of rumors people often forget this admonition from the Gospels: "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye?" And they begin to blame and revile one another.... And Satan stands nearby laughing with silent, evil laughter and prepares the next clash....

Under conditions of a shortage of correct information, superficial conclusions are often drawn, facts are blown out of proportion or, to some extent deliberately, distorted. All of this can result in unfortunate consequences. To make the following discussion easier, let us consider two specific cases:

1. Recently I ran across an acquaintance who is a leader of the People's Front at TSU [Tbilisi State University]. He spoke despairingly of the past and present of Adjara, one of Georgia's districts. He offered categorical assessments of recent events there. Finally he asked me whether it was true that men are not working in Adjara.... Of course I told him the truth and explained that because of their hard life, Adjarians have to keep busy winter and summer. I told him about the characteristic features and traditions of life there.

My conversation with this honorable man once more revealed one of our misfortunes: **we do not know one another**. For this reason, we frequently draw serious conclusions from trivial, random instances. We forget that seeing once is better than hearing a hundred times, and we tend to trust some insidious person's false or one-sided report. We tend to analyze reports from stereotypical angles....

I have deemed it necessary to reveal this private conversation because both in Tbilisi and in Batumi (and elsewhere) there are many persons whose consciousness is clouded with superficial views....

2. At the behest and with the encouragement of imperialist forces, a small group of ambitious persons has been formed in Batumi (parties and societies have been formed in Tbilisi on the basis of similar behests!). Against the background of the national forces in Adjara, the group looks rather bankrupt and is hardly worth talking about in public. Yet, in the past two weeks the republic press has already published three articles about the harmfulness of this "separatist" group (it would be more accurate to call it "careerist group"). For some reason we forget that even public denunciation to some extent constitutes advertising. Our society is not homogeneous, and after that negative advertising in public

they might be able to gather ill-informed forces together. For example, Tsarist Russia denounced the bolsheviks to the point that it rallied the dark forces around them. We have denounced Adamon Nikhas until we have made it into a group posing a serious danger (let us also keep in mind the "forbidden fruit" complex that is in man). Groups of that sort, generally, do not enjoy much influence in the public at large. It is not necessary to exaggerate the danger they pose. Local national forces can deal with them successfully. In connection with this specific case, it is essential that we always keep in mind one thing: the Adjarian ASSR is the only autonomous formation that is ready for abolition but is politically calm. The divisive forces are unhappy about that and so have begun to labor more intensively in that part of Georgia.... For our part, we ought to measure what we say and do more deliberately....

Hence, nothing unusual is taking place in Adjaria today (this can be clearly seen in a letter that was printed in Issue No 4 of the newspaper SAKARTVELO, titled "Processes Taking Place in Adjaria"). There is no need to panic! Fortunately for us, there are sufficient forces in the Batumi district to ensure that Adjaria will continue to be one of the main bulwarks in the struggle for Georgian independence!

#### **Abkhazian Group of Georgian People's Front Has Own Paper**

*18130058A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 4 Jan 90 p 3*

[Article by Ketevan Sadgobelashvili: "To Establish the Harmony That Has Become a Memory"]

[Text] "In no time or epoch has Georgia or the Georgian people ever been immune from surges of Jassons and attempts to pillage Georgia's spiritual and material treasures.

"The Georgian nation's history and centuries of struggle constitute a struggle to regain its Golden Fleece, its stolen treasures and freedom!..."

These words proclaim the purpose and the motives conferring the right to exist on the Georgian People's Front's Abkhazian Regional Organization newspaper OKROS SATSMISI [Golden Fleece].

The first edition of the newspaper offers materials concerning the functions and principles of the Abkhazian Regional Organization of the Georgian People's Front, also concerning the sources and consequences of the bloody tragedy of July and August of 1989.

OKROS SATSMISI presents materials devoted to the memory of Merab Kostava, Vova Vekua, and Soso Adamia.

Under the rubric "Field of Blood" the newspaper presents accounts of the tragedy of July and August by direct participants and eyewitnesses. These are articles written

with unaccustomed truthfulness, and in the not-too-distant future they will be called annals.

When Judas, who betrayed Jesus, saw that people had condemned him, he repented, returned the 30 pieces of silver to the elders and high priests, and said, I have sinned and betrayed innocent blood.... The first edition of OKROS SATSMISI enables us to hope that anyone, individual or group, who has stooped to killing, will repent of his crime and beg forgiveness.

OKROS SATSMISI probably has no greater purpose....

#### **Georgian Refugees From Ossetia Recount Atrocities**

*18130059A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian 5 Jan 90 p 6*

[Article by Aleko Aslanishvili: "Shocking Brutality. Crisis Situation in Inner Kartli"]

[Text] What happened on the night of 3 January in Tskhinvali Rayon's village of Prisi is so shocking in its brutality, so horrifying, that I find it difficult to describe (when they heard the news, even hardened male journalists could not hold back their tears). An armed mob had attacked the Nikorishvili family and... shot a nine-month-old child in its cradle (the baby, critically wounded in the head, was taken to the Gori Hospital but could not be saved).

One more barbaric act! The blood of 17-year-old Vepkhia Tutarashvili of Tamarasheni was hardly dry, and now another victim. The tears of a gang-raped and savagely tortured Georgian girl hardly had time to dry, and now one more crime!

People's patience is at an end. Yesterday, 4 January, a large delegation from Eredvi, Kurta, Kemerta, and Prisi and other villages rushed down to Tbilisi in search of justice—more than 150 women, men, youngsters, and old persons. They came to the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee publishing house and demanded a meeting with the press.

The meeting was held in KOMUNISTI's assembly hall. It was participated in by republic newspaper editors, officials of the State TV and Radio Committee, representatives of the Georgian Rustaveli Society, the People's Front, the Saint Ilia the Righteous Society, the Helsinki Group, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the press.

An emotional, uncompromising discussion took place. These people from Inner Kartli portrayed very grave pictures of the life of Georgians there.

**Giorgi Kristesiashvili**, an old man who has gone through a great deal, cannot hide his emotion. "We Georgians are in terrible trouble. In effect, we are without rights. Militia officers of Ossetian nationality themselves take part in attacks against us. We are afraid to go to Tskhinvali. We can't get any food from there; everything



is distributed to the Ossetian villages. If it were not for Gori Rayon's help we would starve. Armed bands roam about with automatic rifles and machine guns. The village of Kheiti suffered an armed attack on 3 January. Kekhvi, Kurta, Dzartsemi, and other villages are practically under siege."

**Lali Tsotniashvili:** "The episode in Prisi is certainly no exception. On 1 January shots were taken at Pridon Bortsvadze of Eredvi, who was taking his wife and children for a car ride. Vigenti Kristesiashvili's car was also shot at. Both miraculously survived. Tskhinvali Radio, however, broadcasts items about 'Georgian brutality' and stirs up people's blood."

**Lali Baliashvili:** "I am a Tskhinvalian, but I have taken refuge in Eredvi with my husband and children. They threaten us. I and my child have been accosted walking on the street. Someone held a revolver to my boy's chest and pulled the trigger. The gun did not go off—it was not loaded, but it was like I died anyway. Georgian School No 1 has been attacked three times. I don't know how, but it is a fact that armored troop carriers are transporting extremists along with soldiers. There is shooting every night."

**Zhuzhuna Kasradze:** "When the people from Tbilisi came to Tskhinvali on 23 November, I took some food to the hungry lads. When the people found out about it they made my life hell. I was forced to take refuge in Eredvi. Nevertheless, my husband and I decided to greet the New Year in Tskhinvali, in our own house. But on the evening of 2 January, someone started shooting near our windows; I still haven't got over it."

**Mikheil Kristesiashvili:** "On 27 November we arrested several armed men, confiscated their weapons and turned them over to our militia. But they were immediately released. They have been made so bold by this indulgence that they are certain to do us more harm tomorrow."

**Liana Zubashvili:** "My brother-in-law Sevasti Zubashvili was wounded. We took him to the hospital in Gori. The next day, Tskhinvali Radio announced that the Georgians had wounded another Ossetian, Severian Zubayev. Hence, the number of 'victimized' Ossetians has grown by one more."

Eighty-year-old **Luba Alborova-Vakhtangashvili** made these disquieting remarks: "My husband and brother-in-law died in the war. I raised my three children as orphans. I have nine grandchildren. I thought I would be able to enjoy my old age, but I can't because of worrying about them. Our people can't do anything; they stand guard on the roads and at the edge of the woods to prevent attacks on families. There shouldn't be any need to argue that Tskhinvali is Georgia. I've been around a long time. I can remember when there were scarcely more than one or two Ossetians in Tskhinvali. It was mostly Georgians who lived there: Kasradzes, Mindiashvilis, Chovelidzes and others. There were Armenians

and Jews too. It was later, in the 1920s, that the Ossetians began to drift down from the mountains to the city."

**Lili Beruashvili** cannot hold back the tears: "Four men go away from my house every day, and I never know whether they will come back alive. As long as I have any strength I will stand by them—where they are, I am too; if there is to be dying, I will die with them. We can't go on living in fear all the time. Our government and our militia are dragging their feet and are not helping us. Help us, people!"

**Tsisana Vakhtangashvili:** "I work as an orderly on an ambulance brigade, and I have seen for myself, in the Ossetians' 'Defense Headquarters' (which is located in the Tskhinvali House of Weddings), young Georgian men who have been savagely beaten and are then shown on television."

**Natela Bagashvili:** "The persecution and abuse of Georgians in Tskhinvali have become outrageous. On 20 November I fell ill and called the doctor. When he found out I was Georgian he did not come that day or the next, but he immediately showed up at my Ossetian neighbor's house. In the library where I work they have categorically forbidden me to touch anything or add anything to the Georgian holdings. All of my Georgian neighbors have been robbed."

**Givi Bortsvadze**, Georgian Television's correspondent in South Ossetia, cited examples of discriminative cadre policies. He emphasized that great numbers of arms are coming in from North Ossetia via the Roki Tunnel.

**Vakhtang Gvaramia**, deputy chief of the Investigation Administration of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], who tried to give the assembly an up-to-date idea about the situation in South Ossetia, expressed regret over the fact that the Georgians do not always come to the militia in cases of attack or abuse in order to register each episode. His remarks were interrupted by retorts that it is hard to get to the militia there, that the South Ossetian Militia refuses to register crimes against Georgians, that in general the Georgian Militia is rather impotent, that the field infirmaries that have been promised to the people of Eredvi have yet to be set up, and that Major Gia Sanakoyev, who himself abused a wounded Georgian Militia Officer, is still going around wearing his uniform...."

In short, the situation that has developed in Inner Kartli is such that it cannot fail to horrify us. The people who had come down to Tbilisi conveyed the demands of the Georgians living in Ossetia: The situation is extremely critical. The responsible organs are intolerably inactive. Empty promises and occasional measures are not enough. The republic militia must take the situation in Tskhinvali into its own hands. The so-called "Defense Headquarters" there has to be abolished....

The discussion was participated in by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Elizbar Dzhavelidze, Apolon Silagadze, Mindia

Ugrekheldidze, Giorgi Gachechiladze, Guram Koranashvili, Ramin Chelidze, Marine Tektumanidze, Levan Topuridze, Valeri Kvaratskhelia, Vladimir Gogolashvili, and others.

People complained that the republic press, radio, and television have not been providing the public with exhaustive and up-to-date information concerning the situation in Inner Kartli, while the all-union press is publishing one-sided and basically disinformative materials. Georgian journalists sent an appeal to the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Council of Ministers.

Our correspondent Guram Vashakidze has informed us that yesterday at 2:00 a big rally was held in Gori concerning the extremely serious situation in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. Speakers at the rally included G. Gumbardidze, N. Chitanava, and Gori Gorkom [city party committee] Secretary A. Kavsadze.

### **Tbilisi Demonstrations, Transport Strike Reported**

*18130060A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 11 Jan 90 p 1*

[Report by Gulnara Basharuli and Rusudan Lebnidze: "Will the Seedling of Hope Thrive?"]

[Text] Events are taking place so rapidly in Tbilisi these days, and so many new troubles are coming up, that it has become necessary to register and record each day separately. Yesterday morning in front of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee building we met with Georgians who have come down from Samachablo and who have for two weeks now been demanding solutions to vitally important problems. They told us that the first encouraging steps have finally been taken. In particular, the government has made a decision concerning the placement of guards [kontrolery] at the Roki Tunnel, and the headquarters in the Tskhinvali House of Weddings—a center for fomenting ethnic strife—has been dismantled. We are all well aware what it has cost to obtain this beginning consolation. Consider, for example, that even Georgian mothers and grandmothers, who have experienced so much misfortune, have had to leave their homes, stand side by side with their men, and for three days now have spent days and nights in the lobby of the Central Committee. We have to admit that we did not manage to get in to see them, but we have been able to get a sense of their mood. They do not intend to throw down their arms until truth and justice have triumphed. How can you throw down your arms when you stand beside the mother and father whose baby was murdered in its cradle and who didn't even have time to grieve?

Along with the slogan near the Central Committee building demanding abolition of the illegally created South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, our attention was attracted by another one: "Rid Us of Aspindza Raykom [rayon party committee] Secretary Maruashvili." What

did he do that was wrong, we asked the Aspindzians who had gathered there. You ought to ask what he did that was right and we could give you a quicker answer, they said. Despite everything, apparently, they have not lost their sense of humor....

Yesterday was the third day of the hunger strike in front of Government House. National-Democratic Party leader Giorgi Chanturia told us that the demonstration is being participated in by 57 persons representing parties that make up the National Salvation Committee, and that other citizens are not joining them.

As for the transport workers' strike that was started yesterday morning, Giorgi Chanturia told us that the strike was organized at the behest of the National Salvation Committee, and that all forms of transport had gone on strike except for those involved in serving medical and food supply outfits, including special-purpose transport. It was not considered advisable for the subway and taxicabs to go on strike. (According to data from the city's transport association, at 9:00 in the morning on 10 January 597 buses, 124 trolleys, 58 streetcars, and 220 minibuses were supposed to go on duty. A total of 346 buses, 66 trolleys, 12 streetcars, and 215 minibuses did go on duty; most of them were sent back to their garages or stopped by pickets on the streets.)

Giorgi Chanturia explained why the demonstrators are demanding that representatives of the all-union government come down to Georgia. It is true, he said, that we have never placed our hope or trust in Moscow, and we don't now, but there's no other way. Real power today is in the hands of Moscow, not the Georgian government.

This is the position of one political leader, but the vigil-holding mothers of murdered children on Rustaveli Prospekt, the Georgians who have come down from South Ossetia, and all kinds of other people are still looking hopefully to the Georgian government.

Perhaps the seedling of hope will thrive....

### **Society Formed To Promote Order in Georgian Ossetia**

*18130061A Tbilisi LITERATURULI SAKARTVELO  
in Georgian No 2, 12 Jan 90 p 15*

[Article by Guram Sharadze: "The Ivane Machabeli Society"]

[Text] On 8 January in Tbilisi, the Constituent Assembly of the Ivane Machabeli Society was held in the Georgian Academy of Sciences Computer Center. It must be said that the founding of this Society is very timely and essential. Its sole purpose will be to find timely and objective solutions to the problems of Inner Kartli. The founding of the Ivane Machabeli Society has been endorsed by the Georgian Justice Ministry and the Georgian Council of Ministers Juridical Department. It was registered in the Georgian Council of Ministers on 3

January. In the near future it will have its own account in the Zhilsotsbank; its own banner and emblem.

The functions and aims of the Ivane Machabeli Society are explained to us by its chairman, doctor of philosophy **Guram Sharadze**:

"The Ivane Machabeli Society is a voluntary association whose purpose is to settle interethnic conflicts, to restore the age-old good relations between Georgians and Ossetians, to establish scientific contacts with scholars of both nationalities who have direct contacts with Inner Kartli, to return people who have migrated from there back to their homes, to protect the district's historical monuments, to reinstate worship services which have been so unjustly neglected, to institute a Vanooba [Ivane Machabeli festival] in the village of Tamarasheni, and to open Kristepore Areshidze's house-museum in Tskhinvali. It is also necessary to found a Georgian-language literary almanac in Tskhinvali in order to provide objective information on the local life of the district. We must also ask the Tbilisi Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] to give the Ivane Machabeli House on Tbilisi's Lenin Street to the Society as its residence; at present the house contains a workshop and a housing administration office. In short, the Ivane Machabeli Society must spearhead all the cultural measures which the Georgian public considers necessary. It must be said that there are many people all over Georgia who want to join us. Our collective members include the Justice Ministry, the Health Ministry, the Education Ministry, the Highways and Transport Ministry, and others. We must all stand by one another and do the great and urgent things that have been set in motion by the newly founded Ivane Machabeli Society."

Speakers at the constituent assembly of the Ivane Machabeli Society expressed their deep concern over the difficult social-political developments in Inner Kartli. They included Docent Lovard Tukhashvili, Professor Levan Sanikidze, writer Merab Eliazishvili, Professor Aleksandre Glonti, Professor Ioseb Megreldize, and others.

At the close of the Constituent Assembly, on behalf of Georgians from Samachablo, G. Geladze read the text of an appeal to the Georgian government, signed by members of the Society for the Defense of the Samachablo Heritage, which was active prior to the founding of the Ivane Machabeli Society.

The Appeal states that in order to correct the difficult social-political situation that has developed in Inner Kartli it will be necessary to take radical measures, in particular:

The republic authorities must create guarantees of the safety of the native population of the district in order to provide constitutional protection for the inhabitants of the district.

The status of the "South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast" must be reviewed as soon as possible. In order to halt

migration from the highland districts it is essential to dismantle the big industrial enterprises in the region (the Vibration Machine Plant, the Enamel Pipeline Plant, the Mechanical Plant, the Bus Repair Plant, the Chemical Plant, and the Textile Combine), because the manpower for them is being recruited at the expense of agricultural manpower, leading to a catastrophic decline in the output of agricultural goods and the depopulation of the highland rayons. Also essential is a Georgian-language newspaper in the district, its name and contents to be in Georgian, the allocation of a Georgian theater in Tskhinvali, radical changes in cadres, abolition of the informal association Adamon Nikhas, and the institution of court proceedings against its leaders on charges of fomenting interethnic strife, examination of all printed matter having to do with the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast in order to prevent the falsification and distortion of historical facts and place names.

#### **Georgian National-Democratic Party Demonstrators Report Gains**

18130062A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 13 Jan 90 p 4

[Report by Gulnara Basharuli and Rusudan Lebanidze:  
"The Truth Above All!"]

[Text] Representatives of the National-Democratic Party are staging a hunger strike in the lobby of the Kartuli Pilmi Cinema. Yesterday we met with Giorgi Chanturia, the leader of the party, who told us that starting on 14 January the hunger strike will be continued by new groups, while those on strike now will repair to the Sioni Cathedral to take Holy Communion. One new development of the past two days is the fact that the religious protest rally has resulted in the abolition of the apparatus of the Georgian Council of Ministers' Religious Affairs Office. On the basis of old Georgian traditions it is planned to create a Secular Institute of Religious Affairs which will take part in meetings of the Church Synod. The Secular Institute will include representatives of the various parties. It will mark one more step toward bringing the Church and the people together. Yesterday, all the churches in Tbilisi rang their bells in affirmation of solidarity with the Baltic republics. It is a sign of the unity of the struggle of the Baltic and Georgian peoples.

As far as the strike is concerned, transport outfits except for the subway and taxicabs are still on strike, and they have been joined by strikes in enterprises. According to Giorgi Chanturia, as of yesterday morning 24 of Tbilisi's enterprises were on strike, including several under union-republic jurisdiction. It has been learned that protest demonstrations have also been started in outlying rayons.

We finally managed to get into the lobby of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, where Georgians

who have come down from Samachablo are still gathered. We talked with many of them and learned of their grief.

The question of placing the Roki Tunnel under guard has not yet been settled. As for the Adamon Nikhas Headquarters, while it is true that they have been forced to vacate the Tskhinvali House of Weddings, the Headquarters is continuing its activities very near there in a private home on Lenin Street. Hence, as the Samachablo Georgians told us, it is premature, to put it mildly, to speak of any stabilization of the situation. That is the simple truth, and nothing's going to help unless we tell the truth....

### Investigation of Georgian Ethnic Clashes Continues

18130063A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian  
16 Jan 90 p 4

[Gruzinform interview with First Deputy Georgian SSR Procurator N. Shoshiashvili and Deputy Justice Minister A. Taliashvili: "Not One Criminal Will Escape Responsibility!"]

[Text] As we know, during the tragic events last year in Lower Kartli, Inner Kartli, and Abkhazia, criminal proceedings were instituted against persons who had committed crimes. To date we have had no complete information as to any progress in the investigation of these cases. The Georgian public is concerned about the detection and punishment of those who took part in or organized these events.

At a Gruzinform correspondent's request, First Deputy Georgian SSR Procurator N. Shoshiashvili and Deputy Justice Minister A. Taliashvili talked to us. Here is what they had to say:

[N. Shoshiashvili] We have to keep in mind that the investigation of these cases entails overcoming a number of additional difficulties, such as, for example, a certain amount of opposition, a considerable amount of work to determine the role of each of the accused, and so on. We cannot, therefore, agree with the notion that since the crime is obvious there is nothing to investigate. This just isn't so. Jurists have assured me that investigations come up against particular difficulties in crimes of this type.

What has the Procuracy done specifically? Regarding the events in Lower Kartli, 47 criminal cases have been instituted, and 23 have already been turned over to the courts. There are 41 investigators at work there now.

In connection with the Abkhazian tragedy, 116 criminal cases have been instituted against 132 persons. Seventy-four persons have been jailed. Significantly, one out of every three of them is an official, and 16 are former high officials of the Abkhazian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. I can name former Oчамchире Rayon Procurator V. Gurdzhua and the same rayon's chief of the OVO [Non-departmental Guards Department], Militia

Major D. Shlarba, who were caught concealing 1200 hunting rifles, robbing the Hunters' Union Store, and arming Abkhazians with the weapons they stole. Proceedings have been instituted against Militia Captain G. Kvaratskhelia, chief operations officer of the Sukhumi Station's Militia Line Department, for the murder of Citizen Kogonia; Militia Senior Lieutenant V. Zukhba, senior inspector in the Abkhazian ASSR MVD Criminal Investigation Department, for organizing mass disorders and taking part in them—incidentally, his safe was found to contain more than half a kilogram of unregistered anasha [a narcotic] and 7000 rubles; Senior Inspector T. Gunia, head of the Cadre Department in the same Ministry; Deputy Pitsunda Resort Director N. Bganba; Gudauta Rayon Ordzhonikidze Selsoviet [village soviet] Secretary O. Pkhazaria; and others. Abkhazstroy Automotive Transport Enterprise Director V. Agrba has been charged with unlawful possession of weapons and abuse of office.

Five murders have been solved. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against a number of persons who took active part in the attack on the TSU [Tbilisi State University] affiliate located in Sukhumi School No 1, also in organizing the attack against some Georgians in Rustaveli Park. A court investigation is underway concerning the case of I. Palba, who is charged with the murder of V. Vekua.

In addition, a special brigade of the republic Procuracy is studying the role played by a number of officials in fomenting strife between Georgians and Abkhazians, which resulted in tragic consequences. Sufficient evidence has been accumulated against a number of them, and the question of whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against them will be decided in the near future.

In connection with the events in South Ossetia, 84 criminal cases have been instituted, two of which involve the instigation of ethnic conflict. One of them is against Adamon Nikhas leader A. Chochiyev. Investigation is underway into attempts on the lives of citizens N. Tegashvili, P. Nikorishvili, N. Samniashvili, V. Tutarashvili, T. Tigiyev, V. Driayev, and G. Khorava.

The republic Procuracy is making every effort to investigate each case, call everything by its right name, and institute proceedings against every culprit regardless of his social status, position, or national affiliation.

[A. Taliashvili] 79 cases have been submitted to the republic courts for examination. As of today, the courts of Abkhazia have examined 25 cases. Sentences have been handed down against 29 persons. Three have been convicted of fomenting ethnic conflict, 11 have been convicted of gross violations of public order, 15 have been convicted of organizing mass disorders resulting in killings, armed attacks, gunfights, raids and depredations, and so on. There are 24 cases in progress. They include the criminal case of V. Inapshba, who is charged with the shooting deaths on 21 July 1989 of Cadet

Akopov and Lieutenant Novikov, who were on duty maintaining public order in Ochamchire Rayon.

The courts of South Ossetia have now examined six criminal cases, including one involving M. Chochiyev, who put up resistance against MVD officers, and V. Zakharov, who on 29 September 1989 inflicted physical and verbal abuse upon some truck drivers who reported for duty.

Twenty-three criminal cases are in progress in the courts for crimes committed in Lower Kartli, and sentences have been handed down in 19 of them. A. Kerimov has been found guilty and sentenced to six years imprisonment under Article 75 of the Georgian SSR Criminal Code for fomenting ethnic conflict. Ex-Militia Major U. Aliyev faces a sentence of four years and driver Amirov has been sentenced to three years; in June of this year these men took active part in malicious gang hooliganism in Bolnisi, actions designed to foment ethnic conflict that resulted in grave consequences.

In addition, persons convicted in connection with the events in Lower Kartli also include one Georgian and one Armenian.

The republic's courts are continuing their examination of cases of this sort.

N. Shoshiashvili and A. Taliashvili have promised that they will continue to inform the public regularly about the progress of the investigation and court proceedings.

### **Georgians Urged To Vote Against Entrenched, Discredited Officials**

*18130064A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 18 Jan 90 p 5*

[Lenin Rayon Regional People's Front Appeal: "To All Members of the Georgian People's Front and All Citizens of Georgia"]

[Text] Everyone is aware of the great responsibility every voter bears in the coming elections. Many worthy candidates for deputy will be opposed by the bureaucratic forces of the present government [vlast]. They will be opposed by those who organized and incited Georgian young people against each other on 18 February, those who spoke at various meetings and utilized all the media to denounce the revival of the national-liberation movement in Georgia and demanded that proceedings be instituted against the movement's leaders, those who labeled persons involved in the national movement extremists.

There will be persons striving to become people's deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet who greeted the appearance of Kochetov and Rodionov with thunderous applause at the 8 April party-economic aktiv, those who made the decision at that meeting to make use of force to halt the rally, who betrayed their own people and employed troop units against them. The post of deputy

will be sought by persons who at the same meeting unanimously shouted, "...Georgia must be socialist and in the fraternal family of Soviet peoples, there is no other way!" (see KOMUNISTI, 9 April 1989). People of this sort must not be entrusted with the fate of Georgia. It is unacceptable even to nominate them as candidates for deputy to the Supreme Soviet; they do not have the moral right to be people's deputies of Georgia. We firmly believe this, we are convinced of it, and therefore we appeal to you, our dear countrymen, as follows:

Let us voice no-confidence in all those who participated in the aforementioned measures—regardless of nationality, occupation, or position. Let us not permit their election to the Georgian Supreme Soviet.

### **Georgia's Armenians Urge Countrymen to Show Restraint**

*18130066A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 20 Jan 90 p 1*

[Gruzinform report: "The Demands Are the Same"]

[Text] On 17 January, a rally was held in Tbilisi at the initiative of the city's Armenian community. Participants drafted an appeal addressed to USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman M. S. Gorbachev and to the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations of Georgia. The appeal stated, in particular, that today, when the situation in Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh AO [autonomous oblast] has become extremely tense, when the conflict has reached its apogee, we appeal to you to use reason and refrain from any actions posing the danger of a conflict between our peoples living on Georgia's hospitable soil, because any clash on grounds of ethnicity can seriously impair the struggle for Georgia's independence. Let us, then, be responsible for the fate of the country on whose land we live.

### **Tbilisi Demonstrations Ended, 'New Stage Begins'**

*18130067A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 23 Jan 90 pp 1, 3*

[Special article for AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI by Gulnara Basharuli and Rusudan Lebanidze: "Every Friday at 6:00..."]

[Text] Probably we have all heard, and in recent days we heard again, various people's complaint that we Georgians display practically all our troubles at rallies, yet many of our problems need to be dealt with in the calm atmosphere of the negotiating table rather than in huge, emotional gatherings. There is probably a grain of truth in this complaint, but most of the issues that were brought up in recent days in front of Government House for thousands of people to hear are so painful and need to be settled as soon as possible, that we ought to make them known not just in Tbilisi, to the throngs in front of Government House, but to all of Georgia and, perhaps, to the whole world.



Be that as it may, the fact is that everyone—both friend and foe—needs to know and understand that no Georgian has ever persecuted anyone on Georgian soil and is not doing so now. Quite the contrary: it has often been true, and is true today, that such things need to be stopped immediately.

Everyone also needs to be aware that the Georgian will fight until he achieves his cherished aim, namely, an independent, democratic, Christian Georgia. This was the main goal of the hunger strike in front of Government House these past two weeks, the goal which the ongoing struggle must lead us to.

The rally that was held last Saturday marked the end of the first stage of that struggle. The demonstration is ended, but the struggle for Georgia's independence still continues. The general consensus is that at this stage, when ethnic crises have badly worsened in Transcaucasia, it is necessary to mobilize all our forces in order not to allow the bloodshed that has started in Armenia and Azerbaijan to spill over into our republic and turn Georgia into an arena of life-and-death struggle between our two neighbors. This general consensus has resulted from a dialogue between various official and unofficial political forces, and it is indicative of the political maturity of Georgia's national movement.

So one stage is ended, and the second begins—the stage of cool reason and deliberation. Every Georgian participating in this process must examine his own position and be able to subordinate his personal interests to the interests of his society and nation.

We must also certainly keep in mind something that Mr. Zviad Gamsakhurdia said at one of the rallies: what we want is a firm, Christian, democratic Georgia for Georgians and their future; therefore, it is these Georgians—each one in particular and all together—that we must be concerned for.

At the end of the rally it was stated that from this week on, every Friday at 6:00 in the evening, representatives of the various societies and parties will gather in front of Government House. The discussion, of course, will concern the tasks of Georgia's national movement.

### **Georgian 'Political Club' States Demands Regarding Ossetia**

18130068A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI  
in Georgian 23 Jan 90 p 4

[Announcement by the Political Club]

[Text] A regular meeting of the "What Do We Say, What Do We Do" Social-Political Club was held. The topic of discussion this time was "The Present Social Situation and the Tasks of the Georgian Nation."

The meeting opened with a speech by Club President writer Revaz Mishveladze. He spoke at length on the

impudence and unbridled actions committed by Ossetian separatists against the peaceful Georgian population, and he suggested ways to normalize the situation. Talks were given and specific proposals were submitted to the meeting by S. Sigua, S. Tsintsadze, L. Peradze, V. Gulua, T. Chalabashvili, I. Taliashvili, K. Garibashvili, N. Grigalashvili, G. Berishvili, and others.

The Social-Political Debate Club passed the following resolution with a majority of votes:

1. That an extraordinary session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet be convened immediately, in the near future.
2. That the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast be abolished as being illegal and unconstitutional.
3. That the law enforcement organs be directed to arrest Ossetian murderers and separatists immediately.
4. That Adamon Nikhas be dissolved as an organization fomenting interethnic strife, and its leaders be brought to account.
5. That the Roki Tunnel be abolished.

6. That the ringleaders of Ossetian separatism and the fomenters of fratricidal hysteria be declared excommunicated and advised to leave Georgian territory within a month's time.

The Political Club joins its voice to the national liberation movement for a unified, democratic, free, independent Georgia.

18 January 1990.

### **Commission Member Details Uzbek Language Law Implementation Progress**

90US0600A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA  
in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by N. Mirkurbanov, member of Uzbek republic council of ministers' commission for creating a state program for implementing the law 'On the State Language of the Uzbek Republic': "Program Is Adopted—It Is Time To Act"]

[Text] In the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers Commission for the Implementation of the Law about the State Language The Law about the State Language of the Uzbek SSR was adopted at the eleventh session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet of the eleventh convocation, in full agreement with the Soviet Constitution and the CPSU Platform 'National Policy of the Party in the Current Conditions'. As a whole, it corresponds to hopes and demands of the Uzbek people and of people of other nationalities residing on the territory of the republic, as well as to the call of time and to the democratic processes taking place in the society. The adoption of the Law has become an important event in the social and cultural life of the Uzbekistan.

Not too much time has passed since the Law was adopted, but we can already make some preliminary conclusions and answer the questions: "To what extent has the Uzbek language become the truly state language? Does it turn, in large industrial centers, from an everyday language into an official language and that of business and management? In other words, are one or another Articles of the Law coming into force and to what extent?"

Any law becomes effective only when it is put into practice. To realize the Law about the State Language, the government of the republic has taken a number of arrangements. Measures have been approved and Commission of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers has been formed to expedite Law implementation and to develop a state program. The commission of 35 members consists of well-known scientists, leaders of ministries and departments, representatives of educational institutions, public organizations, and creative unions. It holds its meetings twice a month. It is possible to estimate how intensive the work of the commission is on the basis of the fact, that the preparation of the documents is carried out ahead of schedule.

As a member of the working group of the ideological commission which had developed the draft of the Language Law, and a member of the Commission of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers for the Law implementation, I often speak aloud in collectives of workers and in educational institutions, answer numerous questions, and have to listen to deserved and undeserved reproaches. Though seldom, but still there are some cases of expressing gratitude and thanks. But currently, one question is asked more and more often: "Don't you think the Law implementation is slowed down? Don't we have a feeling of a certain care-free calm, in other words, a sense of a fulfilled duty?"

I usually answer in the negative and present the facts. First, the government commission is deeply studying and analyzing the process of the Law implementation in oblasts and rayons, ministries and departments, at enterprises and in organizations. For instance, the Commission heard the accounts of the management of the Ministry of Consumer Services, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Housing and Communal Services, Ministry of Public Health, the Tashkent gorispolkom, Namangan oblispolkom, Ordzhonikidze rayispolkom, and reports of the members of the commission for preparation of the proposals and measures for the government program.

I am not going to comment on each of the reports of the ministries and ispolkoms; I would like only to mention that the work is being done, and that if to study it attentively and, what is very important, objectively and kindly, it can be noticed.

In oblasts and cities toponymic commissions have begun their work, commentaries and explanations of the Law have been prepared; groups for studying Uzbek are being formed everywhere.

Moreover, we have discussed the question of creating the Republican Committee for Terminology, which is already approved by a special decree of the government. It is headed by Abdurakhmanov Gani Abdurakhmanovich, a well-known scientist in the area of the Uzbek terminology and a Corresponding Member of the Academy of Science. This Committee has already begun to work on the designing of a terminological dictionary and bilingual dictionaries of the Uzbek language.

Practical implementation of the Law is being done by the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education, the Academy of Science, and State Committee for Press, who in many aspects determine the success of the whole work. The Commission of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers and its working group generalized the proposals of ministries and departments for the preparation of the state program. Such work has been done, and remarks of the members of the Commission and of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers as for each article, as well as suggestions made during the discussion of the work of the ministries and departments, have been fully taken into account in the course of the meeting of the Commission.

In the process of the work of the Commission, it became clear that in the provinces the work for the Law implementation is performed slowly, that there are facts of formalism and bureaucracy, that no concrete measures are being taken to transfer for the state language in the office-work, in the use of the Uzbek language at meetings, conferences, etc. There are still many problems dealing with financial supply, e.g. purchase of typewriters with Uzbek fonts, training translators (simultaneous interpreters, in particular) typists, stenographers, etc.

The Commission emphasized the necessity of activating the work on teaching the Uzbek language management and other workers, who contact directly with the population and do not know Uzbek; solving the problems of the preparation, adopting resolutions and orders in the state language. Special attention of the Commission was given to the inculcation into life of those Articles of the Law which had already become valid.

The project of the state program was discussed at the meeting of the Commission, approved, and presented for the consideration of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers. On February 8, 1990, the program was adopted. Now it's time for its practical implementation.

The state program envisages the solution of all problems. Those are establishing commissions on the bases of ispolkoms of the local soviets of the people's deputies for supervising the Law implementation, the terminological committee, publication of the comments for the Law and of special magazines, creating national and cultural societies, broadening the instruction of teachers of the

Uzbek language in the republic and many other problems. Besides that, it is overseen to create an independent Language and Literature Institute of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Science and to reorganize the Uzbek Republican Pedagogical Institute of the Russian Language and Literature into Uzbek State Pedagogical Institute of the Uzbek and Russian Languages. It is planned to assign money for the strengthening of its financial basis.

For the scientific study of the Uzbek language, the program foresees arrangement and publication of the academical grammar of the Uzbek language, as well as of various terminological and bilingual dictionaries, phrase-books, reference literature, and handbooks. Publication of an explanatory dictionary of the Uzbek language, popular encyclopedia 'The Uzbek Language', and a two-volume encyclopedia of the life and creative work of A. Navoyi will enrich the Uzbek language. Another significant event will become the publication of the Academy collected works of classics of the Uzbek literature and of historical and cultural monuments of the Uzbek people.

Special attention is given in the program to the staff training. Within five years, 154,000 teachers of the Uzbek language for all types of educational institutions of the republic will be re-trained as will be 54,300 teachers of pre-school institutions. It is planned to realize qualitative renovation of the fund of the teaching and methodical literature in Uzbek. A transfer will be completed to the teaching in higher educational institutions in the state language, without infringing upon interests of other nations and nationalities residing on the territory of the republic, of course. The program provides for organization of free teaching Uzbek for those who do not know it, at enterprises and institutions.

The implementation of the transfer to the state language, within the period of time determined by the Law, will become possible only on the condition that we should have a strong polygraphic base. It is foreseen to continue its strengthening to provide the publication of all necessary books, manuals, and reference materials in Uzbek. The broadcasting time of radio and TV in the state language is increasing. The First republican program will be put on the air only in Uzbek. The total time of

educational programs for children will expand up to six hours in both TV and radio.

For the foremost implementation of the Law Articles, it is planned to train 9,200 clerks, stenographers, and typists in Uzbek. Lists of members of staff will include positions of translators and simultaneous interpreters. It is anticipated to allot money for purchasing equipment needed for the simultaneous translation and for educational purposes, i.g. for 1,500 audio-equipped classrooms and 3,500 personal computers. The Commission is planning to develop principles of office work and state standards in the state language.

As estimated by the Commission, the implementation of the program will require 1.5 billion rubles. The sum is tremendous, but we must find the money.

Still the anxiety of the citizens as to an extremely slow introduction of the Law into our everyday life is well-grounded. The Commission has mentioned an insufficient work of all ministries for the implementation of the Law and warned against such an approach. A number of measures were suggested to improve the work on the Language Law implementation in various departments. A decision has been made to hear the accounts of some ministry leaders at a meeting of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

As we can see, the measures are serious and effective, but even they will not be able to solve the problem in full.

During the discussion of the state program at the meeting of the Presidium of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, Academician E. Yusupov, People's Deputy of the USSR, stressed its political and social importance. He suggested that a permanent working body be established to coordinate all this work.

It is true, we have to fulfill an important assignment of creating a state committee or, at least, a special division in the machinery of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers, to coordinate this work and to control over the Law implementation. This body should be responsible for the work which is extremely complicated but so necessary today. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to anticipate any noticeable speeding-up of the Law implementation.

### Media Experts Discuss Draft Press Law

90US5677A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 3

[Roundtable discussion organized by TASS and SOVETSKAYA KULTURA with M. Poltoranin, NOVOSTI observer, USSR candidate deputy; L. Shcherbina, secretary of the board of the Moscow organization of the USSR Union of Journalists; Ya. Zasurskiy, dean of the journalism department of Moscow State University; G. Kondratenko, deputy editor-in-chief of SOVETSKAYA KULTURA; N. Yefimov, chairman of the USSR Committee for the Press; Yu. Baturian, senior scientific associate of the Institute of State and Law; L. Kravchenko, USSR people's deputy and general director of TASS; Ye. Manyakin, USSR deputy minister of communications: "Freedom of Creativity and Responsibility to the Society"]

[Text] Many people in our society are concerned about the draft press law that has been brought up for discussion. For it could be the guarantee of glasnost in our country. Along with the draft laws on ownership and land that are now being widely discussed, this document is one of the most important for the society today.

TASS and SOVETSKAYA KULTURA conducted a roundtable meeting during the course of which a unique expert social evaluation of this document was made. Of course the organizers are far from thinking that one newspaper column or report can encompass all aspects of the draft law on the press. But still...

[Poltoranin] One should probably say at the very outset that the problem with all Soviet journalism is the lack of economic regulation of our relations. The journalist cannot dispose of the funds he earns and does not know where the lion's share of the profit goes. Even in IZVESTIYA today only about one percent of revenues go for wages. Not enough money is being used for the development of the material and technical base, which is in a depressing condition.

We do not have social regulation either, and therefore journalists do not live as well as the representatives of other professions do and they receive less than the average wages for the country. And, finally, we journalists are not protected by legal guarantees. Therefore today there is a lot of pressure on journalists and editors are being removed from many publications. Just take the case in Kirghizia where eight journalists of VECHERNIY FRUNZE were taken to court at the same time for, and I quote, "expression of their own opinion."

[Shcherbina] There is a good deal to show that the reaction to the draft law on the press in the society is varied. We on the board of the Moscow organization of the USSR Union of Journalists are also receiving many letters and telegrams and not just from the capital. The discussion of the draft is very heated. And what is remarkable is that the same articles always end up at the center of the discussion—apparently they are the least

developed. I have before me a record of a meeting of journalists of KROKODIL. What do they suggest? To get rid of the variant of Article 6 that was proposed at the last minute by a group of people's deputies; to remove from Article 14 the section which indicates that the editorial rules are established by the founder... The KROKODIL writers think that the legal mechanism for working out these regulations has not been refined and this means that there can be endless conflicts among editorial collectives and their founders...

[Poltoranin] The greatest arguments obviously have to do with Article 6, particularly regarding granting the right to individual citizens to establish mass media. I think this provision should remain. I do not think that every citizen will run to establish his own newspaper, but we simply must grant this right to every citizen if we are really creating a law-governed state. Article 6 also speaks of the inadmissibility of monopolizing the mass media on the scale of the country, republic, or individual region. This is quite a positive proposal but it is not backed up by anything and is therefore nothing more than a declaration.

There are also provisions in the draft law with which I disagreed even in the stage of development. These include Point 5 of Article 8—the refusal to issue certificates of registration of mass media if the given organ has already issued a certificate of registration to a publication with the same name which is intended for the same audience. In practice it can turn out that there is always a pro forma excuse for refusal. For example, in Moscow there is already a newspaper that is intended for a Muscovite readership so what is the point in starting another one? This is a significant trump card for the command-administrative system.

Articles 10 and 11 pertain to shutting down and curtailing the activity of the mass media. According to the draft law, a decision of the founder, with the agreement of the publisher, is enough to do this. But life suggests to us a situation in which this path is unacceptable. Just take the Noginsk affair. It can happen that for some reason the founder does not like the editorial collective. Or the publisher may want to receive a larger share of the profit and the collective does not agree. Then the founder, with the agreement of the publisher, can close down this newspaper and the journalists will be thrown out into the streets. It turns out that we are leaving the editorial collective without any rights. I think that both of these articles will work normally only if we add the council of the labor collective of the editorial staff to the founder and the publisher.

Many letters which are now coming in to the parliamentary committee on glasnost write about the lack of protection for editors-in-chief. For example, if the rank-and-file journalist is fired unjustly he can take the editorial board to court and get his job back. But if the editor-in-chief who has stepped on someone's toes is fired he has nowhere to turn and the collective cannot save him. Therefore I suggest adding this sentence to

Article 17 after the third paragraph: "The editor (editor-in-chief) cannot be relieved of his position without the agreement of the labor collective council."

[Zasurskiy] Monopoly is the sorest spot in Soviet journalism. The Americans have a policy which prohibits one individual from having several newspapers or television stations in one city. All of our mass media are monopolized either by the party or by the soviets, governments, or, worst of all, by the trade unions. A special place is occupied by Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] which for some reason has an exclusive right to all radio and television broadcasting.

[Kondratenko] I cannot get rid of the feeling that after a certain amount of time it will be necessary to adopt a new law on the press or seriously change this one.

Journalism is work that is filled with conflict and it revolves around real people. Its consequences are not always predictable. As in politics, a great many distortions have accumulated here. But certain articles of the law, in my view, do not eliminate them and do not help actually to raise the practice to a higher level of legal science. This doubt also arises: Are we not opening up the floodgates for the commercialization of the press? Profitability is good in principle. But unscrupulousness, to put it mildly, can also be profitable...

[Yefimov] The merit of the draft is the abolition of censorship and the demonopolization of the press. The latter is especially important. If there had been two or three newspapers in Nогinsk and not just one, the conflict would probably not have arisen. But the path to demonopolization is not simple: Our material and technical base is weak and we cannot create one in an hour.

As concerns commercialization, alas, this threat is quite real.

In my view, there is a serious flaw in the draft law under discussion: It does not indicate that each founder in the mass media must be "solvent." It is very easy to report a tempting idea about a new publication but, alas, many do not think about the "nuts and bolts" like paper and printing. With the extremely critical shortage of both, founders must be concerned about solving the material and technical problems of their newspapers and magazines.

[Kondratenko] In terms of our production base we are already about 20-30 years behind the times, so how are we going to keep this from becoming a permanent condition.

[Poltoranin] I still think the danger of commercialization has been somewhat exaggerated. Having lost its civil status, which has always been strong for our journalism, the Russian press does not threaten us. Certain phenomena, of course, are inevitable, especially under the conditions of competition of the mass media but they will gradually be overcome.

[Zasurskiy] I will refer to world experience. The London DAILY MIRROR SUN [as published] is the tabloid of tabloids; it contains no information whatsoever. But it is flourishing. The SUN and the STAR and other such publications are surviving. And the straight-laced, well-informed TIMES, as they say, is going under. So it is very difficult to predict anything in the newspaper world.

[Poltoranin] If we construct the new society the way, say, the Japanese have done—they take all the best and "implant" it in their traditions—if we carry out perestroika that way we will not lose the distinctiveness of Russian journalism.

[Yefimov] But still it is a fact that the Russian press of the past was commercial. And Grech and Bulgarin primarily figured in it if one is to speak about circulation. At some point in the 1880's there was a popular newspaper, MOSKOVSKIY LISTOK, in which they printed endless continuations of the novel "Bandit Churkin" for a year or two. And when even the head city official could no longer tolerate such commercialization he called in the owner of the newspaper and asked him what the paper's program was, and the latter answered: "We are feeding ourselves, your excellency."

[Baturin] We frequently confuse the concepts "founder" and "owner" and they are not the same thing. The founder accomplishes a political act, he announces the establishment of a newspaper. For publishing he can take advantage of leasing, he can have sponsors, and so forth.

[Kravchenko] I must say that in Article 6, which states the right to establish mass media, I do not like either the first or the second edition. When speaking in the USSR Supreme Soviet I suggested transferring to our draft law the corresponding wordings from the Vienna agreements. Then we will establish for Soviet citizens the right to own, receive, reproduce, and disseminate informational materials of any kind. What does this mean specifically? First of all one can take advantage of any possibility to obtain information, including television, satellite systems, and so forth. And it is also permitted to store all communications in any form—from newspaper files to sound recordings, videocassettes, or computer memory. And to reproduce it means that anything can be used: typewriters, xerox, mimeograph, small printing shops, and computers. Reproduce it and disseminate it. This provides complete freedom for an individual to express his views. This way we will make sure that we respect international commitments that have been made, we will demonstrate the natural priority of international norms over national laws, and the main thing is that we will proclaim our adherence to complete democracy. This is my suggestion.

[Poltoranin] We have become somewhat caught up in one aspect of the draft law but I should like to draw attention to the very important fourth chapter—"Relations Between the Mass Media and Organizations



and Citizens." It stipulates the right to obtain information and to refuse and postpone the granting of information. Since we have written in Article 1 that the press and other mass media are free and censorship of mass information is not allowed, this premise must have a working mechanism. But when you read the entire draft you discover that it does not have such a mechanism.

In order for the law to begin to work, even today we must raise the question of creating a list of military and state secrets, which must be considered at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I assume that the deputies will weed out from it a mass of "secrets" which the departments will put away in order to protect themselves from criticism of their poor work. I suggest that Article 27 be completed: "It is possible to refuse to grant information only if it contains facts indicated in the list of state, military, and other specially protected secrets established by the USSR Supreme Soviet." I think that from time to time the Supreme Soviet will revise this list but this should not be done at the will or caprice of any departments.

And, finally, Article 43, which has caused not only disenchantment but also confusion on the part of many journalists. Of course we know of many cases from our practice when careless publications unjustifiably insulted a person and caused him moral harm. And this article is intended to restrain "cavalier journalists" who are not accustomed to dealing with morality or with anything else. And yet a fine of 50,000 cannot be taken seriously. I think that the amount of reimbursement for moral harm should be determined by the court but the sum in each individual case should not exceed R3,000. People say that the amount of 50,000 arose on the basis of the idea that honor should have more value than a Volga. But, in the first place, in a couple of years a Volga will cost not 50,000 but 70,000 or 100,000. We cannot keep up with our own prices.

[Kondratenko] On the surface it is a very effective point of the law but it has nothing to do with life. The entire annual editorial fund of our newspapers is not enough to pay one such fine. Fine, if we could we would. But then in this same law we would have to get rid of this alienation of the press organs from the publishers and the means of production and revise the unequal, discriminatory economic relations among them. And if any monetary fine is set, it should be, in the first place, realistic, and, in the second place, the same fine (and not just court costs) should be stipulated for the plaintiff if he loses the case.

In general in the way it is formulated now we will stumble over Article 43 every step of the way. The judicial practice has not been worked out yet. There are not yet any specialized courts for hearing such cases. And this is why now the people's courts are accepting for consideration many cases against newspapers without making distinctions among the ordinary ideological and political disputes or between polemics and actual encroachment on a person's honor and dignity.

[Poltoranin] Apparently we need a second part of Article 43: "If the suit against the mass media for causing moral harm is deemed by the court to be unsubstantiated, the citizen or organization that has brought the suit makes reimbursement to the editorial office for court costs. The amount of the court costs cannot exceed R3,000." That is, if you go to court especially to terrorize the editorial staff you will have to answer for it.

[Baturin] This situation exists even now...

[Poltoranin] No, not this one. I was an editor and we already know that we have up to nine people in the courts at one time and there is nobody to do any work. And we do not receive a kopeck from this. I have in mind not the court costs but the legal expenses of the editorial office.

[Baturin] You are bringing up new concepts.

[Poltoranin] Yes? But, for instance, how many lawyers do we hire? All this is on the shoulders of the editorial office and the editorial office should be reimbursed for this expense.

[Zasurskiy] If we want to live in a law-governed state we must become honest. Therefore I suggest that remaining silent and concealing information be prohibited by law. For not to tell everything, not to report everything, not to show everything is still a lie, even if it is "for the benefit of." We must not manipulate consciousness, it is time to put a stop to pulling the wool over people's eyes. Of course, this pertains to socially significant information...

[Kondratenko] And in addition to concealment and secrecy, there is embellishment of the truth, selectivity of information, incitement, tendentious relaying of facts, moral pressure, and mass attention to one-sided information while paying no attention to other information which "stands in the way" or is "uncomfortable." All these are also elements of manipulation of public awareness and the mood of the people. There must be a guarantee against this. We have completely forgotten about such a phenomenon as ignoring the basic critical statements of the press. We are bothered by a certain dilution of a number of key concepts. Take this same "socially significant information." Who is to determine this significance? According to what criteria? After all, this provides a basis, for example, for the publication of information about private life.

Another example—about the rights of the journalists. It says in the draft that interfering with his work and forcing him to say anything is "punishable under the law." But, tell me, where is this law? During the decades I have been working I do not recall a single case when this norm of protection has been applied.

[Zasurskiy] This aspect must be thought of and stipulated in the law.

[Kondratenko] We must not forget that journalism is a creative sphere and there are millions and millions of collisions in it. The law must be made more compact and

it should not stipulate so many particularities. The more we stipulate, the more new questions arise. And we must dig deeper for answers. We dig but frequently we do not reach the bottom.

[Yefimov] The concept of the draft law was constructed on three postulates: The journalist is always right, the editor is almost never right, and the founder is always wrong. In a word, we are moving forward while looking backward. There is no doubt that much has hampered us in the past. And we are now most afraid of taking something from the past with us into the future. I notice this especially frequently during discussions about the founder of mass media. As a rule, by this we mean the party organ which has one function "to hold them back and not let them go." But we cannot but note that our society is progressing and personnel are changing rapidly. And relations between the founders and the journalists are changing. And how can we fail to take this into account in the law on the press?

During the course of the discussion in the USSR Supreme Soviet one of the deputies suggested clarifying whom this law was meant for—was it for the press or about the press. I think we need a law on a broader plane. We must think not only about the journalist but also about the person who comes into his field of vision. For we know that the press can not only save the innocent but also destroy the innocent. The law must protect both the rights of the journalist and the rights, honor, and dignity of the individual and the interests of the society as a whole.

I am referring to the article in the draft in which it says that the journalist does not bear any responsibility if he reproduces somebody's public statement verbatim. What do they mean by public? Is any statement at a rally, any anti-Armenian or anti-Azeri speech public? For comparison: In English legislation on interracial relations it is unambiguously stated that a newspaper and its workers when publishing inflammatory statements or election manifestos of any political extremist is just as subject to punishment as the individual who made the statement. Does it not seem to you that the English have acted more wisely? This includes protection both of the rights of the individual and the interests of the society.

[Manyakin] I have been convinced from my own experience of how important it is for the person about whom one is writing to have the legal right to protect his honor and dignity. Not so long ago I came under real pressure from the mass media when I was unwittingly depicted as one of the main parties to blame for introducing a limit on subscriptions. After that there was something like a pardon but the bitterness caused by what happened remains with me to this day.

Here I represent an immense detachment of distributors of the press—730,000 people. They are very interested in how the draft law under consideration today turns out. Let us touch on Point 3 of Article 18 which discusses the initial data of the press organs. I suggest indicating, in

addition to the date, circulation, and so forth, the time of the planned and actual publication of the issue—for quite frequently a newspaper is scandalously late, and all the responsibility for this, including material, lies with the expeditors, mailmen, and kiosk operators. Why? It should be stated in the law: Losses are sustained by the guilty parties.

It is stated that "products of the mass media are disseminated by the publisher directly or on a contractual (I would add commercial) or other legal basis." We communications workers are bothered: Is there not a loophole for continuing the unequal relations of the publisher and the distributor in the words "on other legal bases"? This document should be worded more clearly. It is important to include in Article 24, for example, that the form of dissemination—retail and by subscription—is determined by the publisher himself so that he is responsible along with the party he enlists for the delivery of the publication to the consumer.

Allow me to make another remark. It seems to me that this law should protect the right of our citizens to receive information from the foreign press and television. I recall that the Vienna agreement envisions such a law and our law should also protect this.

[Kravchenko] It says in Article 38 of the draft law: "On the basis of international contracts and agreements." And the Vienna agreements, which we also adopted, envision the right to disseminate information.

[Zasurskiy] Today there are only about 6,000 newspapers coming from the West. This is not very many at all...

[Manyakin] I should still like to know whether this law sufficiently protects the rights of the Soviet citizens to obtain any, even foreign, information.

[Baturin] It refers to this in Chapter VI—"International Cooperation in the Area of Mass Information."

[Zasurskiy] No it does not, you read it. There is nothing concrete there. There is no confirmation of international agreements in which the right is declared to be unimpeded. And the lack of this kind of confirmation makes it possible for various departments to impose a "taboo" at their own discretion.

[Kravchenko] I do not think that this will happen. Even now everyone is demanding that as quickly as possible we set up production of antennas that are capable of receiving television signals from satellites. We repeat that this is stipulated by the Vienna agreements. And we must fulfill them.

[Poltoranin] I will perhaps interrupt this discussion. Even as it stands the work group that created the draft law is being accused of including too many details. People are saying that this document should declare the norms of the law and should not go into concrete details. But we have especially gone into the details of it since we have had neither a political nor a legal basis for this document. But I think that this is just the first step

toward a law on freedom of speech. The second step should be a law on glasnost.

[Baturin] Yes, we do indeed need a legal act that guarantees glasnost—a law on glasnost. It will be concretized by a number of laws such as the law on the press, the law on archives, and the law on secrecy.

I agree with the idea that everything related to radio and television should be included in a separate document. Only after that, when our information relations are more orderly can we again bring everything together into a single law—say, the law on freedom of information.

One hears that in America and many other countries they live without a law on the press. I must note that they have a different legal system there. They do not have a law on the press but they do have an immense number of precedents and judicial decisions, that is, they have created a legal base on which everything is constructed.

Opinions have been expressed to the effect that the law that has been adopted will not work 100 percent of the time. I am convinced that it will not work 100 percent of the time in any form. In the first place, the implementation of any law depends upon a large number of nonlegal factors: social, political, and economic. In the second place, the law on the press can operate only in combination with other laws. And, finally, in the third place, we have a severe case of legal inflation. We are publishing many laws but their quality is not the best. And they are not well backed up. The same thing is happening with the ruble. We are earning more and more but for some reason the relations among people are worse.

I do not agree with the notion that the law is rough, although it might be far from perfection. I think that all of its shortcomings, its so-called "sore points," noted by legal experts and professional journalists, can be corrected.

Regarding moral harm, reimbursement must undoubtedly be made for moral harm. But why should the mass media be the only ones responsible for this? I think a considerable amount of moral harm is caused to citizens by the bureaucratic apparatus. Therefore such an article is needed but it is not needed here but in civil legislation.

In conclusion I should like to give one example. In 1979 the Americans lost a weather balloon that had been sent to Venus. Billions of dollars were simply thrown into space. And all because in the computer program for adjusting the course a colon was confused with a semicolon. And if we do not want our law to be tossed into the wind we must be no less attentive to each word, to each point.

[Kravchenko] Everyone understands the colossal significance of this law. In essence this is a law on power. Lenin began with the creation of a newspaper and then the party. Of course one cannot find analogs in the past for everything that happens on this earth but still: The person who gives up a newspaper gives up power.

Recent events both in our country and abroad force us to look at the draft law more as a juridical document than as a political declaration. In my view, in Article 1, after the words about how freedom of the press is provided, it would be worthwhile to add a phrase I have discovered in many existing laws of capitalist countries: "Freedom of speech and the press is used in the interests of society and the interests of the people."

In conclusion I should like to say a couple of words about the relations among the founder, the publisher, and the editorial collective. I think that with the adoption of the law on the press there will be a demonopolization of the mass media. All collectives will be able to establish their own press organs and publish their own opinions. Even TASS and Gosteleradio will be unable to retain their monopoly on the news and evaluation of events. They will have to become systems capable of being used equally by all social currents. But even so the rights of the founder, which are clearly curtailed in this draft, will have to be designated more clearly. The founder—whether it be a party committee, an economic organ, a cooperative, a kolkhoz [collective farm], a religious community, or anything else—will not begin to publish anything until it is sure that the collective of journalists will work namely for it and will defend its views! Otherwise the founder has the right to close down the organ that is not carrying out the tasks set for it. If your viewpoint does not coincide with the founder's program—go to a different newspaper. Hence it is obvious that the founder must have the right to appoint the editor, for otherwise the publication he has founded might possibly profess views and ideas that do not coincide at all with the goals pursued by the founder.

Of course here immediately arises the question of the lack of rights of the journalist and the editor who could be fired on the whim of the founder or the publisher. I think that for their legal and social protection it is necessary to introduce a system of contracts that could be concluded for a year or two and then reviewed, taking into account the wishes of both parties. This is the only real protection for the body of journalists and editors.

Now about Points 7 and 8 of Article 34. If they are retained in the law not a single newspaper will be published. For they suggest literally a dictatorship of the journalist—do not dare lay a hand on my text, do not dare to edit my work. I think that this article would work for hacks and untalented and unimaginative people. Literary editing is a normal working process. Is the editor really going to have to find the author in order to cut a fragment of text that will not fit in a newspaper when it is already to go to press? In practice this will end up with the law being ignored on a mass scale. So why include in a legislative act provisions that are known to be unrealistic?...

Many of the most diverse opinions were expressed by participants in the roundtable discussion. Some consider the draft press law to be "rough" and not ready while others are confident that on the whole it is good but

requires small "cosmetic" improvements. The parliamentarians will have the last word. At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet they will have to adopt a document which will determine the development of glasnost in the country for the years ahead.

The meeting was prepared for in creative cooperation by journalists of TASS and SOVETSKAYA KULTURA V. Zenkovits, T. Ivanova, A. Kamenev, V. Petrunya, and V. Saklakov.

### Chairman on State Press Committee Changes

90US0506A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 5, Jan 90 p 9

[Interview with N. Yefimov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press, by V. Volkov: "The Demands of Glasnost Have Clearly Exceeded the Capabilities of Printers"; place and date not given]

[Text] [Volkov] Nikolay Ivanovich, when preparing to enter your current position as chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Press, at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet you convincingly showed the people's deputies the difficult, even very difficult position the branch is in. A half year has passed. Recently the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree directed toward improving and rearranging the organizational structure of the branch. To what extent will this contribute to improving the situation and what are its basic provisions?

[Yefimov] The old structure of the branch from top to bottom was adapted to the command-administrative system. Hence the slowness, the sluggishness, and the unnecessary barrier within the publishing industry and above it, the petty tutelage, and the command system regarding who can print what and when and so forth. Where does this lead in the final analysis? In our country it takes an average of two years to publish a book and abroad it takes up to six months. So in principle for us there is no question of whether to retain the old structure, or to change it radically: The sooner we break it down, the more rapidly we shall move forward. In this respect the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers is a great help to us. It will make it possible to accelerate the restructuring process significantly.

Of course, changes have already been made in the branch. I wish to emphasize that my predecessor, Mikhail Fedorovich Nenashev, did a great deal to democratize the entire publishing process.

The branch changed over to economic accountability on 1 January of last year. The publishing houses have been given considerably greater rights and independence in resolving creative and economic issues. Large associations have appeared and it has become customary to elect directors of publishing houses, enterprises, and corporations through a competition. The first steps have been taken to enlist the public in book publishing—the new practice of publishing books at the author's expense

is expanding considerably. I think that with the increased independence of the publishing houses and enterprises and with the development of large associations, logic dictates that the functions of the Goskompechat [State Committee for the Press] should change as well. The committee should increasingly become the analytical center for the branch.

[Volkov] What does this mean, specifically?

[Yefimov] Briefly, the committee's task in this respect is to conduct a unified state policy in its area, to form reader demand, to coordinate all publishing activity, to analyze the process of dissemination of books, and to develop a technical policy. And it must resolve one of the neglected questions—the socioeconomic one.

Here I should like to explain that the branch has not yet made a breakthrough in the direction of improving conditions for the labor and life of the people, there is a shortage of housing, dining rooms, and comfort stations. For 360,000 workers there are only 33 kindergartens and 15,000 people are waiting in line for housing. The branch consists of small enterprises, we do not have our own construction organizations and therefore housing and social, cultural, and domestic enterprises are constructed mainly through shared participation. So far we are not getting enough help from local soviets of people's deputies for this.

So, returning to the functions of the committee, I wish to note that those who were involved in operational control, tutelage, and command are increasingly departing. And this makes it possible for us really to deal with the fundamental problems, of which there are many.

First of all there is the problem of the printing equipment. We have encountered a situation where unlimited subscriptions, which everyone welcomed so heartily, and the demands of glasnost have exceeded the capabilities of the printers. Today a dozen or so journals have ended up, to put it crudely, "out on the street"—they have nowhere to go and nothing on which to print. We can unravel this knot in two ways.

The first is to build new printing houses. For newspapers and magazines and books. It is clear that on the scale of the country it would be absurd to ship a book, say, from Moscow or Leningrad to Khabarovsk Kray. It would probably be simpler to send the prepared offset film there and print books from them right there in Khabarovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Alma-Ata, Novosibirsk, and so forth.

[Volkov] But many central newspapers are now printed locally...

[Yefimov] Yes, there are somewhere around 60 points for this throughout the country. I can tell you that this is a great benefit. This streamlines delivery and it costs less. But, unfortunately, this pertains only to newspapers. Books and especially magazines with multicolored printing are printed only in the center. Here we need new

printing houses in order to decentralize their printing and bring it as close as possible to the regions. This will be both cheaper and faster.

Incidentally, it is also necessary to create a number of enterprises that serve printing combines. These include mainly the production of dyes, foil, and the materials necessary for producing books and journals. Here is one example which illustrates well the level where we are today. We have built a dye plant in Torzhok. It is a modern enterprise with a good, harmonious collective, and the director, Nikolay Ivanovich Orel, is an intelligent leader and a good manager. But this is essentially the only plant like this that we have. We are very much in need of two or three more. Compare: On the whole we are producing 32,000 tons of dyes and the United States is producing 800,000 tons. This is the difference between what we have today and what we need. And our dyes are used in other branches of the national economy as well...

There is also much to be done in places where there are printing houses. This is the second path. For instance the well-known Chekhov Printing Combine which today produces 10-15 percent of all of our journalistic products. Without building a new combine but by updating the fleet of machines and equipment, in other words, through efficient reconstruction, it was possible to increase its capacity by another 70 percent. The land has been developed, there are purification installations, and infrastructure, and trained personnel—but the capacities, I repeat, are barely being doubled. Even those printing plants where through reconstruction it is possible to increase capacities by 30-40 percent, while before reconstruction they may have had the capacities of three plants, ultimately the capacities would be equivalent to those of almost four plants, that is, the real effect would be tantamount to gaining one plant.

Another fundamental problem does not depend on us, unfortunately, but we cannot stand on the sidelines either—this is the development of domestic machine building for printing. The situation here is bad through and through! Judge for yourself. Publishing books or magazines takes about 360 kinds of equipment. Of these, 120 are not produced in our country at all. And more than 200 of the remaining kinds that are produced by machine builders are outdated, they are not productive, and they require a lot of energy along with manual labor. Incidentally, 38 percent in the branch requires manual labor. But there is a catastrophic shortage even of those machines which we do acquire. We need a large-scale state program. We hope that conversion will have an effect on this. We have serious suggestions regarding this. [Volkov] But decrees concerning the development of printing machine building have been adopted in the country before.

[Yefimov] They have been. But these decisions were distinguished by two qualities. In the first place, they solved the problem only partially and, in the second place, not a one of them was implemented. We understand how complicated this production is—specialists

say that in terms of the class of manufacture it is comparable to space equipment. It is unthinkable to buy this kind of equipment all the time and spend hard currency on it. It would be more efficient to build the necessary plants and sell them ourselves for hard currency. Thus several ministries, with our direct and indirect assistance, have practically prepared this kind of program.

The third problem is control of book publication. Previously (under the guise of coordination) the committee simply prescribed who was to publish what and when. But we have already said that these functions have been eliminated. The publishing houses solve these problems for themselves.

[Volkov] But will there not be duplication? Or, on the contrary, might it be that nobody will publish the necessary books and they will all want to publish those that are in high demand? Perhaps some kind of coordination is needed after all.

[Yefimov] Recently at a board meeting we had a discussion of a unified system of information on the scale of the branch. (We have an electronic center in operation which has an immense mass of information). And here I heard a proposal about cooperation. But why have it? In reality if you are an intelligent director, why should anybody have to coordinate with you? You receive the data from the electronic center, you see what your colleagues are doing, and you coordinate yourself. This means that you must be able to use this information and make the necessary decisions yourself.

[Volkov] But still, Nikolay Ivanovich, you will agree that there are still many books that are lying on the shelves which the consumers do not want...

[Yefimov] Yes, and there are several reasons for that. Incorrect determination of the number of copies, a lack of accounting for local peculiarities (one of our comrades recently purchased in Armenia a book about the construction of buildings in the permafrost zone—and there are other cases like this), and the lack of scientifically developed methods of analyzing reader demand. And, finally, there is the economic interest of the book publishers. This is an interesting thing. A publishing house, having published an edition of books, turns it over to the book trade network and literally the next day it receives the entire sum for these not yet sold but delivered books. Everything is turned upside down, as they say. And we should put everything in order—we should pay money for goods that are sold. Incidentally, we now have a special group working on preparing a proposal for reforming book trade. Incidentally, this is a subject for a special thorough discussion where we could think about the time periods for publishing one category of book or another, price setting, the times for sale of books, and various forms of this work, about the problems with paper, and so forth.

[Volkov] A couple of words about the change in the structure of the committee itself.



[Yefimov] The new structure that was approved by the Council of Ministers envisions the creation of a large department of periodical publications. It will handle new publications. And it will not just register them, which will obviously be entrusted to it if the new law on the press is adopted; it will also render methodological and practical assistance. The four most significant departments—the aforementioned periodical press, scientific-technical and production development, planning, capital construction and reconstruction, and foreign economic and international ties—are headed by deputy chairmen of the committee. Incidentally, our former main administrations and other administrations have been transformed into departments. This was done in order to change from a three-level to a two-level control system.

To this end the Soyuzkniga all-union state book trade association has been abolished, it has become the Soyuzkniga all-union wholesale-retail production association, and its functions, particularly for organization and methodological guidance of book trade activity in the country, has been turned over to the committee directly. All these measures make it possible for us to reduce the management staff quite significantly.

[Volkov] I should like to draw your attention, Nikolay Ivanovich, to the point of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers in which the Goskompechat has included "keeping state statistics and unified bibliographical registration of printed works." Were statistics really not kept before this?

[Yefimov] State statistics must be precise and honest. When I spoke at the session of the Supreme Soviet I had a figure with me—in 1988 more than 87,000 titles had been published. Fortunately I did not cite this. It turns out that this number had been used in booklets, advertising brochures, catalogs for exhibitions, and so forth. But we had actually published only about 50,000 titles of books. There are your statistics for you.

The branch has a very powerful association—the Book Chamber. This is an enormous state archive and is the richest storehouse of publications that have come out in the country during all the years of Soviet power. Stored there, for example, are the files not only of oblast and rayon newspapers but also of kolkhoz [collective farm] and sovkhoz [state farm] newspapers which are not even to be found in the Library imeni V.I. Lenin.

But where is all this stored? In incredibly—I am not afraid to use that word—monstrous conditions—in the basements of buildings that are quite unadapted for this purpose, even in former religious buildings. The public is very worried now about what will happen to our Lenin Library, our main library. I share this distress. But it seems to me that we should be no less alarmed about the fate of the Book Chamber. In order for public property stored there not to be lost, we very much need a House of Books designated especially for this purpose.

It has been under construction, incidentally, for many years (I am ashamed even to tell you how many) on

Ulitsa Profsoyuznaya. Last year Lev Alekseyevich Voronin was forced to take over this slow moving project. The frame of the building was finally erected but there is still much to be done.

[Volkov] The last two questions. In keeping with the decree we are discussing today the committee must work out the concept of the development of the press in the country and measures providing for its realization. What is the status of this work? And the second question: The committee in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice is to submit to the USSR Council of Ministers draft provisions about the State Committee for the Press itself. What will this be?

[Yefimov] Concerning the first question: We have already concluded an agreement with Moscow State University and the Book Institute to jointly conduct, I would say, basic research on the rayon and oblast press. The purpose of the research is not simply to inventory what we have. It takes into account the experience existing in the country, the possibilities, and a clarification of the real needs of various segments and categories of readers and a study of the experience of other countries where lower-level local press is well developed. They should also study the mistakes that have been made in this work—both ours and others—in order not to repeat them in the future. Within the country we shall study broad regions—the Russian Federation, other union republics and a number of autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts, rayons, national okrugs, and so forth. This research and the conclusions and suggestions contained in it will be the basis for the creation of the concept of the development of the press in the country. And this will take several years.

As concerns the draft of the provisions for our committee, this work is under way and we have certain developments; after all the project is not beginning with nothing. But apparently it will assume its final form after the adoption of the law on the press, since it will apparently either determine some new functions for the State Committee for the Press or else some will be clarified and given new form.

### Newsprint Deficit Causes Chronicled

90US0708A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 18 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by P. Nikitin: "The Paper Famine"]

[Text] Reader Yelena Fedorovna Sapunkova from Vorkuta demands an explanation: Why has a supplement to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA not appeared? After all, it was reported in PRAVDA back in November that there would be such a supplement in 1990. The explanation is brief: There is no paper. Yes, it is a deplorable fact: Russia, the land of forests, cannot find paper for its newspaper.

The printing plants are suffocating without paper. It may already be said now that it is possible that schoolchildren

will begin the next academic year without having enough textbooks. In some places, printing plant combines have even been forced to stop the machines because of the lack of raw material.

The crisis is the consequence of prolonged inattention to the pulp-paper industry. Its situation today is lamentable. Of 157 enterprises, only 25 were constructed after 1960; of 380 paper separation machines, about 5.6 percent have been in use less than 15 years, and 65 percent of the equipment has 100 percent wear.

According to the data of the USSR Ministry of the Forest Industry Scientific Research Institute, at best, the demand of the USSR national economy for paper and cardboard is 60 percent fulfilled. Due to the lack of paper packaging, the country is annually deprived of 10 percent of mineral fertilizers and cement; 100,000 metric tons of fish, vegetables, and other products.

The resolutions of state organs aimed at protecting the environment delivered a crushing blow to the wood and paper industry. It seems that shying away from things is becoming a sign of the times. Could the branch's enterprises, most of which were built in the fifties, hold up to the strict requirements of the ecologists? With a wave of the hand, without consideration for the consequences of this step, a death knell was sounded for the production capacities of 20,000 metric tons of cardboard, 40,000 metric tons of paper, and 220,000 metric tons of pulp.

But this is just the beginning. The SES [Sanitation and Epidemiology Station] is planning to halt production capacity of 5 million metric tons of pulp (of the 11 million produced), 1 million metric tons of cardboard, and almost 5 million metric tons of paper!

"If this takes place," says V. Malygin, head of the balance and planning subdepartment of distribution for the wood and paper industry under USSR Gosplan, "We will be stripped of the domestic pulp-paper industry. At times, the sanitation organs demand of the 'paper makers' indices which even their colleagues in foreign countries would be hard pressed to achieve. For example, experts visiting from Finland considered the Slokskiy pulp factory to be among the world's most ecologically clean enterprises, but the local authorities demanded it be closed.

As we know, in Leningrad, the Ministry of the Forest Industry eliminated the Priozerskiy pulp plant. But this made the ecological situation worse in lake Ladoga, since the pulp workers, in addition to treating their own discharge, treated urban waste as well. Now, in order to construct an enterprise equal in capacity to Priozerskiy, the state is faced with investing R300 million from its own pocket.

Yet we do not defend Minlesprom [Ministry of the Forest Industry], either. In the ministry, purification facilities are secondary sites. For example, at the "Kalininogradbumprom" association, the environmental protection facilities under construction for 10 years now have

only been 60 percent assimilated. And according to the plans, the site should have been working for 5 years now. Incidents of this nature undermine the prestige of the pulp-paper industry.

"The Minlesprom enterprises could improve the ecological background at the price of more rational utilization of raw materials," feels A. Glovatskiy, sector head of the wood and wood processing industry of the USSR people's control committee. "In Irkutsk Oblast, where the major pulp producing industries are concentrated, over 3 million metric tons of waste suitable for producing that same pulp accumulates annually, but the waste is only 40 percent used; the rest is lost to the dumps and burned in the furnaces."

It would seem that under the conditions of the tightest shortage, strict state control would be imposed upon paper distribution and utilization. But a bacchanal has come to replace that previous order, which at least was something. A significant portion of the paper is going to the "black market," where it costs 3-5 times as much. The new commercialists do business on this "under the counter" paper; the newspapers of the "informals" are printed. I inquired of Emiliya Kharlanova, editor of a newspaper with a big name, but meager contents—ALTERNATIVA—where she managed to scrounge up paper. "What do you mean, where?" asked in surprise the boss of a newspaper that comes out in a press run of 50,000 copies. "We get it where everybody gets it, from the speculators!" Y. Muzychenko, director of the Chertanovskaya printing press, in responding to the question as to why an overburdened enterprise has taken upon itself to print ALTERNATIVA, unregistered with Goskompechat, could find nothing better than to get off with a blameless "I am unaware of this."

On 1 March, during the Moscow TV program, "In the Music World," one of the variety stars "detailed" a machine in one of the Moscow printing combines to work for her, specializing in turning out expensive art albums, permitting the machine's main production to be printed in the "time free from printing advertising." It would seem that besides the paper shortage, the printers have also been stricken with a responsibility shortage. How else to assess the cases where publications speaking against the party are printed in the CPSU printing press capacities, and newspapers defaming the army at the machines of the Ministry of Defense?

ALTERNATIVA, citing a list of the "samizdat" press, considered it appropriate to mention that it is improper to so call newspapers that are at times put out in a press run of 30,000 copies. Let us read from this list: PRIZRAK KOMMUNIZMA (a fraction of the communist-democrat party, DS [Democratic Union]), EKSPRESS KHRONIKA (the DS party); GOLOS ANARKHII (the Anarchic-revolutionary league of Petersburg), and SOVETSKAYA MORALKA, and so on, and so forth. According to estimates there are published in the country today about 700 "amateur" publications. Naturally, not one of them intends to pay taxes,

or to name the sources from which they get paper. And demanding this of the cooperatives is also in vain. By USSR Goskomstat decree, paper is excluded from the roster of raw materials for which it keeps accounts. Yu. Yurasov, USSR Goskomstat department head, explains this by the fact that the cooperatives "do not have sufficient inventory personnel." But in that case, why does Goskomstat require of them data on the utilization of other forms of raw materials?

"Informal" party publications are springing up like mushrooms. In particular, under the party raykoms in Moscow over 20 newspapers have opened recently. Many questions arise in connection with this. Why have they jointly rejected party topics? Why, with the status of "rayon papers," are they being sold at 20 kopeks? Why is their associates' salary sometimes higher than that of central party press staffers? Not a single "party rayon paper" is registered with USSR Goskompechat. They are not in the library of the House of Political Education of the CPSU Moscow City Committee. And in general, can newspapers such as KARETNY RYAD be considered party papers in the commonly accepted sense of the word? Is it not a luxury to waste paper on the new rayon publications, when the CPSU Central Committee publishing house, where the majority of the central newspapers are produced, is functioning without any insured raw material reserves?

Under conditions of expanding wholesale trade and the mass decline of publishing discipline, the central party newspapers will either be forced to drastically curtail

their circulation or equally drastically raise the price for their product, in order to compete in the market for raw materials.

Funds for paper are being cut, which is, unfortunately, a natural phenomenon under shortage conditions, but why is Russia getting yet another going-over here? From the outside, equality is observed: On the average, the same quantity of paper is being taken from all the union republics. But state orders comprise the greatest share, 85 percent, in the plans of Russia's printers and publishers. That is what was not taken into consideration. In order not to disrupt the fulfillment of state orders (and this is primarily textbooks and children's literature), RSFSR Goskomizdat was forced to take paper from the book publishing houses, placing them on starvation rations. Many writers are being deprived of the chance to publish their works, and the readers are not getting hundreds of thousands of copies of books on Russia, its history, and culture.

It is necessary to understand the existing situation, to bring order to the distribution of paper, which is a strategic raw material. Apparently, there should be created under the Government a temporary committee to develop a program for the country's extrication from the "paper crisis." We can no longer reconcile ourselves to the fact that the country having one-quarter of the world's forest reserves holds one of the last places in world paper production.

Even if the pulp-paper industry is developed according to the 5-year-plan, in that case the newsprint shortage will go on until 1995. Such prospects do not suit the newspaper people. Nor the readers, apparently.

### **Soviet Central Asian History Tied to State Federative Concepts**

90US0582A *Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian*  
26 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by A. Agzamkhodzhaev, corresponding member, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences: "The Contours of Legal Reform"]

[Text] The problems that now leave not a single Soviet person indifferent, the problems of legal reform, demand the most steady attention and the fundamental research of legal scholars. We speak first and foremost of the more detailed development of a number of fundamental principles in the formation and strengthening of the socialist federated law-governed state.

**The first of these is indubitably the principle of the command of law in all spheres of public life.**

This is an inalienable feature of socialist civilization, a necessary condition for the power of the people.

It seems that in a socialist law-governed state, a law adopted by the supreme organ of power by means of referendum, under strict observance of all constitutional procedures cannot be repealed, amended, or halted either by Government, or all the more so, by departmental acts, however high and authoritative, and whatever their guiding concepts. Naturally, this assumes a high quality of laws. In the preparation of laws, it is expedient to make broad application of the recommendations of scholars, and to more widely involve them in the activity of the working commissions for the development of the corresponding draft laws. Until now, such a practice in our republic has been unstable. For example, lawyers have not been involved in the development of the general plan for management of the Uzbek SSR national economy, acts concerning the limitation of cooperative activity.

The Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers decree "On the formation of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers commission on the realization of economic reform on the basis of expansion of the republic's sovereign rights, self-management, and self-financing" was recently adopted. It is heartening to note that a legal scholar has been included in the composition of this body.

Until now, more than a few examples testify to the conservation of the practice of developing draft legislative and Government acts within the bowels of the apparatus. But after all, when adopted, these have frequently shown their insolvency.

**The second important principle characterizing the law-governed state is the linkage of the law of the state itself and its organs.**

To put it more simply, the state, having published the law, has itself no right to violate the law. This principle stands in opposition to any form of arbitrary rule, a raging free-for-all.

Just recall the tragedy of the Aral Sea, the heartless use of butifos and other poisonous chemicals, the air pollution in a number of the republic's cities. Yet after all, sufficiently developed union and republic environmental protection legislation has already existed for many years! Such a situation simply could not have been created in a genuinely law-governed state.

An important role in overcoming legal nihilism and in forming respect for the law belongs to a precise limitation of the competence of the party and state apparatus. The 19th Party Conference harshly condemned the practice of party organs continuing to issue instructions on all matters of economic life while not bearing any responsibility for them.

**The third principle of the law-governed state is stability of individual freedom, its rights and interests, honor and dignity, and the preservation and guarantee of these.**

Nevertheless, for now, not all of the citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms have support in the current legislation; the practical implementation of certain of these is complicated. Just take freedom of conscience. Attempts by the faithful to realize this constitutional establishment not infrequently run into rejections of the opening of a new mosque or church.

Certain normative acts in the area of defending citizens' human rights have low efficacy. For example, the Criminal Code article on prosecution for criticism is practically not applied.

**The fourth principle of the law-governed state, expressing moral principles in relations between the state, as the bearer of political power, and the citizen, as the participant in its implementation, is the mutual responsibility of the state and the individual.**

In accordance with point 3, article 122 of the Uzbek SSR Constitution, the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers implements measures to ensure the defense of citizens' rights and freedoms. We know, however, that the republic Government has not once made a report to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet on this important trend in their activity. Such a situation is particularly intolerable under conditions in which the threatening growth of criminal infringement against the individual is being noted.

A law-governed state is unthinkable without clear and concrete legal measures of the accountability of official individuals of all echelons of party and state leadership. The public rightly notes that leaders who have inflicted direct damage to society should be removed from the job, not with the formulation "for reasons of health," or "in view of retirement," but with a clear indication of their illegal actions. In the meantime, many of them receive personal pensions, and enjoy various privileges.

**The fifth principle is the presence of an effective mechanism of control and supervision.**

There is in the republic, just as in the country in general, a multitude of control and supervisory organs. At the

same time, their activity is poorly coordinated, bringing fewer results than may have been anticipated. The unification of three heterogeneous functions in the procuracy organs should be recognized as ineffective: criminal investigation, support of accusations, and supervision of legality.

The problem of expanding the functions of the lawyers, as a self-managing association, has not yet been resolved.

It is natural that the circle of studies on legal topics has not been limited to general principles of legal reform. A deep study of the problems specific to Uzbekistan is required. Problems, for example, such as rational land and water utilization, the protection of maternal and infant health, labor resources utilization, and price formation in agricultural production.

I would like to pause in more detail on the issues of improving national statehood in the Soviet Federation, as well as issues of the state apparatus in the Uzbek SSR.

The primary task is seen as the creation of an authentic, objective history of the party, of the Soviet state and law, of all our society.

If we pursue Marxist-Leninist research methodology, then we must, as was noted at the February (1988) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "Vividly portray how the millions of people lived, labored, what they believed in; how victory and failure, revelations and errors, the bright and the tragic were combined; the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses, and the violations of socialist legality, at times, even crimes."

Both the entire actual history of the state-legal structure in our country, and the history of its interpretation within soviet legal scholarship are in need of a new historical-legal and theoretical comprehension.

It is necessary to decisively overcome the orientation toward a limited selection of "canonized" historical facts and events, chronological descriptions with the reproduction of generally obligatory positive and negative assessments.

For the development of historical-legal research responding to the modern level and requirements, a general theoretical conception of the new approach to the Soviet state-legal construction as a whole is needed; its past, the present day, and the future. A genuine renewal, deepening, and development of research in all branches of legal science, including the history of the state and law, is possible only on the basis of such a conception.

Even elementary historical facts require a legal evaluation. The issue of the legal status of the Turkestan ASSR within the body of the RSFSR has not been fully elucidated, nor the particulars of the interrelations of the Turkestan ASSR with the Bukhara and Khorezm soviet people's republics. The treatment of national-state delimitation in Central Asia, and the experience of the function of Central Asian organs is in need of new approaches.

The republic's historical-legal science has practically not broached the elucidation of the Stalinist repressions, and is shamefully silent on the forced mobilization into a labor army in which many fell victim to hunger and harsh labor conditions.

The republic's legal scholars have not yet examined the mechanism of the emergence and the investigation of the cotton affairs, the consequences of the destructive influence of corruption.

We still do not have fundamental studies devoted to the natural traits and tendencies of the development of organs of state administration, either on a central or local level. It is far from a coincidence that the numerous reorganizations of the apparatus of administration are carried out in haste, without being thought through. In just this past year, a number of ministries and state committees were united, then divided once more. Nor are issues of administrative-territorial division always resolved on solid grounds.

We know the sort of exclusive urgency that the national question has recently acquired in our country. Properly speaking, it has secretly been so for more than a just a single decade. Uzbekistan's legal scholars have done no small amount for the development of the problems of the establishment and the development national Soviet statehood. However, even here, we were often the prisoners of the stereotypes that had come to exist, the dogmatic concepts. Among the most topical problems today can be named: The study of various aspects of the sovereignty of the union republics; the correlation of the competences of the Union of SSRs and the union republics; their mutual obligations; the property of the union republic, republic economic accountability; the mechanism for permitting disagreement between the Union of SSRs and the union republics, as among the union republics themselves; the representation of union republics in the organs of the federation, and the legal status of the national cultural centers.

In conclusion, a few words on the coordination of the legal studies. They are conducted primarily at the Institute of Philosophy and Law, the Law Faculty of Tashkent State University, at the Tashkent Scientific Research Institute of Court Expertise, and at the USSR MVD Tashkent Higher School. They are also being implemented at the legal departments of a number of the republic's VUZs. However, this research is still poorly coordinated. We need a long-term all-republic program of legal research, the coordinator of which could be the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences.

### **1921 Treaty On Independent Nakhchivan Highlighted**

*90US0621C Baku AZARBAYJAN MUALLIMI in Azeri 17 Nov 89 p 3*

[Article by Said Sadygov: "A Treaty Of Friendship And Fraternity"]

[Text] The realization in our country of perestroyka, glasnost and Soviet democracy makes it possible for us to



write our history as it was without distortions and falsifications and communicate it to the people.

In this article I consider it appropriate to discuss fundamental questions which have not been reflected in our historical literature and which are very important today along with presenting monographs and articles which are important sources in our historiography and devoted to the history of the Nakhchivan republic without reducing their importance.

The social and political events which occurred in the Nakhchivan, Sharur-Dereleyez and Ordubad districts took such a terrible, tragic form that they were turned into an important problem in the international world beyond the borders of the Transcaucasus. The Entente powers, headed by American and English imperialists, armed the Dashnak-Armenian troops and brought about a national slaughter. In 1918 the Nakhchivan question was discussed often at the Transcaucasian seym, in 1918-1920 at the parliament and national council of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, at the Armenian National Council and the Armenian Dashnak government, at the parliament of the state of Turkey, at the Tabriz municipal administration, in the Maky Khanate, in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference, in 1919-1920 by the US representatives in Armenia and Nakhchivan, in 1920-1921 at the Revolutionary Committees in the Azerbaijan and Armenian SSRs, on 16 March 1921 at the Politburo of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (bolshevik)], and countless times in 1920-1921 at the RSFSR Soviet of Peoples Commissars under the chairmanship of V. I. Lenin, and again at the international conferences called in Moscow and Kars.

Prominent statesmen, diplomats, soldiers, and hundreds of thousands of common people of the Transcaucasus, the RSFSR, Turkey, Iran and even some European countries tried to resolve the Nakhchivan question peacefully.

The entrance of the 11th Red Army into the city of Nakhchivan was the beginning of the victory of the Soviet government in this region. The fight for the victory of the Soviet government occurred under conditions of intense conflict against Dashnak armies and lasted eight months. In the course of this hundreds of people lost their lives.

11th Red Army groups located in Nakhchivan acted in concert with Red Turkish soldiers, who greatly outnumbered the Red Army, in battles against the Dashnak army on the basis of a general agreement. The basic duty standing before both armies was to liberate this territory from interventionists and establish peace and security.

With regard to the victory of the Soviet government in Armenia, V. I. Lenin, in his congratulatory telegram to S.I. Kasyan, chairman of Armenia's military-revolutionary committee, expressed his certainty that "workers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey would use all their powers to establish fraternal solidarity among themselves."

In connection with the victory of the Soviet government in Armenia a declaration by the Azerbaijan SSR on Armenia was included in the newspaper *KOMMUNIST* of 2 December under the signature of N. Narimanov, chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee. This declaration was an example of the correct implementation of Lenin's nationalities policy, which eradicated the artificial hostility between the two neighboring peoples.

The Armenian Revolutionary Committee twice issued a declaration on Nakhchivan. On 26 December it repudiated the independence of the Nakhchivan republic, but on the 28th the second declaration was compelled to recognize the independence of Nakhchivan as a Soviet republic. S. I. Kasyan, chairman of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee, and committee members Avis and Bekzadyan signed these documents.

The victory of the Soviet government strengthened the tendency of the two peoples towards friendship and rapprochement. In the document adopted at the Irevan meeting between Armenians and soldiers of the "Red Camp" ["Krasnyy Tabor"], who were led by the renowned and courageous commander Abbasgulu bey Shadlinski, a participant in the liberation of Armenia from Dashnak bondage, it is stated: "The Muslim workers of Armenia say to the whole world that they are ready to defend Armenia, a Soviet republic of workers and peasants, to the last drop of blood." [sentence as received] With these words they expressed their belief in the future and spoke from the heart in the name of mankind. But they never would have imagined that at the end of the century all the property of their children would be taken from their hands and confiscated and that they would be driven, naked and in the dark of night, from their own lands into the mountains and forests and subjected to terrors and degradations, the likes of which had never been seen.

With the goal of completing the victory of the Soviet government on Nakhchivan's territory, putting an end to internal chaos, and establishing law and order in the region, a special commissariat under the leadership of B. Valibeyov was established on 5 October 1920. Military, political, and civilian government was placed at the disposal of the special commissariat.

One of the most important tasks placed before the special commissariat was the relationship to the Red Turkish soldiers, who considerably outnumbered Red Army units on Nakhchivan's territory and were located between Ordubad and Arazdoyan station.

V. I. Lenin advised diplomats that diplomacy be used to regulate relations with the Turkish state in the Transcaucasus, that a strategic policy be set in motion, that the inflaming of disputes on tactical issues not be permitted, and that they should be cautious to the maximum extent.

On 21 December 1920 at the 8th Congress of Soviets in V. I. Lenin's last speech in which he discussed the Soviet government's relationship to Turkey he said: "We personally have been and will be extremely peaceloving in

the Caucasus and, slight though the chances are that we would go to war, we will not permit ill-considered actions."

In its relationship to the Turkish army the Nakhchivan Special Commissariat set in motion a very farsighted policy based on Lenin's assertion.

Veyselbey, commander for political affairs of Turkish forces located on Nakhchivan's territory, declared himself Special Commissar of Nakhchivan. His basic pretext was that B. Valibeyov had to go to Irevan for a few days to conduct talks with leaders of the Armenian government on some disputed questions. Valibeyov's train sat for three days at the Shahtakhty station because they did not allow it into Nakhchivan city. Veyselbey stated that Turkish forces had come to this land at the repeated invitations of ambassadors sent by elders from Sharur- Dereleyez, Nakhchivan, and Ordubad, and that he had come at their wish: "Our basic objective is to free these lands from the danger of the Dashnak armies, to protect the respect and honor of our mothers and sisters, and to plant the banner of eternal peace in this soil."

B. Valibeyov often informed the Central Committee Azerbaijan KP(b), the Azerbaijan and Armenia Revolutionary Committees, the Military Council of the 11th Red Army, and Kara Kazymbekir Pasha, commander of the Eastern Front of the Turkish Army, about the military-political situation in Nakhchivan by letter.

With the goal of putting the military and political situation in Nakhchivan in order, four notes were given to the Nakhchivan Special Commissariat in January and February of 1921 with the signatures of Kara Kazymbekir Pasha and other statesmen.

It is revealed in B. Valibeyov's answer to one of these notes, which he personally presented to Kara Kazymbekir Pasha in Anatolia on 19 January, that while the banner of national liberation was being raised in the East and our battlefield successes were increasing, the policy of the Soviet state was also changing. This policy uplifted the spirit of the people of the East. Along with these it was demanded that basic attention be given to the living conditions, customs, religion, and national characteristics of nationalities. The Armenian SSR, Ukraine SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Dagestan ASSR, the Maku Khan, and the ruler of Tabriz recognized Nakhchivan's independence. The Turkish side could be sure that Nakhchivan would be able to manage itself under Azerbaijan's protection.

The services of Behbud bey Shahtakhtinski, N. Narimanov's close comrade-in-arms and Azerbaijan's first authorized representative in Moscow, were invaluable in Nakhchivan's organization as a Soviet republic under Azerbaijan's protection and in the implementation of Lenin's nationalities policy throughout the Transcaucasus. In this context, the letter he sent to V. I. Lenin, chairman of the RSFSR Soviet of Peoples' Commissars, on 1 March 1921 is very interesting. Primarily, the future fate of the Muslims of Nakhchivan, Zangazur,

Nagorno-Karabakh, Zagatala, Borchaly, the Garayazy plains, Dagestan, and the North Caucasus was discussed in the letter. Data on the national composition, number, and geography of the territories whose names were mentioned were also added. Unfortunately, a copy of the text of the letter has still not been brought to our republic to this day. Its content would be the best answer to the Armenian extremists who wish to falsify our history. Some fragments of this letter are given in the book "Lenin i stanovleniye Zakavkazskoy federatsii" (Yerevan, 1969) by the Armenian scholar S. V. Kharmandaryan.

B. Shahtakhtinski stated his proposals on resolving the national question in the Transcaucasus and on problems connected with Nakhchivan on the basis of proletarian internationalism. Questions raised in the letter attracted V. I. Lenin's attention, and on 7 March it was sent to Politburo with his approval for discussion.

On 16 March the Politburo of the Central Committee RKP(b), together with Stalin, Vladimirski, and Chicherin examined this letter. Because they liked Shahtakhtinski's proposal, they passed a decree on organizing an NSSR under the protection of the Azerbaijan SSR. The Politburo's decree had a great importance in resolving ethnic relations among the peoples of the Transcaucasus. After much correspondence and many talks of the Transcaucasian republics and the RSFSR with Turkey, peace talks began through a personal order from V. I. Lenin.

At the order of V. I. Lenin and N. Narimanov, B. Shahtakhtinski came to Moscow in March 1921, met with a Turkish representative, and submitted a proposal on the Turks yielding in their policies connected with Nakhchivan. In a letter written on 7 March 1921 sent to G. Chicherin, the RSFSR Commissar of Foreign Affairs, B. Shahtakhtinski wrote: "Yesterday I had a wide-ranging talk with Turkish representatives. Nakhchivan and Batumi now are of less interest to them since they think that talks about these regions cannot lead to positive results."

On 16 March 1921 a special agreement was signed between Turkey and the RSFSR after talks between both sides in Moscow. V.I. Lenin called this historical document the "Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity." At these talks B. Shahtakhtinski, who had once again been appointed Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR, represented Azerbaijan. In the second paragraph of the peace treaty it is shown that the Nakhchivan Soviet Socialist Republic (NSSR) could be organized under the condition that the territory of Nakhchivan remain as part of Azerbaijan.

In a photograph of the treaty, preserved in the Nakhchivan Central State Archive, it is shown that this land cannot be yielded to a third state. On the other hand, any part of the territory of Nakhchivan could be handed over to the Turkish state. G. Chicherin, RSFSR Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Jalil Korkmasov, chairman of

the Dagestan Revolutionary Committee and member of the RSFSR TsIK, and, from the Turkish government Yusif Kamal, Riza Nuri, and Ali Fuad signed this treaty which has great historical significance.

On 13 October 1921 the "Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity" was examined once again by Turkey, the Azerbaijan SSR, Georgian SSR, Armenian SSR and the RSFSR in the city of Kars in Turkey. From Turkey Kazym Garabekir Pasha, Veli Bey, Muhtar Bey, and Memduh Shevket Bey, from the Azerbaijan SSR Behbud bey Shahtakhtinski and Mukhtar Hajyev, chairman of the Azerbaijan Central Ispolkom, from the Armenian SSR Askinaz Mravyan, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, from the Georgian SSR Shalava Eliava, Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs, and Y. S. Ganachevski, ambassador of the RSFSR in Latvia, signed the treaty. In order to define the borders of the newly-formed NSSR a commission consisting of representatives from the Azerbaijan SSR, the Armenian SSR, the Nakhchivan SSR, and the government of Turkey was formed. In a supplement added to the treaty the borders between the Armenian SSR and the states of Turkey and Iran were defined very clearly and precisely. The NSSR's border with Turkey was defined as extending 11 kilometers up to the Arazdoyan station.

This treaty laid a firm foundation for friendly relations between the Soviet state and Turkey. V. I. Lenin, in discussing its importance, said: "...Only this agreement will free us from the Caucasus' constant wars." Just after these historical agreements, on 4 April 1921, a joint meeting between Safarov, secretary of the oblast party committee, and A. Gadimov, chairman of its Revolutionary Committee, was called and the Nakhchivan Soviet of Peoples' Commissars was formed. The special commissariat was disbanded because it had concluded its functions. At this meeting the NSSR Soviet of Peoples' Deputies and its commissariats were organized.

In those years the authorities and rights of the NSSR were quite broad. Because it adjoined and had a common border with Turkey it established a consulate in Kars, and Turkey established a military representation in Nakhchivan city. Since the NSSR also had a common border with Iran of 176 kilometers along the Araz River, consulates of Nakhchivan were opened in the cities of Khoy, Maku and Tabriz dating from 1921. As for Iran's consulate in Nakhchivan, it was active until the second half of November 1938.

With the goal of assuring food supplies by means of trade with Iran for refugees who had escaped from Armenia and gathered in Nakhchivan, for the Turkish army and the 11th Red Army, all of which amounted to some 500 thousand people, together with the local population, the Nakhchivan branch of the RSFSR Commissariat of Foreign Trade was organized.

NSSR missions were established in the Azerbaijan SSR, Armenian SSR, and Georgian SSR with the goal of maintaining economic, trade and diplomatic relations.

But, we must note with great regret that the conditions of the "Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity" signed 68 years ago are often violated in a onesided manner by the Armenian SSR and subjected to definite changes.

### Ossetian Separatism Linked to 1925 Plan

18130049 Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian  
13 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Candidate of Juridical Sciences Iakob Putkaradze, head of the Department of State and International Law, Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences Center for the Study of State and Law: "A Call to Reason"]

[Text] Relations between Georgians and Ossetians go back through the ages. Real life is complex and full of contradictions, and the path of relations between the two brotherly peoples has not always been strewn with flowers. Sometimes, muddy waters have poured into the usual stream of traditional normal relations, to the grief and detriment of both sides. Just such an unfortunate situation has developed today. Both peoples are confronted with severe tests and grave trials.

Our common historical experience proves that folk wisdom and reason will always win out. Life will undoubtedly return to its normal channel and take the right path. The guarantee of this can be seen in age-old examples of how the Georgian and Ossetian peoples, who have gone through so much, have stood together so well and enjoyed good-neighborly relations that have turned into friendship and kinship.

The Georgian people have more than once shown, by deeds, their good will toward the Ossetians, have affirmed their genuine benevolence and truly ungrudging generosity. The Ossetians' permanent, mass settlement in Kartli, and the Georgians' open-handedness, are common knowledge, factors which resulted in the transfiguration of the ancient Georgian lands and the establishment of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. The main thing that Georgians ask in return is gratitude, perception and appreciation of this good will, in order to rule out the proverbial eventuality of "the outside rooster displacing the home rooster." This wish and desire is understandable and natural. To answer goodness with evil is totally unjust and unacceptable in terms of both morality and law. It has to be said that unswerving compliance with this principle constitutes an essential condition for the status of the South Ossetian AO. It is from this position that we must assess the recent deterioration in the social-political situation and the further course of events in the South Ossetian AO.

The demand that the South Ossetian AO be given the status of an autonomous republic must be seen as an attempt to break up Georgia's state-territorial integrity and encroach upon the Georgian nation's vital interests. It portends the creation of an Ossetian state on Georgian lands. However, that's not the end of it. According to the "Appeal" sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Council of Ministers, and CPSU Central Committee, "granting

autonomous republic status to South Ossetia (the oblast)"—get this—is to become “the first step in the unification of North and South Ossetia.”

It is a very painful problem, one requiring a complex approach and discussion of the various aspects. In particular, the juridical aspect of the matter must be the subject of separate, special discussion. The authoritative word, undoubtedly, will be stated by the special commission which a session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet has assigned the task of formulating a conclusion concerning matters associated with the status of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.

Here, however, we shall touch upon a specific historical-juridical fact. It is especially important in that it clearly shows the Ossetian-nationality workers' genuinely patriotic, firm position of excellent good will toward the fraternal Georgian people and cuts the ground out from under those who indulge in speculation and provocative demands in the name of the Ossetian working people.

It must be said that the anti-Georgian plan of unifying North and South Ossetia did not appear for the first time in this infamous “Appeal.” It has a rather long history. Apparently it was conceived long before the creation of the South Ossetian AO. The existence of the autonomous entity constitutes a component in that scheme and, in fact, an intermediate stage in the seizure of Georgian lands.

And so, let us trace the course of events.

At the 15 July 1925 session of the Georgian TsIK [Central Executive Committee] (the republic's highest legislative, executive, and control organ in the period between Congresses of Soviets), when they had finished with matters concerning changes and amendments to the charter governing the judiciary and were supposed to start discussion of the civil law procedural code, session chairman P. Makharadze suddenly said, “Now, comrades, we introduce North Ossetian Oblast Chairman Takoyev, who will present to you a very important report.” Takoyev began his speech as follows: “Comrades! I have been sent by the North Ossetian TsIK concerning the matter of unifying the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast....”

It hardly needs pointing out that the problem that was so abruptly raised at the session is a very important one. P. Makharadze himself emphasizes that. It is worth noting, however, that the question had not been placed on the agenda that the session had adopted (the session confirmed its “agenda” at its first meeting on 14 July). It is unreasonable to think that such a vitally important problem would be submitted for discussion at the session all impromptu, without preparation and unexpectedly. What happened, then? We must assume that it was done not by chance but deliberately in order to forestall excitement in advance and ensure that the desired decision was taken without any trouble.

The question of unifying North and South Ossetia was carefully prepared. It was discussed in the relevant party and state organs.

In January 1925, the North Ossetian Congress of Soviets had passed a decree calling for submitting the issue of the unification of North and South Ossetia to the Central government. On 25 March of that year, moreover, the Congress of Soviets of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast passed a decree expressing the desire to unify North Ossetia and South Ossetia. Later, North Ossetia submitted the issue to the Presidium of the Russian Federation's TsIK. The issue was formulated “on the following grounds: North and South Ossetia to be unified in a single autonomous Soviet republic and form part of the Georgian republic.” And the all-Russian TsIK gave preliminary approval (“no objections were raised”). In order to “prepare the matter,” there was considerable preliminary negotiation with the RSFSR's relevant (North Caucasian) Oblast Executive Committee, which North Ossetia formed a part of, which was “agreeable to that formulation of the issue.” Right after that, the matter was brought up at a session of the Georgian TsIK so that the RSFSR TsIK could bring it up for final discussion and decision in the appropriate all-union organ (the USSR TsIK).

At the session of the Georgian TsIK, the issue was the subject of a very short speech by South Ossetian TsIK Chairman A. Dzhatiev, who expressed “unanimous” support for “this sound and excellent matter” and presented it as “an indicator of our correct and sound method of resolving the troublesome nationality question”; he saw it as an example “of how simply, clearly, and easily the Soviet proletarian republic resolves extremely important matters that the bourgeois governments have been struggling with for thousands of years” (“let our enemies see how simply and easily the Communist Party resolves this difficult issue in the Soviet Republic”).

There was essentially no debate or discussion of the issue. The entire discussion was confined to the aforementioned brief announcements, Chairman P. Makharadze's comments, and comments by two men—Gegelia and Gogiberidze. For comparison, at the first meeting of the session the Chairman devoted much more time to his introductory speech and later on (at the third meeting) than was spent on the matter of uniting North and South Ossetia. In the same way, much more time was devoted to the session's agenda and time frame than to the fate of South Ossetia. In fact, the entire first meeting of the session took up the introductory speech, the agenda, the schedule, and one technical matter. The amount of stenographic material from that meeting adds up to three times the amount of material devoted to the Ossetian question.

P. Makharadze saw the unification of North and South Ossetia as a step forward, “regardless of which republic the union winds up in.” He was challenged by Gegelia,



who stated that "for us Georgians it is of vital importance that Ossetia be united with its brother Georgians." On behalf of "the fraternal Abkhazian republic" Gegelia welcomed "this great political and historical act of uniting North and South Ossetia with Georgia in fraternal union," which "will constitute a sign of our unity for the world to see." He expressed special affinity and gratitude to Comrade Takoyev, who had certainly done a great deal and spent considerable time and energy on the unification of North and South Ossetia. Gogiberidze made mention of "enemies who say that Georgia has lost its territory. This union, however, shows that Georgia has not lost territory but enlarged it. So our enemies have been deprived of agitation material against us; they will no longer dare to say that Soviet rule has given away Georgian lands."

For all its superficiality, the discussion of the issue showed one very important fact: the traditionally unshakeable alliance between the Ossetians and Georgians. It brought out forcefully that "the Ossetian people have historically been allied with Georgia." It clearly revealed the spirit of the Ossetians living in Georgia. As was noted, South Ossetia "demands of North Ossetia that the unification take place within Georgia." It was stated publicly that North Ossetia "expresses the desire to separate from the RSFSR and become part of the Georgian SSR." It is worth noting that the North Ossetian TsIK chairman himself made this statement. Thus was "the North and South Ossetian working people's perfectly deliberate" position made clear.

"There may be those who ask, why this orientation toward Georgia?" said the North Ossetian representative Takoyev at the session, and answered his own question as follows: "Because Ossetia has existed and traveled side by side with the Georgian republic. The working people of North and South Ossetia, and especially senior officials, can see clearly that a sound nationality policy is being implemented more effectively in the Georgian republic than anywhere else." This fact, Takoyev went on to say, "has convinced everyone that North and South Ossetia's cultural and economic development requires joining the Georgian SSR. In addition... South Ossetia categorically states that it will unite with North Ossetia only if the latter agrees to become part of the Georgian SSR."

Today's newly risen extremists and separatists definitely need to heed the Ossetian man's wise words, bequeathed as the older generation's political legacy and formulated as a program of action 64 years ago at a session of the All-Georgian TsIK: "The working people of South Ossetia declare that their cultural and economic needs will be totally, completely, and unconditionally met by the Georgian republic. They therefore recognize that there is absolutely no need for, in fact it would be absolutely useless, to carry out any new experimentation—that is, to separate from Georgia.

"It is obvious that this call to reason by South Ossetia merits every consideration."

This spirit among the working people of Ossetia is significant and especially meaningful in that it was brought forth strongly in the very period when the lands of Georgia were being frittered away by sorry-excuses-for-Georgians themselves, and land was being given out to practically anyone who wanted it, with the blessing of these degenerates. Why, Pilipe Makharadze himself had so little regard for the former Samachablo and the Principality of Ksani that he said it didn't matter which republic they ended up in! Now, thank God, another breeze is blowing, and as long as Georgians can be called a nation they will never willingly give up their hard-won national heritage. And in this just cause, Georgians are counting on the tried and true brotherly support of representatives of other nations living in Georgia, including the Ossetians.

It was Takoyev who submitted the draft of a resolution to the session of the Georgian TsIK concerning the unification of North and South Ossetia into a single autonomous republic. It was read at a meeting by P. Makharadze. The two-point draft endorsed the unification of the separate autonomous entities as well as the aforementioned decisions concerning "united Ossetia's" becoming part of the Georgian SSR. The session (attended by 87 members and 25 candidate members of TsIK and 27 volost executive committee chairmen) voted unanimously by open ballot in favor of the Takoyev resolution. The approved text, in contrast to the Takoyev draft, additionally incorporates Makharadze's cosmopolite position (endorsement of unification of the autonomous entities "regardless of which Soviet republic the new state entity becomes part of").

Although the unification of North and South Ossetia and the idea of the single autonomous republic becoming part of the Georgian SSR were never realized, it is essential to evaluate the draft project from the standpoint of our own national interests.

In the event of the unification of North and South Ossetia, there would be two possibilities in regard to Georgia: the new unified formation either would or would not form part of the Georgian SSR.

The second alternative would be immediately fatal to Georgia, because it would spell the loss of substantial Georgian territory at one fell swoop. Hence, even the possibility of such a thing, which P. Makharadze submitted to the Georgian TsIK session, and which was incorporated in the republic TsIK's resolution under his influence, unquestionably represented a clear expression of an anti-Georgian position.

By the first alternative, new territory would be added to Georgia. Hence, from this standpoint, implementation of the first possibility would undoubtedly seem to be beneficial to Georgia. Paradoxically, however, considering the expectable overall results, the reality is quite otherwise.

The Ossetians' expression of excellent good will toward the Georgian people, and North Ossetia's gravitation toward Georgia, of course, constituted a very important



event and will remain a high point in the history of the two brotherly peoples. But would the implementation of the plan be beneficial to Georgia's national interests, and would it really have been as good and acceptable to us as the speakers at the republic TsIK session represented it to be? It is our opinion that the question must be answered in the negative.

Let us examine the question in terms of demographic problems.

Even without the incorporation of North Ossetia into Georgia, the demographic situation in South Ossetia since the establishment of Soviet rule has changed radically to the detriment of Georgians. In the event of unification, moreover, with the possibility of unimpeded migration from North to South, the Georgians' proportion in the total population of the former Samachablo and Principality of Ksani would have declined catastrophically. In the region as a whole ("united Ossetia") there would have been no question of any national balance of population, to say nothing of any significant number of Georgians within it!

Against this background, now, let us look at the present social-political situation in South Ossetia and in this light think about the "Appeal of the Ossetian Working People" to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Council of Ministers, and CPSU Central Committee. It is easy to guess the resonance that would then be evoked by the extremists' and separatists' demands concerning the self-determination of the fate of the autonomous formation (the right of free secession from a union republic), the subordination of all types of autonomous entities to the common, joint federative Center, and maximum restrictions on the official use of the Georgian language in the region.

In short, North Ossetia itself and "United Ossetia" in general would be the kind of gain for Georgia which, as the saying has it, "blinds the enemy from outside and the friend from inside." Sooner or later it would explode like a delayed-action bomb and separate the former Samachablo and the Principality of Ksani from Georgia.

Hence, the idea of uniting North and South Ossetia, even if the "United Ossetia" were to become a part of the Georgian SSR, is absolutely unacceptable in terms of Georgia's national interests.

It appears that the plan to create a "United Ossetia" was favored by I. Stalin, S. Ordzhonikidze, and A. Mikoyan. This is apparent from one of Stalin's telegrams to Ordzhonikidze and a comparison of it with the materials from the aforementioned session of the Georgian TsIK.

The telegram was sent from Moscow to Tbilisi, to the Transcaucasian Kraykom [kray party committee] (the text was shown to me by L. Toidze, to whom I express my thanks). Its date, with the year not given, is indicated as the day and month the telegram was sent and received and processed at its destination: it was issued on 29 June and received and decoded on 30 June. It appears the

telegram concerns the question of interest to us that was discussed at the Georgian TsIK, and by its content we can see that it pertains to the same year—1925; it is apparent, therefore, that it was received in Tbilisi exactly two weeks prior to the TsIK session.

Stalin's message to Ordzhonikidze was as follows: "I personally had nothing against the Ossetian plan, but because opposing views have come in from the Southeast, I am very hesitant and have not been able to make a decision. I urge you to postpone the answer until our joint meeting with Mikoyan."

This appears to be an answering telegram. Someone probably asked Ordzhonikidze about it, and he in turn asked Stalin's advice about the "Ossetian plan," which, if we go by the context, he himself shared. Stalin is informing Ordzhonikidze that previously he himself was not against the plan, but that now the objection from the Southeast has made him hesitate. To resolve the question he deemed it necessary to hold a three-way conference (Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Mikoyan).

It is necessary to clarify what is meant in the telegram by the "Ossetian plan," "the Southeast," and Stalin's views against the "Ossetian plan," why Ordzhonikidze needed Stalin's advice and what Mikoyan had to do with it.

The situation, as we see it, was this:

The "Ossetian plan" was the draft project for the unification of North and South Ossetia. After consulting with the appropriate organs of the Russian Federation concerning unification, and after the necessary decisions were made in North and South Ossetia, it was to be determined what position Georgia itself took, inasmuch as Georgia was under the general jurisdiction of S. Ordzhonikidze, the head of the Transcaucasian Kraykom. Ordzhonikidze himself, of course, would be as "generous as ever," while Georgia at that time (after the crushing of the uprising of 1924) was depressed. Nevertheless, people did raise their voices in Georgia against the "Ossetian plan." This is what caused Stalin to hesitate; the "Southeast" mentioned in his telegram probably means the relevant region of eastern Georgia in regard to North Ossetia. This is why Ordzhonikidze asked for Stalin's advice in preparing to submit the question to the Georgian TsIK, and it resulted in the aforementioned answering telegram. Under the circumstances it is understandable why they preferred to discuss the "Ossetian plan" in an impromptu manner at the session of the Georgian TsIK.

As far as A. Mikoyan is concerned, his intervention in the "Ossetian plan" can be explained as follows. During that period—1924-1926—Mikoyan was a secretary in the North Caucasian Kraykom. And North Ossetia at the time was a part of North Caucasia. Hence, North Ossetia was under Mikoyan's jurisdiction, and any questions connected with the "Ossetian plan," of course, could not be decided without his involvement. Considering Mikoyan's rank, moreover, we might also assume that he would be more in favor of separating the Georgian lands

known as South Ossetia from Georgia, uniting them with North Ossetia as part of the North Caucasian Oblast, and in this way making them part of the Russian Federation. Russia, naturally, would not say no to such a thing. North Ossetia was part of the Russian Federation anyway, and so in that regard its position would remain unchanged. It was at this point that South Ossetia stepped in. The Ossetian could not betray the law of brotherhood and, as we have seen above, he categorically demanded that he remain with his Georgian friends and companions. It was the South Ossetians' position which triumphed, although the North Caucasian Obkom [oblast party committee] found it difficult to give up North Ossetia and could not agree to allow a "United Ossetia" to become part of Georgia rather than the Russian Federation. Here let us recall Takoyev's words at the session of the Georgian TsIK. Takoyev stated: "We have held lengthy preliminary negotiations to prepare things with the North Oblast Executive Committee [as printed], which, after serious discussion of the matter, agreed to formulate the question this way."

In short, the "Ossetian plan" was finally formulated as presented at the session of the Georgian TsIK. Nevertheless, the idea of uniting Ossetia within the Russian Federation was still alive. A reflection of this, as well as a manifestation of P. Makharadze's cosmopolite creed, was the duplicitous and essentially anti-Georgian position toward the former Samachablo and the Principality of Ksani, which are called South Ossetia, as reflected in the Takoyev resolution at the Georgian TsIK.

In the so-called "Ossetian working people's" appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the CPSU Central Committee, the unification of North and South Ossetia is declared to be "an age-old dream." This is a very disturbing admission, because the creation of a "United Ossetia" in accordance with it, at the expense of Georgian lands, constitutes a long-standing strategic scheme that surfaces periodically from time to time, according to circumstances, as representing a problem to be solved. In this light, the "Ossetian plan" of 1925 and the "Appeal of the Ossetian Working People" of today look like links in a single chain. In fact, the creation of the autonomous oblast itself is seen to be the starting point in the ultimate realization of a strategic goal, the first big step on the path of separatism.

#### **Roundtable on Preparation For New Edition of Kazakh Party History**

90US0493A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 12 Jan 90 pp 1-2

[Roundtable discussion prepared by L. Vaydman, KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, and Ye. Smailov, SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTAN: "The Fact is an Argument of History"; date, place not given]

[Text] "Essays on the history of the Kazakh Communist Party: the development of a new conception"—this was the topic of the "roundtable" session conducted by the

Institute of Party History, with the participation of leading scientists of the capital and of the newspapers SOTSIALISTIK KAZAKHSTANA and KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA.

"Essays" has already come out in two editions, those of 1963 and 1984. However, these works are scarcely capable of withstanding serious criticism from the positions of today's level of public opinion.

The reason that a great deal in party science is being re-interpreted today is because in general there had been no science as such," G. Kozlov, one of the leading specialists in the area of the history of party building during the discussion. "So what had there been? Apologia. Commentaries and propagandizing party resolutions. Without researching them, without revealing the consequences, without evaluating the degree of responsibility for the resolutions adopted."

An absurdity: Party historians have studied all sorts of things, various things, yet as has recently been "detected," they have never studied the party itself, having a poor conception of what it is. They were concerned with researching (to a certain extent, of course) its agrarian, economic, foreign policy, and ever-growing roles in society. Yet they did not trouble themselves with a study of the urgent contradictions in that role, nor an analysis of the subjective factors which quite significantly affected its activity, its status. And they ultimately got to the edge of today's crisis.

We are not speaking today about republishing in a "reworked, expanded, and improved" version that which has already been published twice, although such motives were also voiced for this "roundtable" session. As B. Tulepbayev, the presiding corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and the director of the Institute of Party History noted, it is necessary to begin the preparation of a principally new publication of "Outlines," free from the ideology of Stalinism and the dogmatism of stagnation, based upon the strictest graphic and factual basis, involving all the known archival materials, including those in Arabic characters, which until now have in effect not been involved in scientific study.

As was determined at the session, the authors' collective of "Essays" will not be composed of staffers from the Institute of Party History. The best scientific forces of the republic, the best qualified philosophers, economists, historians, and writers will be involved in the preparation of individual chapters. And they will consider several versions of this or that chapter in order to choose the best works on a competitive basis. One of the participants in the discussion, a man apparently given to humor, leaning toward sarcasm, advised the historians to clear out of the trenches in which they have been for 5 years now, since the beginning of perestroika, shielding themselves from the unceasing attacks of the publicists, who, if not always in step with science, are always in step with the word. This recommendation was taken into consideration with all

*seriousness by both the scientists and journalists sitting at the "roundtable" that had sharp corners.*

*Here is how the discussion took place. Active participants in the discussion were: M. Kozybayaev, academician, KaSSR Academy of Sciences; K. Nurpeisov, corresponding member, KaSSR Academy of Sciences (Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography); A. Sarmurzin, doctor of historical sciences; candidates of sciences V. Spichakov, T. Omarbekov, M. Koygeldiyev, V. Koval, I. Malyar (Institute of Party History); V. Solovyev, doctor of historical sciences; V. Usachev, candidate of historical sciences (Kazakh State University), and others representing various of the capital's VUZs.*

*The fundamental statements of the session's participants are published today from a condensed transcript.*

**B. Tulepbayev, corresponding member, USSR Academy of Sciences: History is Created Only Once.**

Let us begin without any sort of prefaces: What need has impelled us to gather for today's meeting at the "round-table"?

Having encompassed all aspects of Soviet society's life, perestroika, democratization, glasnost are "shaking" the social sciences as well. And this "gets to" the historians in particular.

This is natural. We have come to perestroika with a heavy burden of problems. For many decades, our science was the captive of one-sided interpretations, was cut off from life, preferring commentary to deep analysis of actual historical experience, ignoring an entire range of events and their participants. Science, as a rule, evaluated the activity of party organizations only in superlatives, failing to notice the existing shortcomings and the causes that generated them. And it is hardly worth thinking that in the 4 years since the beginning of perestroika the situation has changed in a cardinal manner. Perhaps that is why almost all its admirers consider it their duty today to eliminate the "sins" of historical science. In this area today, historians and non-historians, philosophers and economists, writers and poets, journalists, painters and artists have moved as a broad front. But after all, it is well known that when a disorganized start strives to get somewhere, more things get trampled down than created.

Of course, there are people, professionals and dilettantes, who are sincerely striving to rehabilitate historical truth, to explain the "blank spots" in our past; they have a multitude of interesting facts. Yet it has turned out that there is more than a small number of those who, while abusing glasnost, are eroding the edges and criteria of scientific ideology under the flag of moral and spiritual "purification." They are trying to shout through louder than everybody else, to blow up a sensation, without being squeamish about half-truths or even outright lies.

In their day, the historians struggled against bourgeois falsifiers. Now our own falsifiers have appeared, much

more scathing than the foreign ones. Yet very few decide to combat them, because by doing so, one immediately risks being labelled a dogmatist, a conservative, an opponent of perestroika. Therefore, the historical extremists are sometimes taken for the victors.

But after all, you cannot make science by screaming. If history is going to be written under the influence of ideological extremism, with a generally negative attitude toward the entire Soviet period, then once again it will not reflect the objective truth, the truth of life, and such history will have to be rewritten once more in the future, as has already happened on more than one occasion.

[Question] In that case, how do you professionals intend to pose the question?

Above all, we will give an accounting of ourselves as to whether we are talking about a cosmetic repair of the facade of historical science, not only about some colorful hues for the "blank spots," but primarily about the creation of a new, genuinely scientific conception of party-historical knowledge, free from subjective, dogmatic stratification, and from the influence of any sort of ideological extremism. Ahead there is a tense and critical job of thought, requiring time, talent, and responsibility. The impatience to read the closed pages of our past as quickly as possible is understandable. Yet this cannot be the justification for hasty conclusions and evaluations, which do more to muddy the truth rather than clear it up.

As a counterweight to those who announce that we do not at all have nor have we ever had socialism, we feel it necessary to principally and comprehensively study both the history of building it in our country, and the actual ideas of the working masses about the socialist ideal, without allowing the successes achieved through the efforts of several generations of Soviet people to be disparaged.

This would be anti-scientific, to forget or distort in an ill-intentioned manner the truth about what has been achieved in the socialist sphere, about the successes of Soviet science, culture, the victory in the Great Patriotic War, about everything that brought our country into the ranks of the world's great powers.

[Question] What publications are being concretely discussed, if we have in mind not only the collections already known?

The institute has published extremely topical materials on such issues as were either ignored in their time, or were given a prejudiced, conjunctured evaluation. I have in mind articles on the collectivization and famine in Kazakhstan, in "Alash-Orda" ["Counterrevolutionary bourgeois-nationalistic party, 1917-1920, which established bourgeois autonomy in Kazakhstan—Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary]. We are actively participating in the rehabilitation of major figures of national culture, the party and state destroyed by Stalinism.

However, what has been done does not satisfy the public. Therefore, we feel that the need has ripened for developing an integrated conception of the history of the development of the Kazakh party organization, that is, the preparation of a new edition of "Essays on the history of the Kazakh CP," which would justly, and with maximal scientific objectivity, study the process of the establishment and activity of our party organization in all its complexity and contradiction.

We also see it as our task to display the people whose activity comprises history. We hope that the encyclopedic reference guide we are preparing, "People of revolutionary duty," will elicit public interest. Proposed in it is the publication of biographies of almost 600 active participants of the October revolution, the civil war, the establishment of Soviet power and socialist building in Kazakhstan, of prominent party and soviet figures. The names of many of them were for a long time groundlessly forgotten. All of this is the "blank spots" as well.

In the course of preparing the "Essays," we must reconceptualize a number of events and phenomena in our history. Therefore it seems expedient to create a commission of the Kazakh CP Central Committee for their preparation, to involve in working on them the best creative forces in the country. Today's meeting is a sort of reconnaissance: to determine the fundamental trends of the impending studies.

#### **G. Kozlov, doctor of historical sciences: He Who Controls The Past...**

In my opinion, today it is above all necessary to renew the theoretical-methodological arsenal of our science, to help each historian master the new thinking, and to overcome the turmoil which has emerged under the influence of publicistic pressure. After all, you could hardly call the conditions under which scientists must currently operate favorable. They have turned out to be under the influence of at least three interrelated phenomena: The cruel and in many ways just criticism of historical science for being sketchy and alienated from practice; the development of historical thought in its artistic and publicistic embodiment, which is outstripping it, and overcoming the bifurcation of the consciousness of the scientists themselves. That is, everybody knows how the history of the party should not be written. But not everybody knows how it should be written.

The dread of making a mistake and the completely justified fear of being groundlessly put down (by the left or the right) determines the viability of a phenomenon such as theoretical-methodological dependency. For the time being, many are setting their hopes that the most principled evaluations of the history of the party and approaches to it will be given not by the historians themselves, but rather will be "expressed," as usual, in party documents. In no way can we realize that the party has not only condemned claims to a monopoly on the

truth, but has itself rejected this monopoly, assuming that the search for this truth is above all a function of the scientists and science.

True, some people are now inclined to feel that the publicists already control this truth. If such convictions are confirmed in the public consciousness, and the scientists yield to them, we will not have real history.

Yet we may prevent the confirmation of this viewpoint only in the event that we ourselves move seriously forward, if we strive not simply toward the disclosure of new historical facts, important in and of themselves, but toward the formulation on their basis of new ideas, new thoughts, the discovery of new truths enriching the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the historical process, and providing a genuine breakthrough on the research front.

[Question] But surely it is the fact which is the argument of history, and not the theoretical concept which predetermines the "search" for the fact?

I will be more precise. Discourse, rather than retelling, is what is demanded of us. The main thing is to seek correct answers to the questions which flow from the facts. And for this, it is necessary to precisely realize that neither the posing of the topical problems themselves, nor the historians' expanded access to new material, despite its indubitable significance, will lead to substantial movements in the development of historical science.

Above all, there is a need for the explication of the object, the subject of the research. For us, the party itself is such a subject, its internal life, all aspects of its activity: theoretical, political, organizational, and propagandistic.

This refinement seems justified, for in the previous editions of "Essays," and in many other historical-party works, the direct object of our study remained in the background.

And to be even more precise, then frequently the history of the party was written and is still now written without knowledge of the party itself, its laws and principles of building, development, and function. And if we recognize the conformity to natural law of the assertion that we do not know the society in which we are living, then this can be equally, if not more applicable to the level of our knowledge of the party as well. After all, the party is a part of society's political structure, and as Engels emphasized, it develops in complete accordance with the laws of dialectical development in general.

For many years, party building as a science lived in conditions of highly restricted information concerning the subject of research. And it can be said that in party life, we still do not know what exactly what it is that we do not know. It is natural that this was reflected in the breadth and depth of the elucidation of the problems of party building.

[Question] Our miscalculations have been studied, if not thoroughly, in any case, in detail. Yet how can the past be extrapolated into the future?

In our view, by the fact that the legacy which has come down to us of "traditions" of the absolutization of positive experience, which had transformed themselves into the idea of party and party leader infallibility, has been replaced by the exact opposite frame of mind—to imagine the history of the CPSU to be a solid chain of errors and crimes. And some have already made the transition from reflections upon the errors, the imperfections of the party, to proposals on its erroneous nature, its insolvency.

Also becoming all the more widespread both in publicistic literature and the work of historians is the phenomenon of thinking with "hindsight," when, from today's perspectives, they define the supposed alternative "optimal" versions of the development of the past, the functioning of the party isolated from the concrete historical realities of the period studied.

Ignoring the principle of historicism is also shown in the fact that the advocates of the extreme views attempt to take the modern understanding of the problems of democracy and humanism as the basis for the evaluation of complex problems of the class struggle, revolutionary violence during the October period and the civil war, and interpret in their own way the party's activity in expanding the contradictions under the conditions of the transitional period, etc.

In the context of the correct understanding and application of the principle of historicism, in historical research we should likewise decisively overcome the so-called phenomenon of "historical superciliousness" caused by a knowledge of the results without a genuine knowledge of the origins.

We, unlike the individuals who actually participated in history, know full well today what the results of their decisions were, and therefore we do not always trouble ourselves with the cognition of what was and how it was **at that moment**; we adjust the research to the result achieved, deforming the actual historical process.

In an organic link with the manifestations of "historical superciliousness" we find the tendency to "improve upon history." It finds its most strongly-etched impression in all sorts of exaggeration of the organization and systematic nature of the historical process, and in the depreciation or even denial of spontaneous manifestations in the popular movements.

In party-historical works, the spontaneous manifestations of the masses' protests, their search for a way out of the crisis situations both before October and in the Soviet period are frequently ignored. After all, it is well known that Lenin viewed the spontaneous movement as a sign of the depth, solidity, and the inevitability of the movement of the popular masses.

Shying from one extreme to another is also observed in the practice of applying the principle of party spirit. The importance of considering common human values, their priority above the class interests, is now being emphasized in a completely just and timely manner. Yet surely the inevitability of a social-party approach to the present and the past has not disappeared. But in the meantime, the concept of party spirit as a most important principle of social development has almost disappeared in the social sciences.

[Question] It would be interesting to confirm this thesis with an example.

It is not worth the trouble. In the discussions, and in publicistic work as well, the departure from certain of the radical statutes of Marxist-Leninist theory in the area of the genesis of nations and national relations has already become more than obvious. The national has apparently hypertrophied, and frequently suppresses the class, international approach to the analysis of interethnic relations.

In the analysis of social relations, and particularly in that of national relations, we will simply lose our way if we discard the class criteria; we will allow a negative orientation with regard to the inter-national to take root in the public consciousness.

#### **M. Kozybayev, academician: History Does Not Consist of Episodes**

I am far removed from the thought that we are prepared today for an exchange of opinions on all matters of the history of the Kazakh Communist Party. It seems to me that an extremely effective path has been chosen there by our Uzbek colleagues: They are holding discussions on individual problems. It seems advisable for us, the collectives of two institutes, not to repeat each other, but on the contrary, to conduct with united forces a discussion of the most urgent problems of Kazakhstan's history, a component of which is the history of the republic party organization.

[Question] Do you have your own conception of "Essays"?

Not so high-flown, but I suppose that in "Essays" it will be necessary to consider thoroughly the issues of the socioeconomic development of Kazakhstan in the system of Russian imperialism. As we know, these plots are given in the form of an overview in the second edition of "Essays." However, they are so smoothed over that there is not even a hint of the pointed issues: the colonization of the province, the missionary-colonial policy, the system of plundering resources, etc.

Without revealing the socioeconomic situation of Kazakhstan as a colony of Russian imperialism, it is difficult, even impossible, to unfold the picture of development of the social-democratic and national liberation movement.

Further, in the last edition of "Essays," the degree of the province's readiness for the revolutionary changes in the



twenties is exaggerated. These exaggerations take place in particular in the determination of the level of maturity of the oblast and party organizations. Let us recall that V.I. Lenin said in October 1922: "There is no doubt that in the majority of its composition, our party is now insufficiently proletarian... On the other hand, it is also beyond doubt that our party is now as politically indoctrinated in general and on the average (if we take the level of the large majority of its members) as is necessary for genuine proletarian leadership." And in the same place: "It is necessary to determine the concept of 'worker' in order that this concept include not only those who actually, by their position in life, had to assimilate the proletarian psychology." He noted that "all around the most authentic petty bourgeoisie who have turned into workers accidentally and in the shortest possible period are falling into the category of workers."

[Question] Do you relegate these words directly to the history of the issue?

The Kazakh Oblast, and then Kray party organization proved to be just such a petty bourgeois organization in its composition in the twenties. Goloshchekin's course toward the creation of the "mass village [aul] communist" made the tendency toward the petty bourgeois even more profound. Are not the enormous ideological-organizational derangements of the Kazakh party organization in the second half of the twenties hidden in this?

As we know, in that period, the party had in fact lost that thin stratum which had endured the entire burden of the three Russian revolutions. On 1 January 1922, the number of pre-revolutionary communists in the Kazakh party organization was 557 members; in 1926, 290, and by January 1930, just 40. The low theoretical level, the predominance in the body of the party organization of a gray petty bourgeois mass gave Goloshchekin and those surrounding him the opportunity to conduct an adventurous policy that led the Kazakh people into an unforeseen tragedy.

[Question] Goloshchekin was, as, incidentally, were other highly placed workers, "Stalin's man"...

It was not simply a matter of individual episodes or concrete situations. Stalin, having personally decided the rearrangement of cadres, sent to Kazakhstan his proxy commissars with extraordinary empowerment; enjoying unlimited power and a lack of control, they created arbitrary rule and violence. Yet Khrushchev's cadre policy was no better, when he totally replaced all the cadres in the republic's party, soviet, and trade union organizations during the period of the assimilation of the virgin lands. As a result, the envoys of the center or other union republics "commanded by review," from the secretary of the Komsomol organization of the virgin lands sovkhoses up to the Kazakh CP Central Committee first secretary. The local cadres were not involved in matters.

In a word, I want to say that we must write the truth, and nothing but the truth in "Essays." Falsity will not get

through in the situation engendered by perestroika. Individuals such as Skvortsov and Shayakhmetov; Karibzhanov, that "gray cardinal" of Brezhnev, Zh. Tashenov, and M. Suzhikov, who became the victims of arbitrary rule, having protested atomic testing in the territory of Kazakhstan, must not remain without a principled evaluation.

It is absolutely necessary for the authors of "Essays" to research the role of the political departments created by Stalin, to study all the facts of the genocide regarding the deportation of peoples. And in view of this, it is necessary to raise with all firmness the issue of opening the archives of the special resettlements. What sort of secrets must be hidden in them, other than Stalinist crimes?

**N. Dzhagrafov, candidate of historical sciences:  
Documents, Like People, Were Subjected To Repression**

We begin work on the new edition of "Essays" with a discussion of the documentary, source basis of the previous book. And the question arises: Was it indeed fundamental, as was confidently written in numerous reviews and responses in its day? I will attempt to object. The authors' collective of the time used only 513 documents, including 67 from the depository of the party archive of the Kazakh branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism; 37 from the party obkoms' party archives, as well as 111 documents from various USSR, Uzbek, and Kazakh state archives.

[Question] Just 513 for such an important work?

Alas. But it is not only a matter of quantity. The utilization of the overwhelming majority of documents is indeed accomplished with a sufficient level of authenticity, or the level of their authenticity is easily established. However, seven of the total number provoke doubt. Thus, for example, the statistical data on the party groups in production from 1932-1933 is cited according to the draft of the author's article; certain indices from the 3rd 5-year plan, according to the preliminary outline of the plan, etc.

From the historiographer's point of view, the chief shortcoming of the "Essays" authors' collective is that it, as a rule, was dealing not with the authentic documents, but with copies. Rough draft copies, versions, draft resolutions, and various notations were widely used without critical analysis. That is, the primary material which is generated in the day-to-day work of the apparatus of the party committees, and is not infrequently thrown out later. But for some reason, outlines having no serious significance turned into a document suitable for the author in his confirmation of his speculative conception.

Selective comparison of the content of the documents used and the authors' text of the chapters evidenced a significant quantity of factual, semantic, and archival mistakes and errors.

[Question] What is the essence here? Are we not speaking about juggling the facts?

No, of course not about juggling. About scholarly carelessness and a peculiar "canonization" of the party document. Most frequently, the researcher is interested only in the course of its realization from the Central Committee to the primary [organization]. The document itself is not analyzed at all as to how it reflected the objective, natural development of society, how correctly the tasks were stated in it. Objective analysis has been replaced by the illusion of the lawfulness of everything adopted and the conformity to natural law of what has been done. Any deviation or failure was viewed as a shortcoming on the part of the executor.

[Question] "Essays" has been through two editions. Their shortcomings were hardly news to the specialists. Yet all the same...

Yes, all the same. The distinguishing feature of the third is that for the first time, the Party Archive of the Kazakh branch of the IML [Institute of Marxism-Leninism] is granting the authors' collective access to all the collections, including the closed ones. All oblast party archives are included in this important work as well. In the course of preparing the second edition of "Essays," an enormous quantity (more than 1,000 cases) of documents was discovered in the archives of the republic and country. Scarcely 3-4 percent of this entire volume was utilized. Now, such a colossal mass of documents is being introduced to scientific study for the first time. This will enable the most complete and objective actual picture of the past to be drawn.

The documents are the product of their time. If, for example, discussions had been allowed, there had been some sort of dissonance in views, approaches, and positions during the first decade of Soviet power, then in subsequent years we all became "united" in everything.

Self-appraising documents of the party organs predominate in the collections of the party archives. The proportion of materials containing information which has gone through several degrees of summarization is high. Yet the main thing is that with each consecutive degree, not only the volume, but the content of the information changed as well.

There are few documents reflecting the mood of the party grass roots, the broad masses of workers.

With the late thirties onward, the documents no longer reflect personal and group positions, the process of decisionmaking. Documents, like people, were subjected to repression, and intentionally destroyed. With the arrests of prominent figures, not only personal, but official documents were removed.

[Question] In that case, how genuinely objective will the regular publication of "Essays" prove to be?

We must thoroughly search other channels, obtain information by means of compiling and analyzing various

groups of documents. It is this aspect of the work which is one of the most difficult hindrances for the authors. Yet the compilation of the entire complex of documents, the comprehensive analysis, their link to the events—only such a route may lead to the truth.

A individual document isolated from a complex may not always reflect the full picture of what had occurred; it may illuminate a portion of the historical process, moreover, it is capable of localizing attention toward only individual moments in history. Maximum sources are necessary for the entirety of the picture. Thus, documents containing an analysis of the causes for the famine which came to the republic in 1932-1933 testify to the terrible consequences of the extremes permitted in the course of collectivization. Supplementing one another, they more fully reveal not only the causes of the tragic outcome, but also name the concrete guilty parties in the catastrophe. I have in mind the political letters to the leadership of the country and the republic at that time from Musrepov, Gataullin, Davletgalieyev, Altynbekov, and Kuvanyshiev; the letter of U. Isayev, chairman of the KaSSR Sovnarkom, and the letter of T. Ryskulov, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Sovnarkom.

#### **A. Sarmurzin, doctor of historical sciences: Having No Right to Make a Mistake**

A search is taking place in the party-historical science of Kazakhstan; it is above all a search for such conceptual approaches as would allow the shortcomings and errors contained in previous "Essays" to be surmounted in order to create an authentic history of the republic party organization, from the conception of the social-democratic movement in Kazakhstan to the present day.

Before us stands the responsible task of analyzing the past and present, dealing with documents never before involved in scientific study, and developing an entire range of the most complicated issues.

To an enormous degree, the successful work on the new edition of "Essays" will depend upon the choice of the optimal version of the periodization, with consideration for the specifics and particulars of development of the Kazakh CP (in the previous edition there were 15 of them). "Essays" could presumably consist of 10 chapters encompassing the most important milestones in the history of the republic party organization, starting with the conception of the social-democratic movement in the beginning of this century to the present day.

It is necessary to resolve this task on the basis of the broad incorporation of new factual material, which has revealed the conformity to natural law of the emergence of capitalistic relations in pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan, having deeply studied the development of the revolutionary, social-democratic, and national liberation movement, and the arrangement of class forces in the process of preparation for and implementation of the three Russian revolutions. The role of the national intelligentsia in the arousal of the Kazakh people's self-awareness, and the correlation of the the common

democratic and revolutionary in the region's national liberation movement should be shown from the position of the new historical thinking. In doing so, we are simply obligated to finally show, besides the social-democratic movement, with historical authenticity the role of the various social forces, political parties, and trends in the development of the emancipation struggle against autocracy. We must, and this time, unerringly, thoroughly analyze the national liberation, common democratic, and general popular nature of the 1916 uprising in Kazakhstan, and its link with the proletarian movement.

We must clearly show all the basic political organizations in unity and in struggle—the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, SRs, etc., and the Bolsheviks' relation to the mass revolutionary-democratic organizations.

[Question] In your opinion, is such a statement of the question really the latest word in history, or is there something still beyond that?

In party historical literature today there is in broad use the thesis that October merged in the single flow of the socialist revolution such democratic movements as the peasants' struggle for land, the struggle of repressed nations for national liberation, of the workers, against the imperialist war. All of this is so, but we must fill in this thesis with factual content, uniting the generally accepted concept with concepts such as the moving forces of socialist revolution, winning the majority necessary for its victory.

A number of party-historical studies on Kazakh Leniniana which have come out in recent years, as well as the disclosure of new materials and documents allow us today to expose in greater contrast problems such as "Lenin and the civil war in Kazakhstan," and the practice of the ideas of socialist building in the republic, etc.

And what is especially necessary indeed is research of the inter-national and national aspects in the organizational and political activity of the Bolshevik organizers of Kazakhstan in the first post-October decade.

We must avoid, since this has taken place, simplification, tendentiousness, and idealization in national-state construction, the exaggeration of successes achieved, and ignoring the negative aspects, which significantly influenced the political mood and position of various strata of the republic's society.

We cannot pass over in silence the history and activity of various petty bourgeois democratic tendencies in Kazakh society in studying their internal development, the reasons for their influence on certain strata of society. For example, Alash, Ush-zhuz, and others. Something has already been done in this respect, but nevertheless the issues of the struggle with "bourgeois nationalism" and "national inclinations" in the party organization, in the serious problems permitted in the process of socialist construction, should be thoroughly investigated.

The issues associated with the national policy conducted by the republic party organization in the twenties-thirties, and the conception of the administrative command system and the suffocating influence of Stalinism on public life demand assiduous study. There is nothing in the previous edition of "Essays" on the activity of the Kara-Kalpak Oblast party organization, which was part of the Kazakh party organization from 1924-1930. Nor is there material on the deportation to Kazakhstan of Koreans in the thirties, nor Germans or any other of a number of nationalities in subsequent years. And after all, this is a most serious problem, which has not been finally removed even to this day.

We should show more thoroughly all the deprivations which the Kazakh people endured during the war years, without remaining silent on the serious shortcomings in the work of the republic party organization during these difficult years.

The problems of the Communist Party's ideological work in the forties-early fifties must be expounded in a new way, concretely, showing what deviations from the Leninist principles of cultural leadership there were, and the subjective distortions in the evaluation of literature and art, and the groundless accusations of nationalism of a number of writers and poets, historians and writers, giving a principled evaluation of incompetent interference in the social sciences.

Without unnecessary hullabaloo, fuss, and twaddle we should look in a new way at the problem of the assimilation of the virgin and fallow lands in Kazakhstan, without forgetting that this large-scale action was a genuine feat of the party and the people; we must show the pluses and minuses of raising the virgin lands for both Kazakhstan and the economy of the entire country.

As far as the period of the seventies and early eighties is concerned, of course, this chapter of "Essays" must in effect be rewritten, using the material in our possession.

### Special Treatment for Privileged Elite at 'Kremlin Hospital'

90US0554A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 11 Feb 90 pp 2-3

[Article by Aleksandr Nadzharov: "The 'Kremlin Hospital': How it Treats People and Who is Treated There"]

[Text] The screech of brakes, a blow filling the entire body with pain—that is the last thing that engineer Nikolay Semenovitch Nikonov remembered, having run across Rublevskoye highway in a spot not designated for doing so. When he came to, he saw the color television, the shiny nickel-plated adjustable bed. He was surprised that the spacious room was adjacent to an elegant sanitary ensemble. He was overjoyed at the menu offered: dozens of dishes, fresh fruit and vegetables. And the currently rare good will of the numerous medical personnel amazed him. Nikolay Semenovitch was dumbstruck; where exactly was it that he had wound up?

"You are in the Central Clinical Hospital [TsKB] of the 4th Main Administration under the USSR Ministry of Health," they explained to him. (It now has another title, and is subordinated elsewhere). "In general, this institution serves far from everybody. However, based upon vital signs and in accordance to the order of that same Ministry of Health, since the accident occurred literally right next to the hospital, you were taken here. So just be treated and you'll recover all the quicker..."

Nikolay Semenovitch had staked out for himself bed space not designated for him, but soon he became accustomed to it, and somehow even made a biting comment about the hot water cut-off that had taken place.

We now bid farewell to engineer Nikonov, who quickly reconciled himself to social injustice in the form of the miracles of Western sanitation and medical equipment, and we talk a bit about that which causes the heart of everyone familiar with a different medical services system to pound with indignation. We will speak about equality and inequality in the face of illness.

Yet somehow it has come about that recently we have been making more attacks without bothering while doing so to at least hear out the opposite side.

"There have been more than a few rumors far removed from the truth piling up surrounding our hospital," says doctor of medical sciences V. Volodin, TsKB deputy chief physician. "A saying has even been thought up: 'well polished floors, well-chosen doctors.' But after all, we 'produce' the doctors ourselves. Previously, in order to get in here, along with other data, it was necessary to have 10 years service in city medical institutions. And then we felt the fruit of the general stagnation: Many city doctors ceased to be interested in the innovations in their profession. Even the best of them did not know half the names of the new medications, instruments, apparatus, and methods which had appeared in the country

and the world. And the main thing is that mercy, compassion, and love toward an ill person began to ebb. We were forced to open our own internship program, into which we accept talented kids right out of the institutes and train them, believe me, in the highest order."

Valeriy Dmitriyevich is correct: They train excellent medical personnel here. Numerous consultants regularly invited to the "Kremlevka," as this health care facility is still called, will confirm this: The young physicians who have gone through their specializations possess rare professional qualifications. First and foremost because they are soon allowed to do independent work. True, under the vigilant eyes of experienced mentors.

It would seem, how could it be otherwise? Alas, in the typical hospital, an experienced doctor does not always have time to help a colleague. There is simply not a chance. Here is the normal "city" correlation of forces: For every 100 patients, there are approximately up to 150 personnel. It is different in the Central Clinical Hospital: 1,380 patients and almost 3,500 staffers.

They live well, you will say. Do not draw hasty conclusions. Abroad, in the United States, for example, the ratio is 50 percent higher on the staff side. And in the final analysis it is not a matter of how much money is spent, but what the effect is. After all, medicine is still economics. Do you know, on the average, how many operations are done annually per space in the surgical department of a typical hospital? Four. The country's best clinics, the Amosov and Fedorov clinics, have gotten up to 10-11 operations. This index equals 17 in Europe. In the "Kremlevka," a single bed space "works" for 25 operations a year. In order not to complicate the calculations, I will remind you of one of life's rules: Cheap shoes that last a month cost more than expensive ones that last 3 years. Incidentally, on its own, each bed space in the TsKB is half the price of one at the Fedorov clinic. And now judge for yourself whether that is good or bad.

In a word, the conditions created here are close to being unique. And people earn pretty good money: 25 percent more than in the typical medical institution. For what? For the quality of work. Strictly speaking, why not? After all, a top-notch machinist gets more at a good plant than at any other. But how viable still is the ideal of general leveling, cultivated over decades, if the appeals to "cease and desist" are simply eclipsing common sense and the aspiration for better work in a better organization, with better labor compensation.

I was led to this thought by a conversation with one of the hospital's patients, USSR People's Artist, Hero of Socialist Labor Natalya Ilinichna Sats, a person who had seen a great deal in her lifetime, including Stalinist labor camps.

"This is, of course, a delicate question. And here I cannot hide my partiality. After all, in this hospital, they saved, prolonged the lives of many of my comrades, people of

the arts. It should be said that labor in this milieu is a matter of the utmost difficulty, requiring a maximal expenditure of psychic energy, spiritual strength. Quite frequently, such a "burning" does not even find understanding even among our families, but here they understand this. In my view, the hospital is a remarkable exemplar of the coordination of enormous professional knowledge and remarkable humanity. In these times, it is a fairly rare phenomenon. And it should be treated all the more carefully. Have we not destroyed enough already? There should be a few more such hospitals and doctors. And the success of the TsKB should be disseminated as widely as possible, and not cut out, as if it were some alien growth. But the patients, well... What patients there are here. Primarily old men whose lives directly depend upon the work of the medical staff."

Ah, Natalya Ilinichna, Natalya Ilinichna. How good it is when we see only nice people around us. But surely the matter is far more complicated. There is such a word as the contingent. How painful it sounds to the ear unaccustomed to social noise.

Who receives service in the "Kremlevka"? Of course, not only the finest representatives of our arts and sciences—academicians, people's artists. Those receiving treatment here are first and foremost leaders of the highest ranks, close relatives of these people residing with them, personal pensioners, war and labor veterans who occupied more than a few posts in the past. Private treatment is a fairly rare phenomenon. There are few young people here, as the ones between 40 and 60 are called. The death of an administrator is usually sudden. But if he survives to get his pension, there is nowhere that a man can be helped like here. That is why 90- and 100-year-old patients are not such a rarity here.

One should be happy about this, but here is what is troubling. Somehow the image of honored veteran, personal pensioner L. Kaganovich does not come together. Yet for the faithful Stalinist comrade-in-arms, upon whose conscience are millions of destroyed destinies, they keep in this hospital a reserved room for such "important" patients. I don't know, I don't know...

Incidentally, there are about 40 such rooms in the "Kremlevka." They are, of course, private, and in half of them, no patient may be admitted even with the permission of the chief physician—this is indeed only for the contingent of ministers or main committee heads.

No, it is not only a matter of nomenclatura, although I see nothing bad in a minister having a private room and a main committee head having to share with someone. In the final analysis, the chief physician of any clinic holds a certain reserve for extreme cases. But how should this reserve be treated? Here there are certain doubts. For example, to what degree of relationship are the services of the given hospital allowed to be used? This question came up for me when I saw Stalin's great-grandson, a man with an eastern, even a south-eastern name. Are there such clinics in his father's homeland, a country far from us?

Or an example like this. Sushkova was under observation in the first clinic, the wife of the former deputy minister of foreign trade, now serving his sentence, and she herself had also been convicted in the recent past. Even Beria's grandchildren are treated here.

Of course, these cases, reported to me as a great secret, are in need of verification. And who better to verify them than the contingent department head, L. Zhukova?

"I do not have any such information," said Lidiya Mikhailovna in a telephone conversation.

"But how can that be? After all, I know the people who are treating one of Beria's descendants."

"I repeat, we have no one here as one of his grandchildren."

Well, it turned out that the contingent department head was right. The aforementioned young people were registered as the grandchildren of former Politburo member, Moscow city party committee first secretary V. Grishin. It would seem that if one had two such grandfathers, even the 10th generation would not come to worry about its health.

"Yes," agrees V. Shakhmatov, first deputy head of a main committee, "The contingent is in need of a major overhaul. And we have already started on this work. Six thousand people have already been removed from the register in just half a year. About 1,000 have been admitted. The majority of them are newly-elected USSR people's deputies. As far as the people whom you mentioned are concerned, we have no room for them."

"And who exactly is it who decides whether there is room or not?"

"A special board, nominated by the corresponding organizations."

"Meaning that an ordinary person could never get in here?"

"Why not? Through the appropriate recommendations, we have about 6,000 people being treated here whom they literally refused to treat in other medical facilities. It should be said that these are unique cases, associated with an entire range of illnesses for which not only the cure is important, but the care for the person. Unfortunately, this cannot be done everywhere the way it is done at TsKB."

With the permission of the head of the main committee, I viewed the necessary documents, and was convinced that over 14 percent of the "Kremlevka" patients do not have the least connection to the corresponding lists of the contingent, also in the documents. For example, there is K., an excavator operator with a broken spine—the minister of construction made the request in his behalf. Ye., a translator, advanced sepsis, the request of the



Ministry of Foreign Affairs. D., a soldier, was transferred from a city hospital with suppurative meningitis, and has no hope for survival.

The medical facilities of the former 4th Main Administration in Moscow serve about 100,000 people. Could that figure be larger?

"It could be, and in my opinion, it must be," says V. Shakhmatov, deputy chief of the administration.

Indeed. Let us say, why are the services of the medical personnel not enjoyed by all USSR people's artists? The same thing with heroes of the Soviet Union. And personal pensioners. Many of them, upon leaving their jobs, are removed from the register. On the other hand, for many months after the closing of USSR Gosagroprom, 4,000 former officials of the former department remained eligible to be served here.

And the "Kremlevka" itself goes to the sick, in the most complex cases. Medical personnel were among the first to arrive to help the victims of the earthquake in Armenia, and at the site of the catastrophe in Bashkiria. The outstanding hematologist Ye. Borovyev flew there; the entire country's blood service is beginning to work according to his methodology, and professor S. Ternovoy flew there, a surgeon and specialist in computerized tomography, as did many doctors from the hemodialysis department. In the disaster areas, the medical personnel transferred the gift of over 1,000 units of blood components, donated by the hospital staffers.

And recently the "Kremlevka" has been acclaimed for its...mathematicians. They presented the only Soviet display at the international exhibition "Hospital-89": a program for the mathematical and functional assessment of peripheral veins. It yields an exact indication of the operation site for restoring blood drainage.

Someone else will say, all this is well and good, but what about social justice?

Indeed, last year, an average of 78 rubles was allocated for the treatment of every Soviet person. Expenditures for the treatment of a single patient here are 10-15 times higher. But after all, such a discrepancy also exists between the service for a patron of, let us say, a Kursk Rayon clinic and someone who is treated in the medsan-chast [medical and public health section] of one of the closed production enterprises of the North, independent of the position held.

And in general, let us take a look at where the city resident, his family members, relatives, and acquaintances go for treatment. In many cases, this is hardly to the rayon clinic. Major plants, the railroad workers, sailors, militamen, and scientists have their own medical facilities. There is also the 3rd Administration under the Ministry of Health, serving workers of the defense industry.

With difficulty, I managed to visit a clinic of this administration, serving the department heads of the

defense ministries, general construction engineers, and other leading specialists. Well, the interiors here are not bad either, and there are color televisions, and flowers, and comfortable furniture, and no lines. Excuse me, but I do not see anything terrible about this. Nor is the medsan-chast of the ZIL plant any worse, organized in the same manner as the Central Clinical Hospital.

Of course, it is quite troubling when for the time being, things are far from being like this everywhere. Yet what can be done if under the existing economic system, only the powerful department or rich enterprise can ensure a worthy existence for our put-upon, impoverished, and half-impotent medical system.

Of course, perhaps the entire medical system should be shut down. But in our country there has already been one attempt to build a society of genuine equality by means of general leveling. We are witnesses as to what this led to in all spheres of our life. Equality in poverty, bringing the best hospitals down to the average level, will not improve anyone's health. Highly qualified collectives have been brought together over decades; this could be ruined by a single hasty stroke of the pen. And once again, we essentially speak not of the general good, but of the general harm.

I personally consider another phrasing of the question to be more competent. If a certain additional sum is paid to supplement the money allocated by Gosbyudzhel for the free medical service for your treatment; you might even be kind enough to reimburse this sum from your own pocket. At worst, let the enterprises pay. Incidentally, that is in effect what is happening in the departmental treatment facilities. That is how it must be in the "Kremlevka" as well, and it recently became known at whose expense the appropriate decisions have already been made: Now the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Soviet will pay their dues. And this is not only a concession to indignant public opinion, but also a recognition of the realities of our life.

But perhaps it is worth transferring this realistic view to our entire medical system? Well, the state cannot maintain and expand its entire network of hospitals and clinics in exemplary conditions under modern circumstances. At the same time, we have more than a few rich factories and kolkhozes, thank god. So why not give the typical rayon clinic over to the economically prospering collective as property. Or make an ocean steamer the sponsor of a maternity hospital? An in no case may these monies be subject to any taxation; this is the how it is done throughout the world. And for a start, I work direct the honestly earned resources from our numerous voluntary Saturdays and Sundays not for faceless general purposes, but to a completely concrete cause: such-and-such a factory for this hospital; such-and-such a plant, for this sanitarium. It would seem worthwhile to direct the results of the labor of those imprisoned in corrective labor institutions to similar charitable aims.

Thus, the "Kremlin" hospital, and, by the way, the entire former 4th Administration, could render literally priceless assistance in the organization of such help, and in assembling and training medical personnel. After all, their experience in such affairs is genuinely unique.

Here is what is worth serious discussion. Why is it that the most heated debates are still inflamed over specifically the "Kremlin" hospital, why do the legends, at times simply the fantasies about it multiply? It seems to me because for many long years, it was as if the TsKB did not exist. Well, show even a single publication in the central press—praising, denouncing, any kind. And as we know, nature does not tolerate a vacuum. Yet even now, when glasnost is penetrating through even the highest fences, the aureole of the state secret still shines over this special medical service. But in keeping secrets, as we know, more than silence is permitted. Unfortunately, none other than the USSR Minister of Health, Ye. Chazov, 17 years the head of the notorious 4th Administration, takes it upon himself to disinform people. In going through the confirmation procedure for his post at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Yevgeniy Ivanovich spoke of only two hospitals and two clinics. This, for 100,000 people served!?

There are actually three of these hospitals, perhaps more: The Central Clinical Hospital on Rublevskiy highway, the emergency hospital in central Moscow on Granovskiy street, and the hospital for the higher ranks on Michurinskij prospect. There are also rented rooms in the country's leading clinics. There are also, to put it mildly, more clinics, and one of them has three separate entrances, according to the positions held by the patients.

And all of this does not count the health care facilities of the 4th Administration of the RSFSR Ministry of Health, which the polemicists have somehow forgotten in the dust. Incidentally, almost every region of our immense country has its own "Kremlevka." But after all, in every branch of the national economy there are better and worse enterprises; there are frankly bad ones, and there are world-class ones. The good plant is not closed down just because the one next door is not as successful, because its labor compensation is lower. This fact should simply be recognized, and the 4th Administration under the Ministry of Health should be unashamedly renamed as the Council of Ministers' Treatment and Recuperation Association, as has now been done. Although I believe that the measures taken will not be limited to renaming.

In my opinion, at the basis of the appeals for "shutting it down" there lies a very serious thing—the desire to change our attitude toward our past life in a radical manner. And this aspiration, gained through suffering, has made us all intolerant. But the illusion of the chance of a simple and rapid change in the situation is extremely dangerous.

Here is the opinion of the well-known Soviet political scientist A. Migraiyan: "On the one hand, we are attempting to destroy leveling and take a new path toward greater differentiation and dynamization of society, of individual responsibility. On the other hand, moods for equalization are very widespread, which cannot stimulate better work, the aspiration of earn, and to invest more effort into a cause."

V.I. Lenin probably understood full well the impossibility of same when, under the circumstances of a bloody struggle for universal equality, which many confused with equal rights, he signed the Decree on the creation of the medical-health service of the Kremlin. At that time, in 1918, several treatment and prevention facilities were created for the Soviet-party aktiv.

"Those cruel, lean times cannot be compared with the present day. The Leninist comrades-at-arms, working at their limit, the party and state leaders of a major scale had to be supported; certain conditions had to be created for fruitful work. But now?" I ask A. Martynov, chief physician of the Central Clinical Hospital.

"It is an indisputable fact: the modern leader, as before, labors on a special regimen. Years without vacations, while working 12-14 hour days. Can this really not leave its mark upon an organism, no matter how strong it is? And not infrequently, when a man is being appointed to this or that post, the question arises: Is he healthy enough?"

Of course, that is exactly how things are. But this is what is troublesome: Probably any inequality can be explained and justified somehow. But an inequality in the face of medicine, and inequality in the price of human life? This is exactly where we should be striving toward leveling.

But still, as they say, Rome wasn't built in a day. We will hope for the best, and overall, it is not so hopeless, since we have before us such a wonderful example of health-care as the "Kremlin" hospital. And the administrative distortions that cast a shadow on its reputation for many long years, well, that is what power is for, to use it here.

#### Failure of Anti-Alcohol Campaign Detailed

90US05864 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian  
No 6, 5-11 Feb 90 p 24

[Article by SOYUZ special correspondent Svetlana Shevchenko: "Trial by Sobriety"]

[Text] Yet another trial has fallen our lot: the struggle for sobriety. After the slump of the "highest wave" the waves for drying out the counter labelled it, along with Chernobyl, one of the causes of the economic crisis. Why has a noble struggle for the human soul turned into an economic black hole?

Let us try to understand.

For this, we go back to yesterday—7 May 1985, the appearance of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On measures to overcome drunkenness and alcoholism." What proved to be its pluses and minuses? The fattest minus was that fact that the struggle was begun in that well-beaten track, the administrative command method. An attempt was made to identify the concept of "sobriety" and the "dry law." That is, the most liquor possible was removed from the stores and it was reported that we do not drink any more! In the beginning, the illusion was created that alcohol had almost disappeared; naturally, there was less drinking. The All-Union Voluntary Society for the Struggle for Sobriety (VDOBT) was formed, and the majority of the country's population flowed into its ranks on a forced-voluntary basis. The production of alcoholic products was sharply curtailed. Statistics confirmed that mortality was reduced; crimes committed under the influence of alcohol were reduced; the addiction specialists saw their work reduced; and the amount of work time lost was lowered.

Yet the illusion proved short-lived and shocking. The hospitals soon filled up with patients with a new diagnosis: "toxic substance abuse." The number of drug addicts grew sharply, giving a powerful impetus to the development of the narco-mafia. Gigantic lines emerged at the wine counters. Over-zealous prospecters uprooted grape vines, while at the same time, many children's facilities have not gotten any grapes at all during their entire existence. The price increase in wine and vodka products hit hard the pocketbook of those families in which alcoholics live.

Speculation started to flourish. The sugar deficit began. According to USSR Goskomstat data, in 1987, 1.4 million metric tons of sugar was consumed by making home-brew, sufficient for 140-150 million decaliters of home-brew, practically compensating for the reduction in sales of wine and vodka products.

It is particularly worth mentioning the "sobriety zones." Many of them emerged by force, and therefore their existence was not lengthy.

That is a brief sketch of the results of the resolution's effect. As time has shown, the chief error was the attempt to eliminate the consequences, rather than the cause of the misfortune.

And now let us turn to the statistics. The sale of wine and vodka products (in decaliters) for 1985 was: vodka, 251.2; wine, 386.8; total, 638.0. For 1986: vodka, 156.6; wine, 189.5; total, 346.1. For 1989: vodka, 180.7; wine, 206.9; total, 387.6.

The number of crimes registered: 1985, 2.08 million; 1986, 1.987 million; 1989, 2.5 million.

It is apparent from the USSR Goskomstat data that about 1.6 times less vodka and wine products were sold in 1989 than in 1985, but crime increased. How can this

be explained, if we take into consideration the interrelation of drunkenness and crime? The negative phenomena, in complete correspondence with the dialectic which has grown in the heat of the struggle for sobriety, continues to exist to this day. The number of homebrewers has not decreased—this confirms the fact that the introduction of ration coupons has not eliminated the sugar shortage. Drunkenness, which in 1986 relocated its base from production into everyday life, has once more broken out of the family "for everyone to see." Salesclerks, eager to deal in liquor out the back entrance at three times the normal price continue to make a living on the lines that they consciously create.

Here we have gotten right up to the question—what has our sobriety movement been doing while the vodka and wine cataclysms have been shaking the country?

Today, its flow is divided into two streams: the official and the informal. The VDOBT represents the official. From the very beginning, its Central Council [TsS] became a purely bureaucratic organ, concerned primarily with collecting dues and its own sustenance.

I cite my journalistic experience. I have frequently had to visit both republic soviets, and primary organizations. The link with many cells was constant. What was their fundamental work reduced to? They subscribed to the magazine, "Sobriety and Culture." And later began the "work" in accordance with the "valued instructions" issued by the TsS. Interest clubs are needed? No argument, they are. But that is what the the Ministry of Culture is concerned with. The "Health" program must be implemented? The sports committee is working on that; it has the halls and the inventory, etc. at its disposal. Let us say, may the VDOBT fine violators on a production line? No, that is within the competence of the commissions on the struggle against drunkenness under the ispolkoms and organizations. May instructors give lectures? No, that is the right of the "Znaniye" society.

There were thousands of questions, but zero answers from the TsS.

The VDOBT TsS proved to be in no condition to resolve the global problems that arose within its domain. Materials appeared in the press critical the activity, or rather, the inactivity, of VDOBT, which immediately reacted with the fascinating argument, "You are against sobriety, in favor of the population's drunkenness!" Generals of sobriety continue to live peacefully and take business trips abroad, particularly to the United States and Australia... True, in 1988, the VDOBT administrative apparatus was reduced by 36.3 percent, and the TsS was cut in half (there had been 86 people working there). And then what? At the same time, on the basis of a USSR Goskomtrud decision, "for good work" the society sought the opportunity to establish up to a 50 percent supplement to its basic rate of pay. In view of the personnel reduction.

It was necessary to present good work immediately. And they found it at the TsS: they brought psychiatrist A.R.

Dobzhenko and his students to cure people of alcoholism and smoking by hypnosis. This activity seemed noble in the beginning. But when it was explained that each person paid R120 for a single seance, the noble image became somewhat clouded. Meaning that it was not just mercy that moved the enthusiasts to the treatment? And what percentage of the profit goes to line the pockets of the TsS?

In the bookkeeping office, I was given very confusing calculations on the "bank." According to these VDOBT was still losing money. But a lawyer well versed in such matters enlightened me: In such deals, no less than half goes to the "organizer," according to "economically accountable activity" article. Incidentally, as they say, what I didn't see, I didn't see.

But this of course, is small change compared with the overall matter of income. Last year, that was planned at a level of R15,588,000. The basic percentage is from society membership dues. Only here is the discrepancy: The movement has discredited itself, and people have long since stopped wanting to submit membership, and even worse, induction dues. In addition to the 18-percent state subsidy from the VTsSPS [All-union Central Council of Trade Unions], there is still one more source of income: the magazine "Sobriety and Culture." After payment of the 15-percent state duty to the publishing house, **all the profit from the magazine** goes to the income of the central apparatus! Last year, this constituted about one million rubles. The exact amounts of the income have not yet been counted.

...The millions rustle as they pay for the calm existence of VDOBT functionaries and the favorites from the TsS, who have official motor transportation, a special shop, and the VTsSPS clinic. And the millions are absolutely useless to the state, the country, and the people. The people, who drink as ever before.

And now we turn to the other stream of the sobriety movement—the informal stream.

One of the branchings is called the "League for the struggle for popular sobriety." Its source appeared in Novosibirsk's Akademgorodok long before the creation of VDOBT. It came to be filled with strength and suddenly turned into an uncontrollable flow. Back in late 1986, its activity took on a scandalous nature. Pundits then rechristened the local DOT ("Sobriety" Voluntary Association) "The Cudgel that Scares off Sobriety." In a word, DOT merged with the "Pamyat" society, having adopted its extremist essence. Branches of the "League for the Struggle" are developing in many cities.

The second branching, more powerful and no less controversial, is called "Optimalist." That is, the ideas originally invested in it are humane and heartening: to cure all humanity of alcoholism by G.A. Shichko's psychotherapeutic method. What then is discrediting the methodology? The "healers," who have so announced themselves in hundreds (!) of cities now, closely resemble the "children of Lieutenant Shmidt," lovers of easy

profit. On the average, 10 courses of lessons are conducted for 50 rubles each. Will there be any benefit to the "optimalists" from this "gold fever"? Will the newly-revealed panacea last long, cheapened by hack work? I must emphasize that Shichko himself felt that help for the unfortunate cannot cost any money.

Perhaps the most humanly attractive is the AA international movement—Alcoholics Anonymous, which penetrated into our country from abroad over 3 years ago. Today, in Moscow alone, there are over 200 people involved in it, and AA groups have been registered in 12 cities in our country.

How does it attract people? AA does not depend upon any sort of organizations; it is subordinate to no one. Any person who has decided to break away from alcohol can attend an AA meeting. There you can confess; you will be heard out attentively, and no one will judge you; on the contrary, they will support you. To save oneself from the disease, it is necessary to go through 12 steps, or 12 stages. Each of them is not easy, and not connected with the cure, the main thing being the steps of recognizing and accepting. At first glance, the fundamental "whale" of the program is simple: "I will not drink today." Of course, in our country it is more difficult to live up to the AA movement than in others—if for no other reason than the impossibility of eating well on a regular basis, dressing nicely, the things that help us feel like people. Incidentally, here we are on the verge of getting into quite a different, although no less pointed topic.

And so, we have come through this trial as well—administrative command sobriety. What do we have as a result? The country has 60,000 drug addicts and 10,000 toxic substance abusers. But these are only the officially registered afflicted.

Is not the number of victims too high?

#### **Narcotics Center Head Interviewed**

90US0606A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS  
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 14 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview of the director of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health Republic Narcotics Center, Abdumalik Zakhidoviy, by KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA correspondent Yevgeniya Lamikhova: "Grief from Sharp Needles"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Our republic holds one of the leading places in the country with regard to numbers of narcotics producers and users. And how do things stand with people who are inflicted with drug addiction?

[Zakhidoviy] According to official statistics, the number of narcotics addicts in the republic is not large—barely more than 4000. There are 476 toxic substance abusers. But these statistics do not present the true picture. They take into consideration only those people who are registered at drug treatment centers.

[Correspondent] Is the system of narcotics help satisfactorily organized within the republic?

[Zakhidoviy] There are 27 narcotics treatment centers in operation in Uzbekistan. In each oblast center, in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, and in Tashkent, there are large oblast treatment centers, and 13 others have the status of inter-rayon centers. Seventeen hospitals have sections for in-patient treatment.

[Correspondent] The figures do not convince one that conditions for taking care of and, most important, for treating narcotics addicts can be considered normal.

[Zakhidoviy] Yes, the poverty of our service is an acknowledged fact. The oblast executive committees assign us the most inconvenient and run-down facilities. The republic does not have a single narcotics hospital that is constructed on the basis of a model plan that takes into account the specifics of such an institution. The course of treatment envisages not only medication, but also work therapy for the patients. But complications constantly arise with this. It is difficult for us to find even the most simple work for narcotics addicts and toxic drug abusers. And, indeed, among the patients, there are people of high intellect. We are unable to keep them busy during those 60 days which they spend in a hospital.

[Correspondent] Do narcotics addicts, while they are under in-patient treatment, have the right to go into town and to associate with their friends and relatives?

[Zakhidoviy] Relatives may visit patients without restriction. But the patients themselves do not have freedom of movement.

[Correspondent] Do narcotics hospitals have a militia guard?

[Zakhidoviy] Only in special sections where people are kept who require forced treatment.

[Correspondent] How is anonymous treatment of narcotics addicts organized?

[Zakhidoviy] Until recently, only victims of alcoholism enjoyed "confidential consultation" because the law prohibited anonymous treatment of narcotics addicts. Very recently the USSR Ministry of Health approved a decision that narcotics addicts as well may undergo a course of treatment anonymously.

[Correspondent] Are there professions that are closed to narcotics addicts?

[Zakhidoviy] All specialties connected with the use of cutting, chopping, and moving objects and work requiring a high degree of tension, obviously, are not for narcotics addicts. But, at the same time, we have been alerted to the fact that instances have become more frequent when people registered with the narcotics service are being fired from enterprises where the work is

not counter-indicated for them. Indeed, at the present time, labor—this is the one thing that can save a narcotics addict.

[Correspondent] Do you know of even one social organization which is engaged in the social rehabilitation of narcotics addicts and toxic drug abusers?

[Zakhidoviy] Alas, there are no such organizations. There is a lack of simple, kind-hearted support for narcotics addicts. It is only in foreign films that we see communes of former narcotics addicts where everybody tries to help the person closest to him, to pull him out of his troubles. We do not have such associations.

### Uzbek Health Facilities, Problems Examined

90US0606B Moscow SELSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian  
20 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by P. Menlikulov, department head in the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health Main Administration for Treatment and Disease Prevention Assistance: "Debts Must Be Paid"]

[Text] In the Uzbek Communist Party platform for the elections of Uzbek SSR people's deputies, as well as in local soviets, a great deal of attention has been paid to problems of social development and plans are being made to effect deep-going transformations in the social character of the village and in medical services that are available to village residents. "We owe a great debt to the peasants," the platform says. "A majority of our rural population centers have no water or sewer systems, no natural gas. In many villages, there are no schools or preschool institutions."

Today our story is about one such problem that requires very urgent solution—about improving medical services for the peasants to whom, as the platform states, we owe a great debt.

At the present time, more than 11 million persons live in the rural areas of Uzbekistan, which is 59 percent of the republic's population. True, the system by which residents are distributed is far from uniform. Thus, while there are more than 250 people per square kilometer in the Fergana valley, then in Samarkand and Surkhandaarya oblasts and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR there are 10 and most often fewer. There are great differences in agricultural production. Some kolkhozes and sovkhoses are engaged exclusively in growing cotton, while more than 90 kolkhozes and sovkhoses raise sheep under distant-pasture conditions. All this requires that the organizers of the republic's public health services find a precise solution to the problem of organizing medical and sanitation assistance to the peasants. This problem is being solved by expanding the network of treatment and disease-prevention institutions, by supplying them with apparatus and equipment, and by recruiting medical cadres. Today, in fact, in every kishlak [village] and remote population point it is possible to encounter people in white robes who are providing needed medical



assistance. At the present time in the republic's rural localities, there are 863 hospitals, including 419 district hospitals, and 2,077 out-patient clinics. There are 155 first aid stations and sections in operation, 2,129 pharmacies, 6,649 pharmacy points, 144 sanitation and epidemiological stations (SES), and 835 sanitation and disease- preventive units. More than 28,000 physicians and 110,000 middle-level medical workers are working directly in rural localities. During the past three years alone, 4,353 physicians and 20,300 middle-level medical workers have been sent to rural treatment and prevention institutions. A total of 850 physician brigades, more than 100 x-ray units, 90 clinical-bacteriological laboratories, and 75 stomatological consulting rooms have been established in order to provide qualified medical assistance to residents of remote regions and distant-pasture animal husbandry areas. Today, within the boundaries of the rural administrative region, medical assistance is being provided in 18- 22 specialties. The Uzbek Ministry of Health, jointly with interested ministries and departments, has developed the complex "Health" program, which stipulates that 207 surgical and obstetrical points (FAP), 252 rural medical out-patient clinics (SVA), and 28 milk kitchens shall be built and put into operation during the current five-year plan.

At the same time, examining public health questions from a broad social viewpoint, we have to affirm that the problems of protecting the health of rural residents are not being solved today on the level of modern requirements. Development of the network of public health institutions, of their material and technical base, and of the medical technology and equipment being made available to them are lagging considerably behind population growth and social and cultural changes in the republic's rural localities. At the present time, the greater part of rural medical institutions are being housed in facilities that have been adapted for their use. In the Kara-Kalpak ASSR and in Syr-Darya Oblast, some of the surgical and obstetrical points do not have any accommodations at all. Various approaches have been taken to correct the difficult situation that has developed in local areas. Thus, for example, in Andizhan Oblast, at the initiative of the oblast party committee and oblast executive committee, it was decided to build 85 rural medical outpatient clinics, 20 surgical and obstetrical points, and 5 rural district hospitals by the end of 1989. This decision was successfully fulfilled. An analogous decision was reached in Bukhara Oblast, which cannot be said about Surkhan- Darya, Kashka-Darya, Samarkand, and Syr-Darya oblasts and the Kara-Kalpak ASSR.

Sixty percent of the republic's children live in the rural areas, but the problem of supplying food for small children remains unsolved. Can there really be any justification for the fact that kolkhozes and sovkhoses which are overfulfilling plans for the production of milk are unable to completely satisfy the needs of children's kitchens for this product, and that its quality in 22 percent of the cases does not meet sanitary and chemical requirements?

The reason for the extremely unsatisfactory epidemiological situation regarding intestinal infection which has developed in rural localities lies in the unsatisfactory water supply to population points and in the lack of sewage systems and in the poor quality of the products being produced by milk industry enterprises, of public catering, and of the catering units at children's and preschool institutions. Of the republic's rural population, 48.8 percent have centralized water supply; five million rural residents use water from irrigation ditches, ponds, wells, and other sources for household and drinking purposes. Water consumption by the populations of the Kara- Kalpak ASSR and Navoi, Khorezm, Bukhara oblasts is considerably below sanitary standards; it does not exceed 25-35 liters per capita per day, whereas the norm is 200-250 liters.

It is also necessary to mention the unsatisfactory sanitary and technical condition of the water pipelines belonging to the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services (Minzhilkomkhov UzSSR) and to UzSSR State Cooperative Committee for Agriculture (Goskoopkomselkhov), as a result of which, in terms of bacteriological and chemical indicators, the water quality is 21.1 percent lower than the requirements of the State Committee for Standards (GOST).

The treatment of farm and everyday waste waters is being done very badly within the republic. Twenty-eight out of 95 town-type settlements have waste- water disposal systems. Waste-water systems have been provided to only 0.6 percent of rural population points. The availability of waste-water systems is particularly low in population centers in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR and in Khorezm, Namangan, and Surkhan-Darya oblasts.

Work is going on within the republic to improve the supply of high-quality drinking water to the population. However, construction of the Tuyamuyun- Nukus-Takhtakutsyr and the Tuyamuyun-Urgench, Damodzhinsk and Khodzhaipak water mains is proceeding at an extremely slow pace. Funds allocated for their construction are not being fully utilized. Construction of water conduits and drains and of a network of street water mains has not begun in the Kara-Kalpak ASSR or in the Khorezm, Bukhara, and Surkhan-Darya oblasts and all that is being done at present is technical planning work.

It should be noted that, according to data of the Uzbek SSR Gosplan and the UzSSR Goskoopkomselkhov, at existing rates of water line and sewerage installation construction, by the year 2000 the percentage of the agricultural population that receives its water by pipeline will decline from 50 to 32 percent, since plans for capital construction of water main installations have been drawn up without taking population growth rates into account.

Working conditions for laborers at a large portion of the farms continue to be unsatisfactory, while the introduction of progressive schedules of work and rest and the

study of the everyday sanitation conditions of rural workers are proceeding slowly. Of the existing 1,917 dairy-product farms, only 1,265 are equipped with shower facilities; 765 have medical stations.

Another problem of no small importance is the creation of suitable housing and everyday conditions for medical workers, particularly young specialists. More than 1,200 medical workers within our republic are without living space. For this reason there is a high turnover of cadres in the Syr-Darya, Samarkand, and Surkhan-Darya oblasts.

The Fundamental Directions for Development of Public Health Protection and the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution "On Measures for Further Improvement of the Public Health Base" have faced us with a serious but entirely realizable task. This is, by the year 1993, to build district hospitals, outpatient clinics or surgical and obstetrical points at all kolkhoz and sovkhoz farm centers, to bring the material and technical base of the surgical and obstetrical points and the medical preventive units into agreement with sanitary and hygienic requirements, and, before 1995, to complete reconstruction of district hospitals, outpatient clinics, and pharmacies, having provided them with central heating, hot and cold water supply, and wastewater disposal systems.

It is planned to pursue the organization of inter-farm medical institutions paid for by the cooperative funds of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and enterprises of the Uzbek SSR Goskoopkomselkhoz, including among these medical outpatient clinics and surgical and obstetrical points. Using the funds of the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and agricultural enterprises, it is necessary to establish sanatoria and dispensaries in the countryside for war and labor veterans and for citizens who live alone. Realization of these tasks will be a contribution to practical realization of the Uzbek Communist Party platform.

### High Infant Mortality in Tajikistan

90US0568A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST

TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Lapin, special warranted physician of the Soviet Children's Foundation imeni V.I. Lenin, chief specialist, USSR Ministry of Health, candidate of medical sciences: "Not to Make a Secret out of the Statistics, or How to Activate the Fight Against Infant Mortality"]

[Text] Every year in the Tajik SSR, thousands of children die who could have been the joy and happiness of their parents today, and the pride of the fatherland tomorrow.

The infant mortality rate in Tajikistan is one of the highest in the country. From 1985 to 1988, the average number of children who died in their first year of life grew from 46.8 to 48.9 per 1,000 live births. In 1988 in our small republic, 9,912 children under age one died; more than in the previous year. And the situation was quite grave in 1989.

According to the preliminary data, during the first 9 months alone, 6,375 children died in their first year... The final summation of these tragic results is still ahead. If we were to manage to reduce the infant mortality level to even that actually achieved in many regions of our country, it would mean that on an annual basis, more than 7,000 of these children would still be alive. Unfortunately, child mortality during the second and subsequent years of life is also very high; the count runs into many thousands.

The increase in infant mortality in recent years is not linked to a growth in the the number born, as certain local soviet and party organ staffers with whom I have had to speak in the line of duty sometimes try to present it. On the contrary, a slight reduction of the birth rate has been noted in the republic over this period.

It is impossible to reconcile oneself to the death of children. It always elicits protest, indignation, and the need to discover the causes, to find out of the measures taken. Many of the causes of high infant mortality are hidden in the social and economic spheres, and the shortcomings in their leadership. One of them is the failure to provide a significant portion of the population with drinking water that poses no threat to their health, the poor nutrition of pregnant women, difficult work and living conditions, and a low hygiene level within families. The lack of attention on the part of planning organs and local soviets to the catastrophical material-technological condition of many hospital maternity and pediatrics departments is disgraceful. Therefore, apparently because of false modesty (who would have thought it!) data on high infant mortality are not published in the compendiums of the results of the the republic's development.

It is fair to address this reproach to the leaders of the health care organs as well, who have not taken advantage of the mass information media for the goal-directed formation of public opinion toward attracting the population to participate in health care work. This lack of public support is undoubtedly conditioned by the isolation and low efficacy of the medical workers' efforts for improving children's health, and lowering their high morbidity and mortality rates.

I think that Tajik SSR Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] must publish in the press on a quarterly basis data on the state of children's health (mortality, infectious disease morbidity) in the republic, oblasts, and rayons. These indices must become one of the most important indicators of the efficacy of the activity not only of the organs and institutions of the health care system, but of the soviet and party organs, which are entrusted with the responsibility of defining the priorities of society's socioeconomic development. Perhaps then the construction, repair, and reconstruction of auxiliary maternity and pediatric treatment facilities will cease to be secondary tasks by comparison to the construction of palatial restaurants, new market buildings, raykom and rayispolkom buildings, or other such "priority" facilities, as is taking place, for example, in the

city of Kulyab, and Dzhilikulskiy, Leningradskiy, Ura-Tyubinskiy, and other rayons.

If the data on the high infant mortality and morbidity become known to the general public, then people simply will not allow such distortions. How can one be reconciled with the fact that in 1987-1988, the target for adding maternity beds was fulfilled by only 13 percent; pediatric beds, 25 percent; increasing gynecological consultations, 6 percent, and pediatric clinical visits, 8 percent? The ispolkoms of Kanibadamskiy, Kumsangirskiy, Nauskiy, Pakharskiy, Pendzhikentskiy, Pyandzhskiy, Ura-Tubinskiy, Shaartuzskiy city and rayon soviets of people's deputies have not ensured the fulfillment of targets for the construction of dairy kitchens for the preparation of baby food products. The enumeration of similar incidents of irresponsibility and a lack of principle could be continued, but that would not help the matter. Measures of coercion are needed, including legal coercion.

Until every kishlak [village], rayon, city, and oblast soviet, and the republic Council of Ministers accepts the defense of children's health as being a most important goal of their own existence, the level of infant mortality will not budge from its standstill.

The fundamental cause of death in infants is acute infectious diseases, among which 70 percent are acute intestinal infections. In summer, these diseases literally "mow down" infants.

It is possible to blame the medical staffers that they did not save them. Indeed, analysis of the quality of medical assistance to infants not infrequently reveals a low level of professional training of doctors, who underestimate the gravity of an infected baby's condition, and do not provide for his timely and competent treatment. For example, at a board held at the Tajik SSR Ministry of Health in July 1989, it was indicated that in Leninabad Oblast 80 percent of the babies who died in their first year from acute intestinal infectious illnesses did not receive competent medical assistance prior to hospitalization, and 58 percent did not even have it under hospital conditions.

Nor is the situation in other regions of the republic better. Why would the republic Ministry of Health not want to publish these and other of the board's materials? All the more so since far from all of the problems discussed by it are exclusively medical ones. At this same board it was ascertained that the oblast's agro-industrial complex annually undermines the fulfillment of construction plans for health care facilities, and that the milk demand of the functioning kitchens are met by only 30-40 percent. How are the children going to be fed, and with such "concern," is it possible to have a healthy growing generation? It seems that after such a performance by the Ministry of Health in the party press, communists working in agriculture (and they are parents as well) would have all justification for discussing and condemning the miserly proportions of their branch's

contribution to maintaining children's health, and that they would think about how to increase it.

Yet however high a level of development medical science and practice reaches in the foreseeable future, the "delivery" of sorrowful material for it has, to a decisive degree, depended upon and will depend upon the condition and problems of the socioeconomic, cultural, spiritual, and other spheres of society's life activity, and the efficacy of their management. Maximal scientific support of measures in the field of health care is needed; it has long since gone beyond the framework of medicine, and has turned into a very complex, comprehensive, interbranch, and, in science, interdisciplinary, problem.

At the present time, the managerial decisions made in the socioeconomic sphere do not have such support, which undoubtedly lowers their production of results, first and foremost in the matter of maintaining children's health. An organized association of the possibilities of the entire scientific potential of the republic is needed for the resolution of this noble task.

In view of this, we propose the creation of a republic scientific center of the socioeconomic problems of the population, where the problems of children's health maintenance will become the subject of comprehensive interdisciplinary study by a collective of scientists, including medical workers, demographers, economists, philosophers, sociologists, ecologists, psychologists, historians, and lawyers. It seems that this will be to the benefit of children's health care.

### **Tajik People's Control Committee on Medicine Shortage**

90US0499A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 3 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by M. Rakhmat-Zade, department head, public education, culture, and health, People's Control Committee, Tajik SSR, M. Beknazarov, inspector, People's Control Committee, Tajik SSR, and N. Prisyadkin: "Medicine...Under the Counter"]

[Text] At the first symptoms of illness, we rush to the doctor, and from the doctor to the pharmacy for medicines. And suddenly we learn that even those medicines which were not in short supply in the recent past have now disappeared from the shelves without a trace. Why is that?

There are several reasons. It is commonly known that the country's pharmaceutical industry is meeting people's needs for medicines at a rate of only 40 percent. The Government has recently decided to purchase the lacking medications and preparations abroad. But whether the medicines will make it to the pharmacy—that is yet another issue.

Of course, the alarmingly bare shelves force people to take pen in hand to write complaints, and to raise the questions, why have even the simplest and cheapest medicines

disappeared from sale, not to mention the imported ones? When will the situation become normal?

The People's Control Committee of the republic, together with the Ashtskiy, Kanibadamskiy, and Matchinskiy rayon People's Control Committees of Leninabad Oblast, and the commission members of the workers' control have checked the provision of medicines to the populations and to hospitals. The work of the Leninabad Oblast "Farmatsiya" production association [PO] has also been checked.

We admit that we were repulsed by the attitude of the workers of the pharmaceutical services toward the storage, inventory, and dispensation of treatment preparations. It may be said with absolute certainty today that the widespread phrase, "precise, like in a pharmacy" has sunk into oblivion.

Discovered during a raid were interruptions in supplying pharmacies with medicines, the absence in a number of them of certain medications, even though they were available in neighboring pharmacies and at the warehouses of the "Farmatsiya" PO. The reason is that the oblast association, in taking orders for medical preparations from the pharmacies, which, incidentally, did not reflect the population's actual needs for medicines, filled these orders in an unsystematic manner, and did not control the remainder of the medicines and other remedies in the pharmacies. There were incidents of allocating certain types of preparations in excess of the annual orders, such as glutamic acid, glucose, and bandaging materials.

Required medicines were frequently missing from the pharmacies' selection. For example, over 70 types of medications were not present in Kanibadamskiy Rayon, and 40 types in Ashtskiy Rayon. The pharmacy workers justified this by the fact that the republic, meaning the oblast as well, does not receive many medicines. But here the PO "Farmatsiya" is also at fault. In the Kanibadamskiy pharmacies, there was no citron, analgesics, tablet-form [nosh-pa: plant-derived medication], nor tincture of fennel. In the Ashtskiy pharmacies, there were no eye drops, nor potassium permanganate.

In the two rayons, there is no finding aloe extract, adenosinetriphosphoric acid, vitamins in ampules, mustard plasters, or pepper plasters. In September of this year, the Ashtskiy Rayon "Farmatsiya" production enterprise refused, citing the lack of medicines, to supply the rayon hospital with 48 types of medications. In checking, it turned out that a great number of them were lying in the warehouses of the oblast PO "Farmatsiya." Also there gathering dust were 46,600 ampules of vitamins B-1 and B-6; about 125,000 ampules of B-12; 8,000 mustard plasters; 18 kilograms loose and 5,000 flasks of potassium permanganate. How should this be taken? Disorganization? Negligence? After all, the B vitamins are goods in very short supply.

"The greater share of the blame for this lies with the rayon leadership," declares I. Karimkhodzhayev,

director of the Leninabadskiy PO "Farmatsiya." "Apparently, they plan their work poorly, and we strive to give them what is needed."

Because of the muddle, there have been created shortages of medical preparations in some pharmacies, and surpluses in others. For example, in Ashtskiy Rayon's pharmacy No. 22 in, there was no citron, analgin, [brilliantovaya zelen—plant tincture used like iodine on cuts], but in pharmacies Nos. 100, 153, and 378, they were lying on the shelves. In Matchinskiy Rayon's pharmacy No. 102, there was no brilliant green solution, dibazol in tablet form, cups for bleeding, or "gold star" balsam, yet all of this was to be had in other pharmacies.

Surpluses were also encountered. Almost R17,000 worth of medicines and preparations piled up in Ashtskiy Rayon's pharmacy number 22. Incidentally, in four of the pharmacies checked, reserves of medical preparations and bandaging materials worth R28,600 were found. In Matchinskiy Rayon, a reserve of goods worth R34,000 was stockpiled in the pharmacies, and in Kanibadamskiy Rayon, according to the bookkeeping of the "Farmatsiya" PO, there was an amount worth over R35,000. It is not known if these monies will be returned to the state by sales; after all, medicines have expiration dates which the pharmacists must observe.

True, they frequently disregard this. The audit revealed a great quantity of medical preparations which had become unusable because of the expired term for use. In two pharmacies of the Kanibadamskiy Rayon, there were found 44 types of expired medicines worth R408. In pharmacy No. 9, they lay in the ventilation shaft, and S. Sharipova, manager of pharmacy No. 161, did not even unseal three expired factory-sealed packages of streptomycin. S. Atayeva, manager of Matchinskiy Rayon's pharmacy No. 102 unsuccessfully tried to make excuses when it was found that seven types of preparations which had become unusable were lying on the shelves. She cited the fact that the oblast frequently sends the rayon expired medicines. T. Saidov, deputy director of the "Farmatsiya" RPP [rayon switching point], released to a pharmacy in June 20 packages of "atmosol" for smoking even though he knew full well that the expiration date was in May. Such violations were discovered in practically all the pharmacies audited.

The audit ascertained a high number of rejections of requests for medicines to the population. Thus, for example, pharmacies Nos. 9, 22, and 112 of the "Farmatsiya" production enterprises of Kanibadamskiy, Ashtskiy, and Matchinskiy rayons registered a one-day total of 262 rejections of 81 types of medicines. There are also blatant cases: In pharmacies Nos. 9 and 161 of Kanibadamskiy Rayon, and No. 112 of Matchinskiy Rayon, the pharmacists refused to issue people medications and preparations for the ill which were in stock in the pharmacies; the medicines were lying in storage, but the pharmacy staffers tell people "no." Because of the lack of the necessary control, the pharmacists do not



display the medicines in the windows, generating an opportunity to trade in them by influence [po blatu] or by acquaintance, at inflated prices, naturally. We will not make unsubstantiated statements.

In Kanibadamskiy Rayon's pharmacy No. 9 there were no breast pumps or ace bandages displayed in the window. And the window of Matchinskiy Rayon's pharmacy No. 112 lacked 6 types of medications, while Ashtskiy Rayon's pharmacy No. 22 lacked 9 types.

It also frequently happens that medicines lie in the hospital unused. In the Ashtskiy Rayon central rayon hospital, headed by A. Kurbanov, there were found six packages of [dopegit], five of [trazikor-20], five of dexamethasone, ten of [tsistenal], sixteen of [fuzidin], and other medicines.

It was noted during the raid that not all preparations and medicines have markings and prices. For example, at the pharmacy window at the Kanibadamskiy rayon clinic, 11 imported medicinal preparations were being sold without an indication of the price. Trade was being conducted exactly the same way in pharmacies Nos. 161 of that same rayon, 102 and 112 of Matchinskiy Rayon. Of course, anybody understands that there are created here all the conditions for abuses.

Pharmacists frequently violate their basis rule in releasing medicines without a doctor's prescription. On the day of the audit, the pharmacist at Kanibadamskiy Rayon's pharmacy No. 9, S. Yuldashev, sold three types of medicines which are dispensed by prescription only. We encountered such violations in Ashtskiy and Matchinskiy rayons as well.

And what of medicines? In the rayons, the laws on dispensing grain alcohol and narcotic substances to the population are frequently subject to gross violation. For example, in treatment and prevention institutions, ethyl grain alcohol is dispensed at the request of an arbitrary form, with many corrections. In the Kanibadamskiy rayon clinic, five of the requests did not even have the signature of the individual who had received the grain alcohol. A selective audit established that at pharmacy No. 9 of the Kanibadamskiy RPP "Farmatsiya" there was a 2.5 kilogram shortage of ethyl grain alcohol worth over R100. At the Ashtskiy central rayon clinic, we detected two flasks of an uninventoried narcotic preparation, [dikoin].

Measures for the social, legal, and economic defense of children are widely implemented in the country today. One of the forms of this work is dispensing medicine free to children under three and invalids.

Due to the lack of control over the doctors' work on the part of the central rayon hospital's administration, violations frequently occur in the distribution and dispensation of medicines. K. Chegibayev, a pediatrician at the Kuruksayskaya city hospital, wrote only 23 free prescriptions from among 567 patients under three. At the same time, the doctors at the Matchinskiy rayon clinic write

out gratis prescriptions without grounds. For example, in a selective audit of eight prescriptions, in two cases the doctors for some reason wrote gratis ones. During those days, neither of these patients had notices of invalid identification, and moreover, neither prescription had been registered in the ledger of the inventory of prescriptions written. Curious what U. Khudoyberdyev, the head of the rayon clinic and chief physician of the central rayon hospital, will say about all of this?

The raid conducted indicated that the Leninabadskoye "Farmatsiya" production association did not show the necessary exactingness of the leaders of the rayon echelons. And the administration of the PO itself worked in a slipshod manner. For example, not one of the fourteen planned comprehensive audits of the oblast's pharmacy and treatment and prevention institutions was completed, and if we imagine that such cases exist in other oblasts as well, it becomes understandable why in the last nearly 4 years the losses from waste, pilferage, and spoilage of medicines reached R50,000. It is sad that the losses are growing. For example, in 1986, they reached R5,000, and in 1988, R23,000. The "Tadzhikfarmatsiya" PO must implement stricter control over the organizations within their jurisdiction.

True, the "Tadzhikfarmatsiya" association also made its contribution to the creation of the muddle and lack of control in the work of the pharmacies. Here is an example. The association's pharmaceutical plant did not ship R286,000 worth of ordered medications to Leninabad Oblast. At the same time, the oblast was sent R461,000 worth of unordered medicines. So it works out that in one case, a shortage is created, and in the other, a surplus of certain medicines and preparations. Incidentally, in 1988, 9 rubles 70 kopeks were spent on medicines per republic resident, which is almost half the average amount in the country.

The People's Control Committee of the republic recently considered the issue of providing the population and medical institutions of Leninabad Oblast with medicines. The decision was made to severely reprimand "Farmatsiya" PO Director I. Karimkhodzhaev for serious shortcomings in work. "Tadzhikfarmatsiya" General Director M. Mamadshoev was shown up for poor guidance of the organizations under his jurisdiction. The committee proposed to republic Deputy Minister of health D. Inomov that measures be taken to eliminate the shortcomings in the planned requirements and utilization of medicinal substances, and to report on the results in November 1990.

It seems that this is all correct. Yet if in the future we settle things only by adopting decisions, then it seems that the situation of providing the population with medicines will not improve. It is necessary to organize the work of the pharmacies and treatment institutions in such a way so that each staffer bears personal responsibility for the matter entrusted to him.



**Karakalpak ASSR Leper Hospital Conditions Described**

90US0591A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
13 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent I. Nigay: "Lepers: Report from a Leper Hospital"]

[Text] [Letter to the editor] *"I read somewhere, 'Lepers exist to this day in Italy.' But do they still exist in our country? I have heard that there has been a leper hospital on one of the islands in the Aral Sea since prerevolutionary times. Is that true?"*

*Kh. Boltayev, associate of UVD,  
Tashkent City Ispolkom.*

The lower reaches of the Amu-Darya is only one of a dozen areas in the USSR where leprosy is endemic. The rumors that patients are being kept on islands in the Aral Sea are far-fetched. The Karakalpak leper hospital is situated 40 kilometers from Nukus. There is no telephone or radio communication with it, and in order to obtain information about it, it is necessary to visit it. I might note that it is not guarded and does not even have a fence around it.

The local residents call this unusual hospital the Krantau settlement. It is "cut off" from the world on one side by a river, and on the other side by an irrigation canal for rice fields.

From the bridge over the canal one can easily see the settlement. Rows of squalid huts and a large number of trees. Narrow asphalt-covered streets. Alongside of each picket fence is a galvanized vat for drinking water, and a garbage pail.

It is cold and getting dark. Not a soul around. Suddenly a little girl wearing a school uniform dashes across the street in front of the car and hides in a cottage made of daubed reeds and wood. She appears to be a perfectly healthy child. A woman carrying a bucket comes out of the same door and heads for the vat. She has a kerchief wrapped around her head in such a way that there is only a slit for her eyes. Speaking through the kerchief, she tells us in a muffled voice how to find the physician on duty.

Obstetrician-gynecologist Marina Yanovna Rotalskaya and medical aide Daulbay Aytimbetov are on duty. In the cramped hospital building for seriously ill patients it is warm and cozy as a result of all the white paint that is typical of hospitals. Marina Yanovna—the very epitome of gentleness and courtesy—attempts by her very first words to put our mind at rest.

"During the entire history of the leper colony (since 1933) there has not been a single instance when the medical personnel have contracted the disease. Even among the nurses and the orderlies."

When she first came here as a young specialist 15 years ago, when there were a large number of patients with a neglected form of the disease, she would be reduced to

tears or would have nightmares from performing her nighttime duties. However, since that time the treatment of the patients has moved considerably ahead and the number of patients who have been disfigured by the disease to the point of unrecognizability has been dropping constantly. For the most part they are old people who contracted the disease long ago.

Leprosy is incurable. Antibiotics with a broad spectrum of action, such as binemycin, rifamycin, rifadin, and a completely new preparation—diucyfon—make it possible to stop the processes of the deterioration of the organism. Patients who are diagnosed at an early stage undergo a six-month course of treatment, after which, if they are not bacillus carriers, they leave the leper hospital for 20-30 days. Then a shorter course is repeated. After convalescence, the patients enjoy a few benefits: they have the right to get housing without being on a waiting list, to get jobs that they select, and are given a disability pension.

Unfortunately, the disease leaves terrible traces on the faces of former patients of the leprosy hospital and most of the patients, fearing alienation from people, prefer to stay here in Krantau.

The settlement has its own isolated but completely normal way of life. Just like the people on the other side of the canal, they work to the extent that they can, they have their happy times and their sad ones, they celebrate holidays, they reminisce about those who have left, they love, and, to Marina Yanovna's regret, they give birth.

"You might ask why I, an obstetrician-gynecologist, say this," she says. "Because we try to prevent pregnancy in those for whom childbirth is counterindicated. But the women's desire to have children wins out over prejudices. So this year there will be one child."

A specialized children's leper hospital combined with an eight-year school is in operation in the same rayon. The patients' young children who have come in contact with the disease are kept here and go to school here. Children are children. They are playful and completely without a care. So far they do not suspect the terrible psychological tribulations that are awaiting them. Take Urazbay, which was seven years old when he came here. He is now 43. He is practically healthy. But he is afraid to leave Krantau. Alienation, I repeat, lies like a rock in the soul of hundreds of people like Urazbay.

People's blind fear of leprosy sometimes leads to a tragedy. The parents of 17-year-old patient K. from Shumanay, who had been ill since the age of 14, were afraid of their neighbors' wrath and hid her for three years at her grandmother's home in another oblast. The girl could not be saved. The patients of 30-year-old patient L. from Nukus also hid her for many years in the cellar until she was entirely covered with scabs and pus.

"In order to turn her over, we had to use a sheet that had been soaked in ointments," Marina Yanovna says. "But she came to us too late."

But there are also reverse examples. A militia worker noticed that his feet had lost their sensitivity to cold. Suspecting leprosy, he immediately consulted the leprosy specialists. Now he is healthy and working again.

"Only the specialists know how many people are living in Karakalpakia after being successfully treated for leprosy, who have subsequently become famous, and are working in important jobs," Bekbultat Nazymov, chief physician at the leper hospital, says.

We met Bekbulat Nazymovich late in the evening. He is a leading leprosy specialist, and a candidate of medical sciences. He spends a lot of time resolving housekeeping problems. For example, he had just returned from a trip to the various sovkhoses in the rayon, trying to find provide assistance in the form of money—the hospital needs an X-ray diagnosis machine. It costs 70,000 rubles in foreign currency. He failed to find that assistance.

And apparently that incomparable optimist will never find it. For three years nine prefabricated homes have been in the stage of installation in Krantau. The customer—UKS [Administration of Capital Construction], Karakalpak ASSR Council of Ministers—located a contractor, to use the term jokingly—the specialized scientific-restoration production sector of Karakalpak ASSR Ministry of Culture. In all of Krantau you will not find a single standard-design structure. There is no bath house, no water mains, no gas, no sewage system. The settlement, to put it without any exaggeration, is falling apart from old age.

The vats "for drinking water" that struck us in the eye as we drove in are definitely not filled with drinking water, but with river water.

In the 1960's USSR Council of Ministers allocated to Karakalpakia 6 million rubles for the construction of a standard-design leper hospital. In 1969, when 20 homes had already been built on the bank of the Amu-Darya, a flood carried away not only those homes, but also all the remaining millions—they were thrown into the restoration of the city of Beruni that had suffered. Now only the 20 foundations that are overgrown with weeds remind people of that ancient history.

And what kind of support is given to the medics? Most of them live in Nukus. It is barely dawn when they leave for work. They return home late at night and do not have time to buy any groceries. They are assigned to the settlement agricultural cooperative where you cannot buy anything but sprats. Recently, after the medics' salaries had been slightly raised, they had their special-work differential reduced, which differential, depending upon their longevity, came to from 30 to 50 percent.

Leprosy is a social disease. The people who contract it are chiefly people who are physically weakened, who have a deficient diet, who live in abnormal ecological and sanitation conditions. So the soil does exist for leprosy in the autonomous republic. Therefore three

medical leprosy institutions operate here, and Karakalpakia maintains records on 917 people; 162 are undergoing treatment, of whom 133 have Category I disabilities. In our country there are approximately 4250 persons suffering from this disease, and within the world 12-15 million.

### **Uzbekistan's Plan for Restoration of Navruz Holiday Outlined**

90US0601A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
26 Jan 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "To Restore Folk Holidays and Rites"]

[Text] In realizing the principles of glasnost, democratization and perestroika, the Ideological Commission organized under the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee is implementing measures which correspond to the desires and aspirations of the people. An example of this has been the broad discussion before the Ideological Commission of the measures related to celebrating the folk holiday of Navruz.

The workers and the broad public support with enthusiasm the measures being undertaken by the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee to restore the folk traditions, rituals, rites and holidays. In particular, the restoring of the celebration of Navruz and the declaring of 21 March to be a holiday have become the embodiment of the years-long dream of our people. The broad celebrating of Navruz last year was proof of the great interest in folk traditions regardless of vocation, age and nationality. In the course of the holiday, folk rites and traditions were widely celebrated and these reflected such very precious common human qualities as friendship and unity of peoples.

Navruz is an ancient holiday which arose in those times when our predecessors began engaging in agriculture. Because of this Navruz has certain particular features in different places and these are linked to the conditions of life and geographic situation. Initially, it expressed the people's love for their homeland and filial relations to nature and her gifts. This was a holiday linked for the peasant to the start of the spring field work. After this they began plowing the fields and sowing the wheat. For precisely this reason, rites appeared related to the labor of the farmer such as "Kush kushish," "Kush oshi" and "Birinch chigit" ("Ekish sayli").

We should also note the great educational significance of Navruz which strikes patriotic feelings and arouses philanthropy. We are reminded of the story when, during the celebration of Navruz, wars were halted, with the former insults and disputes forgotten, people made their peace and sat down at the same table. During the days of Navruz, the people celebrated joyously and happily. Such an ancient rite which embodied the best common human qualities cannot grow old and it is worth keeping and developing in our times.

But the celebrating of Navruz was not only an unrestrained happy time. During these days the people reflected on their problems, outlined ways to solve them and linked definite hopes to this. At the beginning of March, the wise elders usually assembled, they shared their thoughts on what was to come, what weather could be expected, how much moisture there would be, and gave their recommendations on preparing everything necessary for plowing the land and gave advice as to where and how to sow better and distribute water....

We should protect this tradition. Let us remember that Navruz is not only the day of the equinox, when the beginning of a new year is celebrated, but is also the holiday of the farmer's working spring for which the people begin preparing from the first days of March. All the rites and traditions linked to the spring can be justifiably related to Navruz. As was said by Abu Raykhonom Beruni: "Being the first day of the new year, Navruz has the same meaning in Persian. Navruz...previously it coincided with the transition of the sun to the hottest period, saraton. Then it was moved back and now occurs in the spring. And now it comes at that very time which serves the entire year, that is, in the spring, from the first drop of water to the flowering and ripening of the fruits, from the birthing of young animals and the sprouting of the bud.... Thus, Navruz is the birth and development of the entire surrounding world."

For this reason, in the process of preparing for and holding Navruz, we should restore and develop the traditions which, in coming down through the centuries, have reached us, and link these with the modern life of the people and with their hopes and dreams. The Ideological Commission has decided to establish an organizational committee in the republic for organizing and celebrating the holiday of Navruz on the spot. Its membership will include respected persons among the people including party and soviet workers, representatives of the creative intelligentsia and the broad public. They will be entrusted with organizing a more meaningful holiday in comparison with 1989, a holiday which now meets the demands of the people and satisfies their desires. At a meeting of the members of the Ideological Commission of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee and the Organizational Committee many important proposals were made on this level.

The basic measures for the Navruz holiday are celebrated on 21 March in all the oblasts, towns and villages of the republic. By tradition the holiday begins with meetings with relatives and close friends, with war and labor veterans and the visiting of cemeteries.

The ancient and modern holiday of Navruz has particular features in the various points of Uzbekistan. But everywhere it is accompanied without fail by folk outdoor festivals, games, performances by masters of arts, storytellers and tests of strength. Mounted games and races were particularly favorite. On this day trade would be widely organized everywhere. Various national dishes and sweets were prepared for the holiday. In addition to

pilaf, shurpa and shashlik, one could also have rarer "holiday" dishes from tender greens.

Essential on this day was the holiday "sumalak." This was usually prepared by a large group of women. During the preparation of this exceptionally nutritious and tasty dish, songs and dances resounded constantly around the kettle and ancient tales, legends and verses could be heard.... All of this contributed to the strengthening of feelings of community, unity and fraternity in the people.

Navruz is also widely celebrated in the towns and here there must be very careful preparations for it. In the town districts they should sound the traditional horns, calling the people to the holiday wearing holiday national clothing. During the days of celebrating the Navruz in the streets and squares there would be performances by masqueraders and storytellers, folkloric-ethnographic ensembles, fortune tellers, wrestlers and there would be competitions for holiday performances, young talents and exhibits of folk arts.

During the days of celebrating Navruz, guests would be invited from the other fraternal republics and in turn messengers from Uzbekistan would be sent to their holiday. Such relations are of great educational significance and will help to strengthen friendship between peoples. In order for Navruz to become an even more meaningful and important holiday, the mass information media should also have their say. In particular, it would be advisable to re-run the best television and radio broadcasts dedicated to Navruz.

Navruz is a holiday inseparably linked with the creative labor of our people, it embodies their dreams and hopes and reflects their life and national spirit in the best examples of folk creativity. At the same time, this holiday also carries a strong educational impact as it urges the people and primarily the youth to show philanthropy, friendship, mutual respect and charity.

There can be no doubt that the inhabitants of our republic will hold the celebrating of Navruz this year in an uplifted mood and in an organized manner and will demonstrate new facets of this surprising folk tradition. Let there be broad scope and a joyous welcome for Navruz 1990!

#### **Study Provides Data on Armenian Komsomol Composition, Attitudes**

*90US0601B Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian  
6 Feb 90 p 2*

[Article by G. Sayamov: "The Yerevan Komsomol in the Mirror of Sociology"]

[Text] Everywhere, discussions are being held on the future of the youth league, on the reorganization of the Komsomol and on the Komsomol Program and Bylaws. The designated questions were a matter of thorough discussion at the 8th and 9th Plenums of the Komsomol

Central Committee and will be on the agenda of the forthcoming Komsomol Congress.

The Section for the Sociology of Youth Problems under the Yerevan City Center of the NTTM [Scientific and Technical Youth Creativity] has conducted a sociological study the aim of which was to investigate the opinion of the Komsomol members concerning the processes occurring in the youth league.

The object of the given research was 298 Komsomol members who were delegates to the 32d Report-Election Conference of Yerevan. The social make-up of the delegates was as follows. A majority (65.8 percent) was young males with females comprising 34.2 percent of the respondents.

The structure of those questioned depending upon their type of activity indicated that 35.9 percent of the young persons was full-time Komsomol workers, 29.2 percent was engineers, technicians, scientists and white collar personnel, 14.1 percent was students in schools, SPTU [specialized vocational-technical schools] and technical schools, 13.1 percent was workers and 7.7 percent was VUZ students.

The research set two main tasks for itself and reflected in the sociological questionnaire worked out for conducting the sample.

The first of these tasks concerned the problems of the youth league generally as well as the reasons for the crisis and the ways out of it. The other related to the activities of the Komsomol gorkom in the Armenian capital and an assessment of the style and methods of its work over the report period.

One of the eloquent manifestations of the crisis in the Komsomol is the fact of the sharp drop in its authority, as the data of the questionnaire showed. The basic reasons for the drop in Komsomol authority as mentioned by the respondents were the following:

1. "The absence of independence" with 53.5 percent.
2. "The lagging behind the processes occurring in society" with 48.4 percent.
3. "Incorrect personnel policy" with 40.0 percent.
4. "Formalism and ossification of work forms and methods" with 35.5 percent.
5. "The absence of democratic principles" with 32.3 percent.
6. "The absence of a political line and principled positions" with 29.7 percent.
7. "The lack of ties with the broad strata of the youth" with 25.2 percent.
8. "The discrepancy between the proclaimed goals and the methods of achieving them" with 15.5 percent.

9. "The monopoly on expressing the interests of the youth" with 14.8 percent.

(The total exceeds 100 percent as the respondents could mark not more than three causes.)

In analyzing the situation existing in the Komsomol and in summing up the discussions which have developed at the recent plenums of the Komsomol Central Committee and which have been continued on the pages of the central and republic youth press, it can be asserted that the main question which concerns the Komsomol members (and not only them) is the following: Can the Komsomol overcome the current crisis situation and in what manner?

Proceeding from the replies to the first question, all those questioned can be arbitrarily divided into three groups:

Group I—young persons who are convinced that the Komsomol is capable of surmounting the crisis situation or the so-called "optimists"; among those questioned these comprised 155 persons, or 52.5 percent.

Group II—the respondents who do not believe that the Komsomol is capable of overcoming the existing difficulties, or the so-called "pessimists" (81 persons or 27.2 percent).

Group III—"indeterminate," that is, those questioned who did not provide a definite answer to this question (62 persons or 20.8 percent).

The group of "optimists" was made up basically of full-time Komsomol workers.

The "pessimists" largely included the workers, engineers, technicians and white collar personnel as well as students.

As for the question of how to overcome the presently existing situation, the views of those questioned appear as follows:

1. "Revise the goals and principles for the organization of the League" with 64.4 percent.
2. "Raise the independence of the primary Komsomol organizations" with 58.1 percent.
3. "Clearly delimit the powers of the Center and the inferior organizations" with 49.0 percent.
4. "Revise the principles for forming the personnel of the Komsomol organizations" with 39.9 percent.
5. "Adopt the principle of 'democratic unity' instead of 'democratic centralism'" with 38.3 percent.
6. "Provide an opportunity to organize primary organizations not only along the territorial-production lines but also by social affiliation" with 30.8 percent.
7. "Improve the principle of 'democratic centralism'" with 17.4 percent.

(The total exceeds 100 percent for the respondents could indicate not more than three choices.)

Thus, the respondents see the ways for overcoming the current difficulties basically in revising the fundamental principles in the organization of the youth League, in the relations of the central Komsomol bodies and the inferior ones as well as increasing the role of the primary Komsomol organizations and the development of democracy.

It is also characteristic that the idea of democratic unity obtained "double the votes" than improving the principle of "democratic centralism."

Rather contradictory positions were also expressed by those questioned on the future model of the Komsomol. Thus, one-half of the respondents feels that the Komsomol is a federation of the Union republic youth organizations. Here this view to a larger degree is characteristic for the "undetermined" (58.1 percent) and the "optimists" (56.1 percent).

As for the "pessimists," they, as a rule, propose limiting the functions of the Komsomol and at the same time to establish other equal organizations (for example, a youth Greens movement, associations by interests and so forth).

Common for these groups of persons questioned is the circumstance that a majority of them ("pessimists" with 74.1 percent, "undetermined" with 59.7 percent, "optimists" with 55.5 percent and a total average of 61.4 percent) pointed to the need to change the name of the Komsomol.

However, it is not merely a matter of changing the name. It is a question rather of fundamental questions concerning the Komsomol and its interaction with the party.

The problem is that the Komsomol was established as an organization of the communist youth League and this points to its inseparable link with the CPSU.

At the same time, as the questionnaire indicated, a predominant majority (87.6 percent) feels that it is essential to alter the former practice of relations between the CPSU and the Komsomol. While on the given question, all the designated groups of respondents expressed unanimity, the opinions noticeably differed over whether the Komsomol should follow the same platform as the CPSU or not. For comparison we would point out that agreeing with the opinion that the Komsomol should operate on the same platform with the CPSU were 29 percent of the "optimists," 11.7 percent of the "undetermined" and just 8.6 percent of the "pessimists." As a total, an average of just 1 out of 5 respondents supported this opinion.

Thus, the "optimists," in contrast to the "pessimists," prefer having a common platform with the party within the frame work of changing the former practice of relations between the CPSU and the Komsomol.

As for the questions of the interaction of the Komsomol with the republic Komsomol organization as well as

improving the activities of the latter, on this question there were no particular differences in views.

On the idea of the complete independence and autonomy of the republic Komsomol from the Center:

—Some 68.5 percent of those questioned were "affirmative"

—Some 17.4 percent were "more affirmative than negative"

—1.8 percent was "indifferent"

—2.3 percent was "more negative than positive"

—3.0 percent was "negative"

—7.0 percent found it "hard to answer."

Consequently, 85.9 percent of the respondents to one degree or another favored the independence and autonomy of the Armenian Komsomol.

Along with this, respectively, 94.3 percent and 86.7 percent of those questioned indicated that the republic Komsomol required its own program and bylaws.

Due to the fact that the poll was conducted among the delegates of the report-election conference, the questionnaire provided a number of questions concerning the work of the Armenian Komsomol gorkom, the Komsomol raykoms and the primary Komsomol organizations over the report period.

Thus, 52.3 percent of those questioned felt positive changes which had occurred over the report period in the activities of the Komsomol gorkom, 60.7 percent in the work of the Komsomol raykoms and 60.7 percent in the activities of the primary Komsomol organizations.

Regardless of the fact that as an average over one-half of those questioned noted an improvement in the activities of the Komsomol gorkom, it is, however, too early to speak about a completely good situation on this matter.

As the results of the poll indicate, only 25.8 percent of the respondents was satisfied with the activities of the gorkom over the report period, 36.9 percent was not satisfied and 37.3 percent found it difficult to answer. The greatest claims against the work of the Komsomol gorkom were made by the "pessimists" (the proportional amount of those satisfied with the activities of the city Komsomol organization in this group of persons questioned was 14.8 percent, those dissatisfied were 61.7 percent and the "undetermined" were, respectively, 16.1 percent and 17.8 percent).

These data show that regardless of positive changes observed in the activities of the Komsomol gorkom, the pace of these changes is still insufficient.



This is also shown from the circumstance that the distribution of answers to the question "to what degree are you informed on the work of the Komsomol gorkom?" was follows:

1. "Good" with 24.8 percent;
2. "I obtain information from time to time" with 58.1 percent;
3. "I do not have information" with 17.1 percent.

An assessment of the various areas in the activities of the Komsomol gorkom was made with a 5-point scale proposed in the questionnaire. The average assessment was derived as the average weighted one. The data obtained as a result of the poll show that the respondents viewed the areas of activity of the Komsomol gorkom in the following manner:

1. Organizational work within the League with 2.97 points.
2. Ideological-political work with 2.83 points.
3. Socioeconomic activities with 3.18 points.
4. Work with student youth with 2.84 points.
5. Glasnost in work with 2.93 points.

Thus, with the exception of socioeconomic activities which the respondents gave 3.18 points, the other areas of work for the Komsomol were not even judged as "satisfactory."

As for the elections of the delegates to the current city conference, these elections were considered "democratic" by 60.7 percent of those questioned, "not democratic" by 10.4 percent, while 28.9 percent of the respondents did not give a definite answer.

As for the further plans of the delegates, as the poll showed, 47.3 percent of those questioned intended to continue their activities further in the elective Komsomol bodies, 23.8 percent in the staffs of the Komsomol raykom and gorkom and 22.8 percent in the party bodies. Here the "optimists" were more focused on work in the elective Komsomol bodies while the "pessimists" preferred working in the staffs of both the Komsomol and party bodies.

### **Project Underway to Translate Koran Into Modern Uzbek**

90US0601C Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
13 Feb 90 p 4

[Unattributed interview with Prof I. Abdullayev: "The Return of the Koran; Work Has Commenced in Tashkent on Translating the Koran Into Modern Uzbek"]

[Text] In the history of world culture, the Koran stands on equal footing with the Old and New Testaments. At present, in restoring the historic sources of each people,

their culture, rites and beliefs, the need has arisen of familiarizing the people with this great work. Our correspondent has met with one of the translators of the Koran, Doctor of Philological Sciences, Professor and Leading Science Associate at the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, I. Abdullayev, and asked him to reply to a number of questions

[Reporter] Ismatulla Abdullayevich, what is the main difficulty of the commenced work?

[Abdullayev] Above all, to achieve complete agreement with the original in translating is very hard and in certain instances, simply impossible. It is no accident, for example, that the English academic publication of the Koran in 1959 was called an interpretation of the Koran. A person who sets out on this very difficult job must know not only the language of the original but also the historical conditions under which the Koran arose, the economic relations of that distant age, the political balance of forces and even geography. It is also essential to consider numerous commentaries which accompany the Koran. At times, these take up entire volumes.

[Correspondent] Why is the copy of this book located in Tashkent called the Osman Koran and how did it end up in Uzbekistan?

[Abdullayev] The problem was that the Prophet Mohammed gave his sermons and revelations revealed to him by Allah from 610 to his death in 632. A portion of these was written down but a majority was passed from mouth to mouth. Gradually, the need arose to assemble them together. Thus, an "editorial commission" was established and this became involved with this work. It worked precisely during the rule of Calif Osman. For this reason, the Koran was named after Osman. We still do not know how many copies there were at that time: 4, 5, or 7. However, the one that we have, according to legend, was written by the ruler himself. His murderers caught him reading precisely this book. Even now, traces of his blood can be found on certain pages. In truth, no one has conducted any special research on these stains in order not to profane the sacred book.

There are many legends about how this amazing book ended up in Uzbekistan. However, in the archives there is a note from the orientalist A. Kun who compiled this from the words of the ulema of the Samarkand Hodzha-Akhrar Mosque where the Osman Koran was kept until the arrival of the Russian troops here, the mullahs Abdul-Dzhalil and Mukhsini-Mufti. This tale returns us to events of some 400 years ago, when in Tashkent there lived a ruler by the name of Khodzha-Abeydulla who was called Akhrar and in his life considered a saint. One of his murids, in returning from a pilgrimage to holy Mecca, stopped at Rum, the calif of which was at that time very ill. No one could help him. The murid cured him by reading the sacred prayers and by other means. As a sign of gratitude, the calif commanded the murid to request whatever he might wish. He asked for the book. Thus, the Osman Koran went to Turkestan.

[Correspondent] But, as far as I know, the remarkable fate of the book did not end with this.

[Abdullayev] Correct. On 30 May 1869, the Chief of the Zarafshans District, Maj Gen Abramov, sent a letter to the Governor General Kaufman in which he stated that "in one of the Samarkand mosques there is a Koran the origin of which, by tradition, goes back to deep antiquity...." MSgt Serov was sent to the mosque to find out if the Koran could be purchased without any insult to the religious feelings of the Moslems.

According to the information of the master sergeant himself, by paying to the mosque some 500 kokans or 100 rubles according to the rate at that time, Serov completed the transaction to the full satisfaction of the Samarkand clergy. After this, the Osman Koran was sent to St. Petersburg, where it was kept until the October Revolution. Immediately after October, it upon the request of the Moslems was sent to Ufa for safekeeping where it remained from 1918 through 1923, and then was returned to Tashkent, where it was kept in the Uzbekistan History Museum. At the beginning of last year, it was turned over to the Clerical Administration of the Central Asian and Kazakhstan Moslems.

### Rostropovich, Wife Hold Press Conference

90UN0977A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 7, 17-23 Feb 90 p 6

[Interview with Mstislav Rostropovich, director of the National Symphony Orchestra, and Galina Vishnevskaya, his wife, moderated by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 12 February 1990, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center: "We Were True Soldiers of Russian Music..."]

[Text] After 12 years, by an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR citizenship of Mstislav Rostropovich and Galina Vishnevskaya was restored. Simultaneously, the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which deprived them of their state awards and honorary titles of USSR artists, was nullified. After 16 years, the artists arrived in the motherland. Mstislav Rostropovich, as conductor of the National Symphony Orchestra of the United States, whose tour will take it to Moscow and Leningrad during the month.

A news conference was held in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center on 12 February.

[Rostropovich] I am extremely fortunate that, together with my wife Galina Vishnevskaya, I have been able to return to my people, even if only for a time. And I hope that the people will find the strength to complete perestroika. Galina and I are setting our hopes on this. I am happy as a Russian artist and a Russian musician that I came here with the National Symphony Orchestra of the United States. I am happy that our orchestra will play here both modern American compositions and classical

Russian music. Because for the entire 16 years of our life in the West, we were true soldiers of Russian music particularly.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What do you think of the action to restore your citizenship?

[Rostropovich] The action to restore our citizenship gives us the right to feel like people who are not guilty of anything. And, therefore, we welcome it with satisfaction.

[Vishnevskaya] I would like to add that people who left to work on contract for several years, like us, Maksimov, Voinovich, and Aksenov, and who afterwards were deprived of citizenship and were expelled from the country over the 50 years had to start life from zero. In my opinion, it is necessary to legalize the inadmissibility of this barbarous law.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] There is a hope that you will be able to continue cultural contacts with the Soviet Union?

[Rostropovich] Unfortunately, my artistic calendar is fully scheduled under contract until 1992. If a "window" should open somewhere, we, naturally, will try to come here.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Mstislav Rostropovich was known in the Soviet Union primarily as a cellist. Was it not difficult for you to begin a career in the West as a conductor?

[Rostropovich] I must explain that I also appeared in the Soviet Union in this capacity. For example, I directed the opera "War and Peace." I made a recording of Shostakovich's Fourteenth Symphony, which Galina Pavlovna Vishnevskaya sang. Incidentally, I will venture to mention that I was the first to come up with the idea of organizing a musical festival in Gorkiy. At that time, Galina Pavlovna for the first time performed a work that was dedicated to her by Shostakovich. And I directed that premiere.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What is your attitude toward perestroika in the USSR?

[Rostropovich] You understand, even reading the Soviet press carefully, as we do, and, besides, not knowing the internal emotional life of the country, I do not want to assume the responsibility of speaking in this regard. Can history turn for the worse? Everything is possible... I hope that perestroika in the end will pass from the form of discussion to specific deeds. And the people will want to hear music. And they will want to when they have had enough to eat. Now, in order to get food products, it is necessary to stand in lines a long time. And what is more, you all know about the existence of a caste of people who are not standing in lines...

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What is your attitude toward Mikhail Gorbachev?

[ROSTROPOVICH] I think that the position of this person, whom the party placed in a high post, is extremely difficult, and it demands great political skill. We see that he really wants to restructure the country, and this is coming with difficulty. With difficulty, because of the middle group, which is resisting stubbornly.

When I lived in the Soviet Union, I was often told: "Here, you can play this, but under no circumstances can you play that." Is this normal? Naturally, not. And owing to the current situation in the country, I hope that neither Gorbachev nor Ligachev dare to teach music to any musician.

**On the evening of this same day, our correspondent talked with G. Vishnevskaya.**

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What did you feel after you had to leave the motherland?

[Vishnevskaya] We had a feeling that we were being nailed into a coffin alive. And it was not even a matter of not knowing the language—this problem was resolved rather quickly—or of a shortage of contacts. It is simply that there is an entirely different life there, another atmosphere. We felt very lonely.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] But, then, you and Rostropovich departed as very famous musicians?

[Vishnevskaya] Of course. But, nevertheless, the first sensation that the air around us had been pumped out, and we were in a vacuum. Now, of course, it is already easier. We are at work, and we have contracts and trips. But the feeling of the loss of home, the motherland, has not passed to this day.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] A big part of your artistic life is associated with the Bolshoy Theater. Have you visited there yet?

[Vishnevskaya] No. I am afraid to go there. Even the building itself is not just a building for me—it is something animate. That to which I gave so many years of my life, blood, and nerves. And it is painful for me to come to those walls, which at one time rejected me, and to a collective that did not stand up for me. I remember how for several days before my departure, Rostropovich was already in France, and I was held up by some matters, I walked around the Bolshoy Theater like a leper, and no one came up to me.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What brought you and Solzhenitsyn together?

[Vishnevskaya] Actually, he is a recluse-writer, and we are artists accustomed to a bustling life. Very likely, identity of opinions and the similarity of fates. He, like us, was banished from his country.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] In your opinion, why did they not imprison him, like many others, but mercifully permitted him to leave?

[Vishnevskaya] Very probably, because he acted properly at that time, because he disappeared from the city and locked himself up in our country house. I also think that his departure suited everyone.

We met and talked with him before our trip here. Aleksandr Isayevich was and remains a fundamentally Russian person, and, when he speaks of the motherland, tears well up in his eyes. He cannot now come to the Soviet Union, because the stigma of traitor to the motherland has not been removed from him. But his greatest dream is to live in his own country.

### **Zalygin on NOVY MIR Position in Current Literary Polemics**

90UN0935A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian  
10 Feb 90 Second edition p 3

[Interview with NOVY MIR Chief Editor Sergey Zalygin by V. Sinenko: "Remain Oneself"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] NOVY MIR is one of the country's oldest literary, art, social, and political journals. It rightfully occupies a prominent place among such publications. The most outstanding works of Soviet and foreign literature, sharp political writing, deep reflection by representatives of past and present philosophical thinking—the journal has been bestowing the gift of all this upon its readers for many years now. A natural interest in the person who heads this popular publication is therefore understandable. We give him the floor.

[Sinenko] Sergey Pavlovich, political argument between organs of the press has become a matter of course in the period of glasnost. Expressing different, frequently directly opposing points of view, publications have become divided, hypothetically speaking, into "left-radical" and "right-conservative" ones. Each has its own circle of writers, its own themes, its own view of society and the processes that are taking place within it. How would you yourself define the place of NOVY MIR within these polemics?

[Zalygin] In letters to us, people write, not without irony: "You are not 'left,' not 'right,' You are correct." We are striving to consolidate our society on the basis of literature. We do not want the works we publish to burn up, like moths to a flame, but to be read for ten, fifteen, and even more years. It is obviously not an accident that, at the last Moscow International Book Fair, the books of A. Kima, L. Gabyshev, G. Medved, M. Kurayev, and V. Petsukha enjoyed an increased demand—these authors have entered the international arena via NOVY MIR. Our approach has been the same to political writing. The articles of N. Smelev, I. Klyamkin, V. Selyunin, and V. Shubakin, which have had a marked influence on the public consciousness, sound fresh even today, although they were printed, and moreover written, rather long ago.

As regards the polemics of newspapers and journals, then, in my view, the processes of perestroika are losing more than a little from the fact that they fall short in terms of culture. And in such areas as literature and journalistic writing. Our journal does not take sides in the topical problems of public literary life, but consciously selects here its own methods. We sometimes do not "notice" something and do not react to caustic remarks addressed to NOVY MIR, not because we have no reply to give or we do not have any "quick-reaction" writers. But because we now have in our editorial offices almost 3000 original manuscripts. And each time, the editorial collegium is faced with a choice; either to engage in a polemic with somebody or to answer our opponents with the publication of new works which correspond to the position, to the mindset of our journal. This second path, in our view, is more productive. And so, let us open issue number 1 of our journal for this year and take a look at the table of contents: O. Nikolayeva, A. Solzhenitsyn, V. Bykov, Yu. Dombrovskiy, V. Korolenko, N. Berdyayev, V. Popov, A. Latynina—I will not name all of them. Well what do you think, does it make an impression?

[Sinenko] Recently, attitudes toward Soviet literary classics have been under review. Some readers are indignant that, under the banner of struggling against the "Stalinist era," political attempts are being made to dethrone, to belittle the importance of a number of great writers, and they are also indignant that the method of socialist realism is being declared faulty by certain literary critics.

[Zalygin] Faulty? And so what? One or another method of creative work, or of any kind of work for that matter, does not in itself become either worse or better from the fact of how it is evaluated. What is important is the result. If you consider that "Quietly Flows the Don" is a work of socialist realism, then this method has already been justified.

The greatest shortcoming and fault of the method of socialist realism is not the fact that it existed, but the fact that it was proclaimed to be the only method. In literature this is impossible. There can be classical works, but there cannot be a classical method. First of all, thanks to its "individuality" and even "one-man management", socialist realism both degraded itself and destroyed other directions—which is only to be regretted today. I do not understand why A.M. Gorkiy was declared the founder of socialist realism. I think only because that, once there is a method, this means that there should also be a founder of it, and the more authoritative he is, the better. But why is Gorkiy a socialist realist while Mamin-Sibiryak or Reshetnikov, for example, are not, although all of them wrote about everyday life in approximately identical surroundings?

Socialist realism was not the first to try to politicize literature. A classic example of this is "What is to be Done?" [Chto Delat?] by Chernyshevskiy. In this connection, let us all recall Emil Zola, Anatoliy France... The mistake, I repeat, is not even in this policy; once again, it

is in the senseless aspiration to subordinate all other directions and schools of literature to one's own. Besides this, socialist realism also can in fact be viewed in various ways in various times. Let us read "The Life of Klim Samgin" over again today—would this really not be instructive for us? For all of literature?

To list works as belonging to one or another method is always rather hypothetical—in the final account what is important is their artistic level, and not the artistic method.

I think that, with time, Mayakovskiy, for example, will again provoke interest. What will finally attract the reader will not be his sloganeering, but the technique of his writing, poetic vision and tone, his temperament. What we need are our own, contemporary poets and tribunes and they will perceive both the poetry of Mayakovskiy as well as his nature in a new way. I think that Gorkiy too will be read in a new way. He is interesting because of his completely unaccustomed style. Nobody speaks to me, as a reader, like Gorkiy. And for me, this is important. Indeed one is always looking for someone who is "like nobody." Every epoch introduces seemingly forgotten names into the consciousness of contemporaries. The opposite process also is not excluded, of course—that those who are celebrated and idolized today will be forgotten.

Right now, a cautious attitude toward so-called "rural prose" can be observed in literary criticism. But indeed, this prose first revealed the true state of society in the time of stagnation, which means that it was also the first to speak of the necessity of restructuring. And many of today's "heroes" remained silent in those times. And at that time they too sang odes to the leadership, drew parallels between the writers Leonid Ilich Brezhnev and Lev Nikolayevich Tolstoy. And, to be sure, Tolstoy was not a recipient of the Lenin Prize! I think that it is necessary to take a calm look at the reassessment of values that has taken place in our literary criticism. It is not final. Time, again and again, puts everything in their proper places.

[Sinenko] Sergey Pavlovich, every age gives birth to its own hero. The hero of our times, who is he—the worker, the party worker, the cooperative participant, the informal organization member, or is he still that same Pechorin of Lermontov? What are his ideals, his goals, his moral and spiritual characteristics?

[Zalygin] Realistic literature has never invented heroes; it has taken them from life and formed them in life. It is not the fault of literature that our contemporaries have turned out to have extremely, extremely eroded ideals and goals. The Decembrists, the Narodniki, the Social Democrats, and the Bolsheviks knew what they were after and also presented the means with which they hoped to achieve the results they passionately desired. The call "Proletarians of all lands, unite!" at one time contained a purposeful program. These were goals inspired by ideals. Today, man's ideals, in my view, have

declined, have fallen to a primitive state that is expressed by a single word—"survival." Ecological, economic, political, spiritual survival. In the history of world development, there perhaps never before has been such a down-to-earth ideal. Moreover, in our country, as well as in many other countries, all the positive qualities of man are being put to a serious test: his mind, character, his morality, and it we do not have any idea what kind of hero, from the viewpoint of universal human values, will emerge from our present day, whether he will be able to cope with the material side of life, with the problem of survival. Therefore, I think that it is premature to raise the question of a positive hero. We can only speak only about a hero of our times precisely in the terms used by the genius Lermontov. In the process of intellectual formation, it is necessary to comprehend many things anew, just as it is necessary to cancel out many things, also anew.

[Sinenko] Literary surveys of recent years unfailingly make reference to a certain poverty—especially against the background of the books that have been returned to circulation—in the achievements of modern literature. Is it possible that perestroika, which we describe as revolutionary, is not inspiring writers, is not providing them the material they need? Our readers are interested in how it is for writers of the older generation to work under the new conditions.

[Zalygin] The events of the October revolution were reflected rather rapidly in literature. Vsevolod Ivanov, Zazubrin, Mayakovskiy, Sholokhov—this list can go on. I think that we too, the participants in today's events, will be of great interest to our heirs. But not even God knows how interesting or, much less, how significant. A "revolution from above" such as ours has never occurred in the history of mankind. Here is only one question for the contemplative artist-student: How will the bureaucracy be written into the expanding democratic forms? Is this possible at all? This is indeed a process that is political, as well as economic, and moral, and emotional, and aesthetic—whatever you wish. Its participants are real people. It would seem appropriate to take it, study it, and write. But, unfortunately, in my view, no literary style has not been found that is capable of artistically expressing our contemporary social life.

What is the style of Gorkiy, the style of Sholokhov, the style of Tolstoy? Each was born from within his own particular way of life and gave expression precisely to this, not to some other life. We say "War and Peace," but we could say it differently—"War and the Family"—because the style of Tolstoy, this is the style of the noble country estate. All the heroes are bound by family relations, but not in our present-day understanding of the family. The family for Tolstoy was an expression of spirituality and even of the very means of people's existence. Let me pose a question: What kind of way of life do we have today? This is not easy to answer. Way of life—this is also a sense of my today within my yesterday and tomorrow. And we are still only beginning to get a feel of our relationship both to the past and to the future.

Yes, and to the present as well. There have been a great many developments but no surviving way of life. You would not write about the present day in the style of Tolstoy. Something new has to be born. One could place great hopes in Shukshin, with his view and understanding of life that contained both a traditional populism [narodnost] and a modern eventfulness [sobytynost]. He, in my view, was close to a kind of discovery of a new style.

How is for the older generation to work? I will speak about myself. At 72 years of age, I assumed direction of this journal. Why should I do this? There was both a civic and a creative necessity for personal participation in the restructuring of life. I still have the same feeling now. And I also think, continuing the same line of discussion, that the style being shaped by our times is very much oriented toward public and social affairs. Life is bringing literature, in its pure form, and commentary on public and social affairs closer together. The experience of a writer's participation in social perestroika will necessarily manifest itself. This is also how it was during the times of "thaw," when Tendryakov, Soloukhin, Troyepolskiy, Abramov, and others got their start in public and social affairs writing. A clean sheet of paper always provides equal opportunities to both old writers and young ones, since both the one and the other must "begin" to write in a new way about new events.

[Sinenko] It is known that Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was sent abroad in 1974, has given NOVY MIR the right to handle all his publications within the territory of the USSR. Our readers are interested in why this writer has such trust in your journal. And, second, is our readership prepared to grasp Solzhenitsyn? What will he add that is new and beyond the negative reflection of our past contained in a number of his widely publicized works in recent years?

[Zalygin] Overseas Russian literature is gradually coming to occupy a place in our culture. For such publications, we are striving to select the most significant works. However, we increasingly are feeling pressure from the emigres. They are burying us in manuscripts, demanding that they be published. Some of these writers from our country seriously believe that perestroika will not take place if their names do not appear in our journal, others proclaim they we do not have glasnost if they are not printed. But this is not a matter of a lack of glasnost, but rather of a serious selection of works. In addition, we want to participate in the literary process as such, and not to fulfill the role only of a printing press, to only reprint books that have appeared in the West. In other words, we comment upon works (let us say "Doctor Zhivago" by Boris Pasternak), we search out different versions of and amendments to them by writers ("The Trench" [Kotlovan] by A. Platonov), we do new translations (Nabokov), etc.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn is the most important phenomenon within the literature of the modern Russian emigration. The whole world knows his works and nobody



has the right to conceal them from the reader. Solzhenitsyn, is not simple to comprehend. The critic A. Latynina and I have written an article devoted to the creative work of this writer. Of course, that same "GULAG Archipelago" was read differently ten years ago than it is now. Today, indeed, we already know a good deal about the "gulags." But the fact of the matter is also that Solzhenitsyn in this work is by no means episodic—this is not a description of an event, of a fact, not a memoir, although he was present for all this. His strength lies in the fact that he is equally a fiction writer and historian, an artist and a documentalist, and most important—a thinker.

Even from the times of Tvardovskiy, Solzhenitsyn had a special relationship to NOVY MIR. I think that today also he is not indifferent to the composition of the editorial collegium with which he has dealings. This year, many journals and publishing houses with enormous circulations will print his works. But, in connection with this, the hullabaloo and speculation characteristic of those who are out hunting for "stylish" names are disturbing. I could give a whole series of examples of crude violations of Solzhenitsyn's copyrights by so-called "left-radical" publications. I very much wish I didn't have to say this, but, indeed, Solzhenitsyn is upset and is asking for protection, for the same as he is ensured in the West. But, unfortunately, far from always here with us.

[Sinenko] Letters we get from readers express the thought that our publications are more and more turning into the organs of individual persons, and not of publishing organizations. Indeed, with another head, might the face of NOVY MIR also be different?

[Zalygin] But indeed, it could not be otherwise. If it could be otherwise, I would not have taken the position of chief editor. Why should I? How this "special" kind of position is used is another matter. But now I want to share with you things that give the chief editor of NOVY MIR headaches. This year, we achieved a circulation unprecedented for our journal—2.7 million copies. Suddenly, it turned out that the "Izvestiya" publishing house was unable to provide either paper or production capacity for this circulation. While, last year, with a smaller circulation, seven printing houses in the Soviet Union did our printing for us, now three of them have received more favorable orders and have refused us. I do not know how this will end up. We are waiting for help from the government. And there is another question that seriously disturbs the collective. Altogether, including both technical and creative workers, we have 38 people in our editorial offices. Calculations show that each of them annually produces 500,000 to 600,000 rubles in net income, I stress—net income, for the state. Is there any other enterprise in the USSR that works so effectively? But, at the same time, the salary of a senior editor with 20-25 years experience ... is 180 rubles a month. No matter how hard we fight, how much we demand that the decision of the Politburo and other managing organs

about putting us on a par with party publications (or at least Komsomol ones) be carried out, the matter is not moving and, if he leaves for a young people's or some other kind of new journal with a new financial status, a worker of ours will immediately receive one-and-a-half or two-fold more pay. Rich kolkhozes, enterprises, and cooperatives, out of a love for literature, sometimes offer us large amounts of assistance, but we are somehow uncomfortable about accepting this kind of kindness. Indeed, we also work...

[Sinenko] Today, one of the most difficult and painful questions for our society is that of ethnic relations. A fear is being expressed in certain press publications that, if centrifugal forces continue to grow in the future as they have been, they can destroy the country. Your view on this problem?

[Zalygin] Of course, it would be good to look into the literature of the twenty-first century and read there what is written about our time, about us. But we cannot do this, and meanwhile all of us are immediately present at the most responsible moment in our history and are permitting ourselves to be governed by this immediacy...

I think that we have already missed too many possibilities for mutual understanding and unification... Since their place has been immediately taken by arguments in favor of disunity, we feel this stronger and stronger with every day. And there is no need to aggravate this situation over and over again. If there is indeed to be a parting, then, without putting off or dragging out the matter, go ahead and split—but on some kind of more or less mutually acceptable basis, without losing forever all those ties which have been formed between us through the centuries, ties of an economic, historic, ethnographic and, of course, cultural nature. All the more so as culture should become the very core of our new relationships with one another. Although it may very well be that, while we have been talking here, these considerations also have already become obsolete.

[Sinenko] Sergey Pavlovich, socialism is going through a period of renewal. A reader's question concerning you personally. Against the background of our economic disorder and political complexities, do you see a reason for optimism and, if so, then what is it based on?

[Zalygin] I think that necessity will force us to determine a means for our continued existence. Not talk, but the necessity of survival. It is very difficult to learn from necessity, but this is the teacher of all teachers. Incidentally, the developed capitalist countries have taken a great deal from us and have successfully exploited our experience. This shows that it is possible to borrow many things from an alternative system, and if it is possible, this means that it is all the more necessary. But, when borrowing, one must, indeed, remain oneself.

### USSR's 'Refugee' Problems Detailed

90UN0950A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Feb 90  
Second Edition p 3

[Interview with V. Buynovskiy, deputy chairman of USSR Goskomtrud, by A. Gorbato: "The Refugee: Who Will Worry About Him?"]

[Text] There are already more than 500,000 of them—people who were forced to leave their apartments and homes, discarding there everything that they had acquired, and leaving behind in their hometown their acquaintances and sometimes even their close relatives. The term that we now apply openly to them, without any quotation marks, is refugee. Once again, as frequently happens, the concept itself was revealed in all its unpleasantness earlier than we could interpret it or give it some kind of legal substantiation.

However, the phenomenon has taken on such a scope that in late January, for the first time in our country, it was necessary to create a special service to deal with public migration and resettlement. That service was formed under the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions [Goskomtrud]. Our correspondent requested V. Buynovskiy, deputy chairman of USSR Goskomtrud, to discuss its goals and tasks.

[Correspondent] First of all, Viktor Mikhaylovich, why is it that the newly created subdivision does not even contain the word "refugee" in its name? Migration and resettlement are completely ordinary situations that are by no means of an emergency nature...

[V. Buynovskiy] You may be right, but, when approving the name itself, both USSR Goskomtrud and the other departments working with this problem proceeded from the fact that in international practice the concept of "refugee" is linked with migration outside the confines of the country or state. Therefore we settled on this name. Although I think that the crux of the matter is not in the words. It is necessary first of all to understand that the new service will become the state working agency to resolve the specific problems linked with the fate of persons who were forced to leave their places of residence, and it will render practical assistance to the State Commission for Emergency Situations, of USSR Council of Ministers.

We have already completed in January the records for persons who left Azerbaijan. There are about [?80,000] of them. Almost half of them are family members of servicemen. The government instructed the appropriate departments to work with them—USSR Ministry of Defense, MVD, and KGB. The others are handled by us.

For the most part they are Armenians and Russians, but a very large number of them are also mixed families. They left or were evacuated first to Armenia or the southern parts of Russia—to Rostov, Mineralnyye Vody, Krasnodar... But the experience of recent days indicates that most of them attempt to make their way from their

places of initial evacuation to Moscow. This, naturally, creates additional complications for us. More than 90,000 refugees are currently registered in Moscow. Although a certain repeated count is possible here, since it sometimes happens that people are registered twice. Those who arrived in Moscow as early as last year register for a second, or sometimes even a third time.

[Correspondent] How can you help these people?

[V. Buynovskiy] We keep records on them, issue grants in aid (100 rubles without compensation to each), and render assistance in purchasing clothing and shoes (non-cash account for a total of 200 rubles). Finally, we find accommodations for them in trade-union and departmental boarding houses and rest homes. We have already sent there approximately 5,500 persons.

At the present time approximately 2000 refugees live in Moscow hotels and dormitories. But we ourselves realize that this figure is very understated. Many people have moved in with relatives, friends, and acquaintances. One of the reasons why people try to get to Moscow is simply that they have somewhere in Moscow with whom they can move in. The second reason, in my opinion, is that people have become accustomed to thinking that it is only here that they can resolve their problem. We have taught them that everything used to be done in Moscow, and the refugees, naturally, try to come here.

[Correspondent] I have heard that certain people have already been registered as Moscow residents and have been given apartments...

[V. Buynovskiy] Those are completely unsubstantiated rumors. It is planned to find accommodations outside of the confines of Moscow for persons who were forced to migrate. Within the next two months we shall offer jobs to all the able-bodied citizens in conformity with their occupation and specialty. They will also be offered housing, but, I repeat, not in Moscow. At the present time the requisitions are being prepared by the ministries, departments, and ispolkoms of local soviets. True, it must be stated frankly that, during the course of a year, we have already carried out that work with those who arrived previously, but the result, as a rule, is not very comforting. Many people have simply refused what was offered. Therefore I want to say frankly that the best way out is to take advantage of our assistance, rather than leaving no stone unturned in the capital.

[Correspondent] Could it be that the southerners did not like the addresses that were too far away, the severe climate of the place where you offered to send them?

[V. Buynovskiy] I hardly think so. Because now these would be basically the central regions. And, of course, not the North, not Siberia.

[Correspondent] Many people left behind them their homes, apartments, personal belongings, furniture, documents, and savings. The PRAVDA editorial office has received hundreds of letters and dozens of telephone

calls about these questions. How can people get their property or how can they receive compensation for it?

[V. Buynovskiy] That problem was recognized a year ago. And at that time USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree concerning the procedure for giving compensation for lost property to citizens who left Azerbaijan and Armenian SSR. In addition, documents of an instructive nature were issued in development of that decree, which documents defined the mechanism for compensating citizens for lost property.

It was defined that everyone has the right to complete compensation. The expenses are to be paid out of the republic budgets.

Last year that mechanism began operating. And people have begun receiving their compensation. The two neighboring republics made settlements between themselves. Currently this process must be renewed. But first of all it is necessary to create the conditions for people's security: some of them possibly with return and regain their own property, while having received full compensation for the loss of work, for forced absenteeism, or, possible, for something that has been stolen, etc. Everything was paid to those Armenian citizens who, for example, returned to Baku last year. It is more difficult for those who are outside the confines of the republic. But in this instance it is absolutely mandatory to deal with the interrepublic commission for refugees, which is headed respectively by the first deputy chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the two republics.

[Correspondent] The press has already reported that legislation concerning migration and migrants in the USSR is being prepared...

[V. Buynovskiy] Yes, this draft has been submitted to the government for review. The economic and legal departments and public organizations participated in its preparation. Consideration was also taken of worldwide experience. The law, of course, will not resolve all the problems, but it will help primarily the agencies of state authority in the outlying areas to which the people are going, to operate on a legal basis. Prior to this, everything was done on the level of instructions or various initiatives. The law will introduce order into all of this.

[Correspondent] Frequently one hears the opinion to the effect that the republics where the largest number of refugees has accumulated will have to be helped by the center. Economically, first of all. The role of the center, of course, is great, but shouldn't one divide the measure of responsibility, including material responsibility, among the republics themselves?

[V. Buynovskiy] As of today, those questions have specifically all been resolved. The USSR government has precisely defined for the republics the procedure for implementing the rights and guarantees of the citizens who have left their places of residence. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Uzbekistan, from which thousands of persons have left, must compensate all the

losses. It has also been determined at whose expense this will be done, and what conditions must be created for adaptation, for including the person in normal life. But I shall repeat once again that much depends upon the implementation of these documents. Unfortunately, for the time being, the republics themselves do not have much desire to do that which has been stipulated.

Take, for example, Azerbaijan. As long ago as the beginning of last year the administrators of Azerbaijan were told repeatedly that they could not keep people without a job in Baku.

No, they waited it out, and asked the center the question: could you build ten sovkhozes, so that we can send the people there? But that was not a matter for the center to decide. The center determines that credit, additional resources, materials, etc. would be allocated to the citizens. The land in Azerbaijan, incidentally, is free. Currently they have been given money, but many people are already saying that they will not leave Baku.

[Correspondent] With whom has the administration for migration and resettlement already begun to cooperate?

[V. Buynovskiy] We have worked out a system of relations with all the economic departments, the VTsSPS [All Union Central Council of Trade Unions], and the MVD. The public organizations and foundations are also helping actively. The state would not be able to resolve this problem without their help.

### Interethnic Marriages Compared by Republic

90UN0887A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA  
in Russian3 Feb 90 p 5

[Column by Mark Tolts under the rubric "Personal Life in the Mirror of Statistics": "Interethnic Marriages"]

[Text] Traditionally, the year before the All-Union Census, the Central Statistical Agency summarizes data on the number of marriages between representatives of different nationalities. The present materials pertain to 1988, and the preceding to 1978.

First, on how widespread interethnic marriages are on the territory of the union republics. The data pertains to the nations which have given their names to the republic: Ukrainians living in the Ukraine; Russians living in the RSFSR, and so on.

The differences are very noticeable. In the Ukraine 22.4 percent of the women and 20.9 percent of the men are uniting their lives with representatives of another nationality. The situation is about the same in Belorussia (21.7 of women and 20.1 percent of men) and in Latvia (20.1 and 19.7 percent).

In other republics the proportion of mixed marriages is lower. In the RSFSR, among Russians, 11.1 percent of women and 9.7 percent of men established interethnic families. Armenian women marry non-Armenians 0.8 percent of the time (for Armenian men, the figure is 2.3

percent). In most republics over the ten-year period the proportion of women marrying representatives of another nationality increased. Exceptions are Lithuania (in which interethnic marriages declined from 11.4 to 7.8 percent); Estonia (from 9.3 to 8.9 percent); Turkmenia (from 2.5 to 2.4 percent); and Azerbaijan (from 1.5 to 1.4 percent). This, apparently, speaks of the make-up of the population (In some republics it becomes greater and in others less uniform), and of the prevailing attitudes in society.

Members of practically all nationalities who live beyond the bounds of their own republics establish an interethnic family much more often. Throughout the country, Armenian women enter interethnic marriages almost 15 times more often than they do in Armenia (for men, 8.8 times more often). Choosing their life's companion from "outside their own" nationality are Azerbaijanis (3 times more often for women and 4 times for men); Lithuanians (1.6 and 2 times) and Estonians (1.7 and 1.8 times).

An especially characteristic trend for increased interethnic marriages is found among Russians who do not live in the RSFSR. I shall name the republics where more than half the Russian women enter interethnic marriages: Belorussia (73.4 percent), Armenia (70.6 percent), Moldavia (59.9 percent), the Ukraine (56.7 percent), Georgia (53.2 percent), and Lithuania (51.7 percent). In Belorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia and Lithuania the proportion of Russian males marrying non-Russian wives is still higher (respectively, 74.5 percent, 57.2 percent, 61.9 percent, and 56.5 percent). In Armenia (46.5 percent) and Georgia (39.6 percent)—the proportion of [Russian] men is lower. If one speaks about changes which occurred during the ten years, one would especially single out the Russians living in Georgia. In 1978 they entered into interethnic marriage much less often: both women—34.5 percent, and men—22.5 percent.

Before me is still another table: in it USSR Goskomstat shows the spread of interethnic marriages among the 18 most populous nationalities on the territory of the USSR.

In first place on this list are Germans (64.6 percent of the women and 67.6 percent of the men); next, Jews (47.6 percent and 58.3 percent); and, Tatars (42.2 percent and 40.9 percent). The latter two figures draw special attention to themselves, because ordinarily, as we have already seen, men, in this respect will behave much more aggressively, and in some cases the gap between them and the women is very large (For example, among Georgians as a whole throughout the country 17.9 percent of men enter interethnic marriages and 9.5 percent of the women). Turkmen women enter such a marriage less often than all the rest (3.9 percent), as do Uzbek men (6.6 percent).

In every region we see that there are many interethnic families (We will receive precise data when the census results are published). When the sky above us is pure and clear, this enriches our lives and adds new color to it. But when the storm clouds of interethnic friction and conflict gather, the situation of these people becomes truly

tragic. After all, it is so unnatural, it is monstrous, when a barricade of opposition threatens to cut the family house in two...

### **Georgian Census, Nationality Figures Reported**

18130077A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian  
13 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by Temur Ratiani, deputy chairman of Georgian SSR State Statistical Committee: "How Many Are We?"]

### **[Text] A Few Interesting Data Concerning Georgia and the Georgians After the All-Union Census**

As you know, the all-union census was taken in January of 1989. It should be noted first of all that it would have been very difficult for the personnel of the State Statistical Committee by themselves to carry out such a large-scale statistical undertaking, so we take this opportunity to express our thanks to all the enterprises, institutions, and individuals who played an active role in the successful completion of this nationally important undertaking. We benefited from the constant help of party and soviet organs on all levels. All aspects of this important endeavor were dealt with promptly and effectively. Consider, for example, that during the republic census we were given the temporary use of more than 3000 rooms furnished with communication equipment. Around 17,000 workers were directly involved in taking the census, while more than 40,000 persons were involved overall in the general effort.

The initial approximate results were published in the republic press on 29-30 April. Now the information is being processed by machine, an undertaking that is very labor-intensive and requires close supervision. As we have already informed readers, this time the census materials would be processed and published twice as fast as during the last census. We will try not to let interested readers down, and will keep our promise.

We are already able to supply at least some information to readers concerning the census. At the same time, we must apologize in advance for the fact that some of the information will have to be changed somewhat during the revision process.

On the basis of the January 1989 census, the population of the Georgian SSR stood at 5.443 million, a rise of 9 percent over the 1979 census. In terms of the rate of growth, Georgia is substantially surpassed by all the Moslem republics, while Moldavia, Armenia, and Lithuania have a slight advantage. The greatest growth is seen in the Tajik republic (134 percent), Uzbekistan (129 percent), while the lowest rate has occurred in the Ukraine (104 percent), Latvia (106), Belorussia (107), and so on.

The urban share of Georgia's population stood at 55.8 percent in 1989, versus 51.9 percent in 1979 and 22.3



percent in 1926. The republic now has a female population of 2.862 million (52.6 percent) and a male population of 2.581 million. Interestingly, the percentage of females has regularly exceeded that of males in the past 50 years. Their share of the republic's population stood at 50.1 percent in 1939, 53.9 percent in 1959, and 53 percent in 1970; the same ratio obtained at the time of the 1979 census.

Between the 1979 and the 1989 censuses the Georgian population grew by 110.3 percent, adding up to 3,787,400; in the USSR as a whole, the number of Georgians rose to 3.981 million. That growth rate is 111.5 percent. In terms of nationalities, seven of the union republics have better growth rates than we—all the Moslem republics, as we have said, and Armenia (113.1 percent). Especially low growth rates characterize the Estonian nation (101.6 percent), the Ukrainians (102.4), and the Belorussians (104.4).

The Georgian population has risen by 354,000 over the past 10 years. Now the Georgians' share in the republic is 70.1 percent. The Azerbaijani population has risen by 52,000 to 307,000, and now its share in the republic stands at 5.7 percent. Similar to the trend in the previous census, the Armenian population declined by 11,000; its share of the republic's population declined from 9 to 8.1 percent. There are now 437,000 Armenian citizens living in the republic. The Russian population has declined by 30,000—from 7.4 to 6.3 percent, for a total of 341,000. The republic's Greek population has risen by 5000 and now stands at 100,300; the Greeks' share of the population—1.9 percent—remains the same. Over the past decade, the Abkhazian population has increased by 10,000 for a total of 95,000. Of them, 93,000 live in the autonomous republic itself, and the Abkhazians' share of the republic's population has risen from 1.7 to 1.8 percent. The Ossetian population has risen by 4000 and now stands at 164,000. Of the Ossetians, 65,000 live within South Ossetia; their share of the republic's population, however, has declined from 3.2 to 3 percent.

In 1989 compared with 1979, the share of the native population declined in the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Republics where the native population constitutes the largest share are Armenia (93.3 percent), Azerbaijan (82.6), the Russian Federation (81.5 percent), and so on. The most deplorable situation in this regard is in Kazakhstan, where only 39.7 percent of the native population lives, Kirghizia (52.3 percent), Latvia (52.7), Estonia (61.5 percent), and so on.

Also of interest is the annual dynamic of the increase of the aforementioned nationalities within the republic's territory. From 1939 to 1989, for example, Georgians were growing by 21,333; the corresponding figures were 1995 for the Armenian population, 4960 for the Russians, and 254 for the Abkhazians, while the Azerbaijanis declined by 1723, and the Ossetians by 325.

From 1959 through 1970, Georgians had an annual increase of 45,455, Armenians increased by 672, Azerbaijanis increased by 5469, Abkhazians increased by 1325, and Ossetians by 637; the Russians declined by 1563.

From 1970 through 1979, the number of Georgians increased by 36,919, while the Azerbaijanis increased by 4678, the Abkhazians increased by 871, and the Ossetians increased by 1368. The number of Armenians declined annually by 257, while the Russians decreased by 2121.

From 1979 through 1989, Georgians increased annually at the rate of 35,438, the Azerbaijanis increased by 5175, the Abkhazians increased by 1057, and the Ossetians increased by 356. The Armenians declined by 1079, the Russians by 3044.

There are Georgians living in all the union republics, and their number has risen everywhere over the 1979 census. One exception is the Turkmen republic, where the number of Georgians has declined from 1047 to 960. The most Georgians live in the Russian Federation—130,900, the Ukraine (23,700), Belorussia (3000), Uzbekistan (4700), Kazakhstan (9500), Azerbaijan (14,000), Lithuania (600), Moldavia (1100), Latvia (1400), Kirghizia (1100), Tajikistan (900), Armenia (1400), and Estonia (600). The majority of all Georgians—95.1 percent—live in their own republic. This is a rather high figure. It is exceeded only slightly by the Lithuanians (95.3 percent). Only 67 percent of the Armenians live in their own republic, followed by the Tajiks (75.1 percent), the Belorussians (78.7), the Kazakhs (80.3), the RSFSR (82.6), and so on.

As of 1989, 193,000 Georgians lived outside the republic. This figure has shown a tendency to rise over the past 30 years. In 1959, for example, there were only 91,000 Georgians living outside the republic. By 1970 the figure had risen to 115,000, and by 1979 it stood at 137,000.

The 1989 census figures show that a certain number of the main nationality of all 15 republics have settled in every republic. Their number has risen everywhere over the past 10 years. The Lithuanians are an exception: over that period, the number of Lithuanians living outside the republic has declined from 94,900 to 71,500. The number of Estonians living in other republics has also declined from 72,000 to 64,000. At present, 25.265 million citizens of Russian nationality live outside the Russian Federation, in other union republics. Also living outside their own republics are 6.766 million Ukrainians, 2.132 million Belorussians, 2.562 million Uzbeks, 1.606 million Kazakhs, 990,000 Azerbaijanis, 144,000 Lithuanians, 564,000 Moldavians, 303,000 Kirghizians, 1.049 million Tajiks, 1.545 million Armenians, and 194,000 Turkmens.

The following datum is also certainly very interesting: there were 51.8 persons per square kilometer in Georgia in 1940, 58 in 1959, 72 in 1979, and 78.1 in 1989. In



Azerbaijan the respective figures were 37.8 in 1940, 42.7 in 1959, 69.6 in 1979, and 81.3 in 1989. In Armenia the figures were 44.3 in 1940, 59.2 in 1959, 101.7 in 1979, and 110.3 in 1989.

In 1940, there was a total of 8.206 million persons living in the territories of the three republics—44.1 per square kilometer. In 1959 the population stood at 9.505 million, with a population density of 51.1. In 1979 the respective figures were 14.071 million, with a density of 75.6; and in 1989 the population had grown to 15.769 million, with a density of 84.7. Compared with 1940, the Georgian population has increased by 151 percent, while the Armenian population has increased by 2.5 times and the Azerbaijanis have doubled. Over the past 50 years the population of the three republics has almost doubled, and the population density per square kilometer has also nearly doubled.

Another interesting datum concerns native language, which does not always coincide with a person's nationality. According to the 1989 census, 98.2 percent of the Georgians living in this country consider Georgian to be their mother tongue. The best indicator in this regard belongs to the Russians (99.8 percent), the Turkmenians (98.8), and the Uzbeks (98.3 percent); the worst indicator goes to the Belorussians (79.9 percent), the Ukrainians (81.1), and the Armenians and Moldavians (91.6 percent).

It should be pointed out that the information gathered in 1989 concerning native language is lower than it was in the 1970 and 1979 censuses.

Also of considerable interest is the knowledge of the Georgian language among representatives of other nationalities living in Georgia. For example, Georgian is spoken fluently by 43.8 percent of the Kurds (33,000 population), 36 percent of the Aisors (6200), 32.6 percent of the Ossetians (with a population of 164,000), 22.7 percent of the Russians (341,000), 20.3 percent of the Armenians (437,000), 15.4 percent of the Greeks (100,000), 9.3 percent of the Azerbaijanis (307,000), and 2.4 percent of the Abkhazians (95,000).

Russian is spoken fluently by 33.1 percent of the population that is of Georgian nationality—a figure that ranks 11th in the country. At the time of the 1979 census, this figure stood at 26.7 percent.

It should be pointed out, finally, that these population data have great potential in terms of goal-oriented management of the Georgian nation's demographic processes.

This, then, is the general state and overall picture of the population of our republic, on the basis of the information we have today.

## Review of Collection of Articles, Book on Informal Youth Groups

### Tendencies of the Development of Informal Youth Organizations

90US0538A Moscow OSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA I—PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNYY ZHURNAL) in Russian No 6, Dec 89 pp 94-107

[Review of "Neformalnyye obyedineniya molodezhi vchera, segodnya... a zavtra?" [Informal Youth Associations Yesterday, Today... and Tomorrow?]; collection of articles. Higher Komsomol School under All-Union Komsomol Central Committee. Scientific Department; Editorial board: V. V. Semenova (responsible editor), et al., Moscow, 1988, 68 pp.]

#### [Text] Spiritual Culture and Youth

89.06.034-040. Tendencies of the Development of Informal Youth Associations (Combined Review).

The authors of "Neformalnyye obyedineniya molodezhi..."—Soviet scientists who are engaged professionally in youth problems—attempted to trace the social and historical roots of the informal youth movement, and to describe the types of youth groups, the problems and contradictions of their existence today, as well as the possible prospects for their development under conditions of the democratization of Soviet society.

89.06.034. V. V. Semenova, "Roots of the Informal Movement," pp. 5-12.

The informal youth associations have as their basis several—at least three—diverse roots of formation: adolescent contact groups, the youth subculture, and the social-incentive movement.

Groups where persons of the same age can communicate with one another have arisen in the history of development of every generation of youth, beginning with the time when young people are isolated into a separate sociodemographic group within the confines of the social structure at the stage of transition from the state of childhood to the state of adulthood. According to data provided by American psychologists, failure to participate in a group of equals at the stage of entry into adult life frequently leads subsequently to lack of success in life and to deviant behavior at the more adult state (p. 6). Consequently, informal youth associations are a historically natural phenomenon. Groups spring up spontaneously. They are relatively stable and are constructed on the basis of overall age interests and their own behavior norms, and have their own organized structure of relations and, as a rule, their own informal leader.

Whereas initially these groups were based only on age and territorial considerations, with the development of society as a whole and of youth as a group in particular, there has been a differentiation of the interests of various youth groups.

Within the confines of the contact groups there appeared groups that were based on a common, single interest and that were differentiated by a higher form of organization. The leader's role is executed by the person who is most knowledgeable in the area that is of interest to all of them. In such groups there appears in each group its own system of symbols and traditions and there appear elements of its own subculture. Youth "perceives most sensitively the innovational tendencies in the development of society. This occurs by virtue of the fact that youth, in its existence, relies not only and not so much on the standards of the past as on the standards of the future society" (p. 7). It is historically nature, V. Semenova emphasizes, that the youth groupings always have in the center of their interests fashionable culturological tendencies, which are relatively stable within each generation and which gradually become an element of the traditional culture of the adult society. "Present-day youth interests, that are grouped basically around rock 'n roll and sports, on the one hand, are a manifestation of the youth subculture, and, on the other hand, are a tendency toward the development of social cultural interests as a whole" (p. 8). At the present time, when Soviet rock "has come up from underground," there has been a weakening of its pro-Western orientation and it "has acquired its own forms of manifestation, that surprise the West by their variety and deep content" (p. 8).

Today, the author writes, there is every reason for assuming that we are entering a period when youth is turning away from the resolution of its own purely youth problems to vitally important socioeconomic problems, to the problems of war and peace, and to ecological and antinuclear problems; the generational self-identification is shifting into the background as compared with the awareness of youth's commonality with the class and with society as a whole, with problems pertaining to humanity as a whole. In the sphere of informal youth associations, this process expresses itself in the formation of social-initiative groups, and also the formation of as yet small groups with a sociopolitical orientation, a situation that has its own objective reasons.

Youth at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's proved to be actually torn away from the traditional types of sociopolitical participation. According to 1985 statistics, only 3 percent of young workers were in managerial positions. The absence in society of a mechanism for the social protection of youth has led to a situation in which young people proved first of all to be the "victims of unsubstantiated accusations and judicial errors in the law-enforcement agencies... There was a constant decline in the prestige of youth in society. Youth was perceived as a labor resource that was suitable for the less attractive jobs under emergency conditions" (p. 10).

Youth's needs for sociopolitical participation could not be satisfied within the confines of the official institutions and its sociopolitical potential built up in the informal associations. Despite the generally accepted opinion, the author feels that the most active young people enter the informal associations. According to a study in the city of

Elektrostal (Moscow Oblast), among the "ordinary" youth only 4 percent plan in the future to take active part in social life, but among the members of informal groups, 33 percent plan to do so (p. 10). According to the author, this attests to the fact that the informal associations are at the present time a form in which the youth can realize its social potential and its striving for democracy, which is not yet realizable in other forms.

As a result of her sociohistorical analysis of the functioning and development of informal youth associations, the author comes to the conclusion that there exists a definite hierarchy in their development from the more simple to the more complex, from a small group formed on the basis of formal demographic and territorial characteristics to organizations having a complicated structure of goals and hierarchy of connections. The promotion of youth along this hierarchy depends upon the level of the social development of society on the whole and of youth in particular.

89.06.035. M. N. Topalov, "Tendencies in the Existence and Development of Informal Youth Associations at the Present-Day Stage," pp. 13-25.

The stagnation in our country's development had an effect not only upon all spheres of social life, but also upon all social groups, and that stagnation had an especially morbid effect on youth.

The rupture between slogans and social practice caused some young people to feel alienated from social organizations, to feel a distrust toward the social sciences as a whole, and a lack of belief in the possibility of their own participation in the social processes. The sociopolitical activity of youth in the 1970's and early 1980's could manifest itself only in the sphere of Komsomol work and it constituted not creative and socially beneficial labor in the political-ideological spheres, but only participation for show and for paper-shuffling purposes. The alienation and other negative processes exerted an influence upon subdividing the youth by their type of social participation: some young people, valuing their career, took the conformist path; others removed themselves from social life, confining themselves entirely to their own narrow little world; and still others began to gather into informal (spontaneous) associations (NOM).

According to data provided by sociological research, questionnaires, observations, interviews, etc., in the typical medium-sized and major cities in the European part of RSFSR and, presumably, the country, the author writes, the number of young people who consider themselves to be participants in informal associations of all kinds is 10-13 percent; those who do not consider themselves to be participants in them, but who regularly spend their time there, 40-50 percent; and the remaining ones are sympathetic (p. 15).

According to the directions in social activity, the author arbitrarily divides them into positively directed, neutral, and negatively directed; to a large extent this depends upon the personality of the group's leader. Informal

groups with a criminal directedness appear chiefly in regions where the illegal criminal groupings among adults are strong, and their influence determines the directedness of the informal youth associations. This kind of situation has developed in Kazan and in Lyubertsy, Moscow Oblast.

The author feels that, although the number of groups that identify themselves as being asocial, such as the "Nazis," is insignificant, their activities require the state to take action to discontinue them. According to types of activity, the informal youth groups can be subdivided into:

- 1) groups with an orientation toward culture and recreation: modern young people's music; and toward sports and technology (motorcycle rockers, etc.);
- 2) groups with an alternative way of life: mystically religious, hippies, etc.;
- 3) social-initiative groups (ecologists, groups for the preservation and protection of monuments);
- 4) sociopolitical groups.

Speaking of the social essence of the informal associations, one can note that their basic feature at the present stage of development is their activity and their social ties "along the horizontal" (that is, their noninclusion in the hierarchical "vertical" structure of society). The author feels that this state of theirs is an intermediate one in the political system of any society (p. 23). It is obvious that most of the groups will engage more and more in institutional, but not formalized types of sociopolitical activity, at first "along the horizontal" and then "along the vertical." An actual confirmation of this is the recommendation that has been made and that has been supported by the majority of the spontaneous groups and associations with a sociopolitical directedness—the recommendation to prepare a legislative bill governing spontaneous associations—and the striving by a number of groups to obtain the status of officially recognized groups, that is, to obtain a permanent place of location, to register officially the rules and programs that have been created by many groups, to conform membership by the collection of membership dues, to possess a material base and financial independence, and to realize the socially significant goals and tasks in their activity that have developed by those groups and associations, including those in the sociopolitical sphere, as, for example, the Kosmos [Space] association (p. 23).

The participants in these spontaneous associations attempt to make their contribution to the development of various aspects of social life and in this respect the CPSU views the activities of such associations as one of the concrete manifestations of socialist democratism.

Actually a process of youth's return to active participation in the sociopolitical sphere is under way, but it is occurring along a new path, by new methods and forms—"from below."

89.06.036. I. N. Andreyeva, L. G. Novikova, "Subcultural Dominants of Untraditional Forms of Youth Behavior," pp. 26-34.

"The process of democratization that is under way in our country has thrown light upon a series of problems linked with forms of youth behavior that are incorrect for mass awareness." However, the author is discussing the sociocultural process that occurs in all the industrially developed countries, the causes of which lie in the specific conditions for the socialization of youth, that are linked with present-day technological civilization. At the same time, in each society there also operate specific factors that determine the specific forms of youth activity. "The formation of the well-rounded individual is possible only if there is a field of alternative variants of behavior from which the individual is free to choose whichever one he wants for himself" (p. 28). A society with well developed democratic traditions presents the individual with the opportunity to "reselect" various models of social behavior, by monitoring only the final result of his search. But in our society, "over a prolonged period of time, official ideology gave as the standard only one model of behavior" (p. 28).

Under these conditions, which sharply limit the freedom of individual and collective choice, youth has proven to be squeezed out onto the periphery of social life, into the sphere of amusements and leisure. During the long years of "stagnation," youth's orientation toward realizing itself primarily in leisure forms of activity took on a stable and traditional nature, by virtue of which it continues to predominate even now, when many social bans have already been removed.

It must be emphasized, the authors write, that the subculture participation of youth is the "prerogative" of large cities. The mass migration of the rural population into the cities, a migration that continues to this day, is not simply the changing of one's place of residence, but the changing of one's way of life, and, consequently, the serious restructuring of a person's consciousness, in particular his value structure.

A person's migration from the village to the city changes his way of life. He genuinely attempts to be a "real" citydweller, but his "ancestral" consciousness is influenced by stereotypes and by the values of "village" culture. This marginal nature—the contradictory coexistence of both types of culture—necessarily leads to the replacement of the lost genuineness of the "village" culture by a simulation of the "city"-type values.

It is natural that the young representatives of the "marginal" culture unite around those types of activity that, on the basis of the "external data," best express their state of belonging to the city, but certain of them are not linked with the development of individuality or the personality. Therefore they are so attentive to substantive symbolism: leather jackets, chains, sports caps, apparatus, etc.; and they simultaneously demonstrate an astonishing poverty of esthetic tastes and evaluations.

They do what "everyone else" is doing. An aware, reflexive attitude toward themselves and to their actions is not formed in them. But by simulating the substantive symbols of "urban culture," the marginal individuals feel that the genuine values expressed by those symbols are "hidden" from them. Hence their aggressiveness both toward the values themselves and to their carriers.

When speaking about various subcultural groupings, it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that their isolation is to a certain degree arbitrary, inasmuch as, first of all, they are not separated from one another by a "wall of China" so that the heavy metallists include abusers of toxic substances (31.3 percent), and among the addicts include prostitutes who earn in this manner the money that they need for narcotics (16.9 percent) (p. 33).

On the whole the empirical data, the authors write, make it possible to speak of a number of subcultural youth groups that are formed on various kinds of social base and that possess a different social directedness.

89.06.037. G. M. Vokhmintseva, "Informal Associations and Agencies of Administration: Dynamics of Relations," pp. 35-44.

Informal associations, movements, and civic initiatives are an extremely dynamic phenomenon, unlike the administrative system, which represents a clearly centralized and bureaucratized administrative structure with a rigid hierarchy, subordination of the low-level entities to the superior ones, etc., with a definite type of personality of administration that has found itself in a complicated situation as a result of the increasingly critical nature of the mass media and the sharply increasing participation of the masses.

Because of the lack of any overall strategy in the work performed by the administrative agencies with spontaneous initiatives, they use a rather primitive set of measures to discredit the movement: the division of associations into "good" ones and "bad" ones, "work with the leaders" (both the discrediting of the leader, and the tactics of using promises and indulgences), the application of pressure, and summonses to appear before them. But the practice of "mass entrances" of trained propagandists at rallies demonstrates their complete insolvency.

The representatives of the apparatus who operate most successfully with the informal organizations are "recruited," as a rule, from the "new generation" of administrative workers who entered the apparatus immediately, without moving up the hierarchical ladder. But it is precisely they who find themselves in this complicated "buffer" position. On the one hand, there is pressure from the leadership, and the other, there is the problem winning the trust of the informal organizations. The activity in this area—the creation of conditions for a dialogue—is viewed by the apparatus as a retreat, and by the informal organizations as an attempt to play up to

them with the purpose of obtaining information for subsequent use to the detriment of the informal movement.

Forecasting the opportunities for the development of relations between the informal organizations and the administrative agencies, the author expresses the opinion that they are influenced by two probable directions for a change in the general political situation: the application of coercive methods to suppress the developing movement. However, the processes of change in the awareness of a considerable segment of the population are already irreversible, so that this direction is unpromising; the second direction presupposes the further development of the processes of democratization and the breaking of the administrative system in its current form. The appearance of new types of administration that are based on decentralization leads to the formation of horizontal democratic structures that participate in the administration. In this instance, the author writes, the informal civic-initiative associations become a real mechanism that provides the opportunity for expressing the interests of the minority.

The spontaneous associations, movements, and civic initiatives at the present time are the sole mechanism capable of guaranteeing the realization of the individual's rights. Because the democratic society presupposes the taking into consideration of the opinion not only of the majority, but also of the minority, and it would be inconceivable without the participation of its members from without, apart from the administrative structures. This form of activity by the members of society, a form that means monitoring from below of the carrying out of managerial functions by the administrative apparatus, is the only guarantee of the irreversibility of perestroika.

89.06.038. V. I. Chuprov, "Influence of Informal Adolescent Associations on the Process of Their Socialization," pp. 45-48.

In recent years the process of education, a process that exists on several levels and that is extremely rich in its variety of means, has begun to be reduced chiefly to mass forms of socialization, and therefore to an impersonal "influence." Recreation, amusements, entertainment measures, participation in socially beneficial labor, and even sports and the restoration of the person's health are all considered the same concept by the "educational technocrats"—means for exerting an influence. Such methods increasingly contradict the striving of young people to demonstrate their individuality.

In addition to the traditional associations based on interests chiefly in the recreational sphere (amateur singing clubs, sports and tourist groups), there has been a broader and broader development of spontaneous groups with an active social-reform directedness (the protection of the environment, the restoration of monuments of history and architecture, amateur creativity, the resurrection of handicrafts, etc.). At the same time, since they frequently do not have the opportunity to



realize themselves completely by way of the institutional forms, young people strive to find distinctively non-adult, frequently inadequate forms for self-realization in the spontaneously arising informal associations such as the hippies, fanatics, punks, rockers, heavy metallists, etc.

The direct consequence of stagnant phenomena in the socioeconomic life of our society was the appearance among some of our youth of so-called alternative groups, which represent a specific form of youth protest against negative phenomena in the life of society (the "Lyubers," "repairmen," "combat sects," etc.).

There has also been increased activity by the informal youth associations that preach refusal to take any actions, the withdrawal from reality into a search for God and into religious mysticism. The reverse side of the technocratic approach to youth was the pragmatic, instrumental approach taken by the young people themselves to society, the state, social production, and the educational system. So many informal associations are the specific reaction to the alienation of some of the young people from the traditional institutions of socialization.

Unfortunately, for a long time attempts were made to resolve these problems at the formal level, by exerting an influence on the external manifestations of the youth subculture chiefly with the use of administrative methods of a prohibitory nature, thus causing the appearance among the informal associations of groups with an asocial orientation.

The perestroika that is being carried out in our country, the policy of glasnost that has touched all spheres of social life in our society, had an immediate positive effect also in young policy. All the mass media had to do was to remove the ban on many topics that were of interest to youth, and the orientations of the informal associations began to change. Today it is no longer necessary to search for information about their idols, or to buy their photographs from speculators, because all this can be obtained from ROVESNIK magazine, etc.

89.06.039. G. N. Khokhryakov, "Informal Associations in the Mirror of the Relations Between Generations," pp. 49-54.

Young people are aware of themselves as individuals, but all of them together feel that they are a social group not only by means of the associations and the subsequent assimilation to one another, but also by means of their difference from adults. This objective process, which repeats itself from generation to generation, is that basis upon which various youth groups rest in their search for values. The process of differentiation from adults does not necessarily lead to a conflict between "fathers and children." However, the period of stagnation and inhibition in our society was characterized not only by an economic slump, but also caused a devaluation of spiritual values, thus leading to a loss of faith not only in the parents' word, but also in other no less important values.

Adults, by virtue of circumstances, either remained silent, or avoided the acute questions, or recommended to their children that they should behave "the way you're supposed to." All this aggravated the excessively regulated nature of social life, that is, by the all-encompassing regulating of social relations, and it made the informal association even more attractive for the young people.

Democracy and glasnost require, first of all, patience. They have provided not only the opportunity to find out about the informal associations, but also, to a certain extent, have promoted and continue to promote their existence. The members of informal youth associations want the same thing that every other citizen wants: honesty, openness, access to blessings, independence, respect of his rights, opportunities to exert an influence on social life (including on the so-called extremist groups that are causing alarm). The only things that cause objections are the proposed means for achieving the goals that have been set. Therefore, the author feels, it is important to enter with youth into discussions of the most acute questions, convincing them that everyone shares the same goals in our society, but it is necessary to select carefully the means to achieve them.

During the period when our society has an acute need of participation, initiative, and a bold search, it does not have the right to fail to use them in the direction that is necessary for society, since youth is its future, which matures in the present.

89.06.040. V. F. Levicheva, "Experience of the Work Performed by Youth Unions in the Socialist Countries With Spontaneous Informal Associations," pp. 55-61.

The dynamic growth of the untraditional forms of youth participation since the beginning of the 1980's has been noted in practically all the socialist countries. Among the spontaneous (informal) youth associations one can clearly discern two poles. At one of them is the concentration of the chiefly juvenile grouping that form spontaneously around new phenomena in the area of the urban way of life, communication, and popular music (rockers, punks, heavy metallists, fanatics, pop-music fans, etc.). At the other pole are youth associations with a precisely defined, socially significant goal. The spontaneous associations of this type carry within themselves a considerable constructive potential, that can be used to convert the energy of the young generation into deeds that are vitally important for socialist society as a whole.

The author emphasizes that the totality of the reasons that promote the growth of informal associations in the socialist countries can certainly not be reduced to the purely negative circumstances that are linked with the stagnation in the work of various social organizations. The ability of youth to engage in untraditional, spontaneous forms of participation must have matured in the system of the social relations of socialism in order to manifest itself in those zones of social life where the most acute problems had accumulated.



Analyzing the status and tendencies of the development of the youth movement in the socialist countries, the author isolates the following basic areas in the activities of the informal youth groups and associations: ecological, antiwar, and peace movements; social-politics clubs and associations; spontaneous youth associations in the area of culture, recreation, and sport; charitable youth associations; religious spontaneous youth associations; and the feminist movement.

In the development of the spontaneous (informal) youth movement in the socialist countries one observes a number of common features and tendencies, the chief one of which is the orientation of the informal associations on values that pertain to humanity as a whole, values that must be taken into consideration when developing an overall concept for interaction and constructive cooperation among the youth unions and informal associations.

The most effective form of interaction among the youth unions and the informal associations that has formed at the present time is the work on specific projects that have been announced by the initiative groups. One's attention is drawn by the fact that the work performed by the youth unions in the socialist countries with the informal associations has been most fruitful when it is constructed not on the basis of the formation of any special commissions or special agencies, but as the result of the shifting of the center of gravity to discussions, rostrums, roundtables, and open auditoriums to which representatives of the press, scientists and specialists, and cultural figures are invited.

The political leadership of the youth unions can be guaranteed only by expanding their capabilities to defend and represent the interests of youth at all levels of state administration.

### Youth Associations: Real and Imagined Problems

90US0538B Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA I—PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNYI ZHURNAL) in Russian No 6, Dec 89 pp 107-111

[Review by I. A. Vinokurova of "Molodezhnyye obyedineniya: problemy istinnyye i nadumannyye" [Youth Associations: Real and Imagined Problems], by S. V. Nenashev. Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1988. 63 pp. (Perestroika: Problems, Opinions, Practice)]

[Text] 89.06.041. The author, a Leningrad journalist, using as an example the Leningrad youth associations that appeared in recent times, shows that the active participation rate of today's youth is not only a completely natural result of perestroika, but is also one of the motivating forces for the further democratization of society.

The end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987, the author writes, are a period that was marked in our country by an upsurge in the youth movement and by the growth of

various groups and associations. Young people today have started to speak out at the top of their voices about the preservation of the cultural heritage, the ecology, the need to fight for perestroika "from the bottom up," and the struggle for peace by the forces of the people's diplomacy. They started speaking, the author said, before the Soviet Cultural Foundation and the Green Peace organization were created, having decided to keep criticizing until the environmental-protection policy and the actions of city developers were subjected to criticism in party and governmental decrees.

In one of his interviews, Professor V. Yadov, vice president of the Soviet Sociological Association, said, "Until recently all the research on youth proceeded from the assumption that this was the upcoming generation that would have to be 'dragged' to independence. It is necessary to reconsider the political philosophy and the ideology of youth sociology" (p. 5). S. Nenashev categorically objects to the application of the term "informals" to the socially active groups. It would be more correct, he feels, to call them spontaneous or initiative groups.

Consciously or through ignorance, writers create the impression that young people act in a kind of "sociodemographic vacuum," and yet youth is supported by representatives of the older generations.

The people who constitute the active nucleus of youth associations are persons aged from 23 to 38 years, but that nucleus also includes people who are older than 40.

Today's youth movement is supported by those who today are called "people of the 1960's," who in the early 1960's fought for democratic reforms in society; who protested against the tearing down of the cathedral on Sennaya Ploshchad; who in 1965 organized the Rossiya club for the protection of the monuments of history and culture and the environmental-protection home guard at MGU [Moscow State University] and LGU [Leningrad State University]; etc., when participation in the environmental-protection movement was practically the sole opportunity to display social activism. They were the people who today are entering youth associations or creating their own, for example the Perestroika club (1987), which is probably the only association of professional social scientists so far in our country, etc. Groups that are engaged in environmental protection and the cultural-historical heritage are turning to them for assistance.

During the two years after the April 1986 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, approximately 30,000 spontaneous groups arose in the country. In Leningrad and the oblast, approximately 700 sprang up (p. 14). The second half of 1987 in the youth movement was marked by unsuccessful attempts to unite on a city and nationwide scale, thus emphasizing once again how varied they were (although all of them had the same goal—at least the declared goal—of fighting for democratic reforms in society).

The second reason for the striving for independence was the idea of pluralism, since it is absolutely impossible, young people feel, to concentrate any direction in one pair of hands, because the monopoly sooner or later will lead to the introduction of bureaucratic methods and to corruption within the organization.

The attempts to include the spontaneous associations in the already existing social organizations also failed to bring the expected success. Of all the newly created groups, only the BER (Public Bureau of Ecological Research) is in close contact with the official All-Russian Environmental-Protection Society (VOOP). Many of the people in BER have documents identifying them as VOOP public inspectors. This makes it possible to carry on time-responsive work to detain poachers and to draw up official documents concerning the violation of environmental-protection measures by officials. In addition, when conducting expert investigations, the bureau makes broad use of the assistance provided by specialists who are members of the Environmental-Protection Society (p. 20). The attempt to include the youth organizations in the social societies also has a grain of rationality: the influx of fresh forces could enliven their work, and would also raise youth's professional level. However, it is easy to understand youth's fears that this is only a method for "getting our hands on them."

Today the credit of trust in certain official institutions of society has been exhausted, and the school of professionalism, as many youth people feel, can turn out to be a school of bureaucracy. In addition, many initiatives simply cannot be fitted into the existing framework (political discussion clubs, groups in the area of charity or people's democracy, which the so-called Peace Watch is attempting to develop). The spectrum of the existing organizations, the author feels, should be expanded.

The most noticeable in the city is the cultural-ecological movement. The birth of the Salvation group, which is linked with mass demonstrations in front of the Delvig House in 1986 and at Angletterre in the autumn of 1987, which laid the beginning for the arising of many other cultural-ecological groups, and the ideas of creating the City Restoration Youth Center (GRMTs) (p. 24). (Editor's note: On 14 April 1988 the buro of the All-Union Komsomol Obkom approved the rules of the Leningrad

Restoration Youth Center, which will unite the efforts of the Knigolyub [Booklover's] Cooperative and restoration enthusiasts (p. 39).) The fight to preserve antiquity, in the words of Salvation's leader, has become the struggle for its own existence in the future. And in this regard it is natural, the author notes, that the city-development problems are currently attracting a large amount of youth's attention.

Another idea that deserves serious attention and assistance is the idea of the Peace Watch (March 1987). Today, the author writes, the interaction solely on the level of organizations, even such serious ones as the United Nations and Unesco, is insufficient. What is moving into the forefront is people's diplomacy, and the Peace Watch is one of its manifestations (p. 45).

Youth's greater openness, as compared with the openness of the older generations, its communicativeness, and its energy can make an important contribution to the cause of people's democracy. Leningrad's example has already been followed by Novgorod, Moscow, Minsk, Zaporozhye, Arzamas, and Kuybyshev.

In one of his interviews, I. Kon remarked that "we are all very poor at knowing how to conduct a debate, especially if the public suddenly turns into a mob... The laws of social psychology that explain the mob phenomenon are known only to a narrow circle of specialists, although it would be beneficial for everyone to know them." (p. 56). The lack of that knowledge, the author feels, can be compensated for, to a certain degree, by sincerity and honesty. However, one sometimes has to observe actions "that discredit our ideology" that are carried out by... social scientists. For example, in December 1987 at a rally organized by members of the Trust group, a social-scientist professor who had shown up "accidentally" at the square attempted unsuccessfully to switch the crowd's attention from the acute problems of our life to the violation of human rights abroad, thus causing the indignation of those present. But in ideological work, the author emphasizes, "there is no zero version. If it did not operate as a plus, then it was only as a minus" (p. 56). Youth is most sensitive to all negative phenomena—lies, social injustice, and the gap between word and deed. That is why it is youth that is winning more than anyone else from perestroika.

22161

59

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103  
5285 PORT ROYAL RD  
SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

## SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.